


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John W. Yetter



AN
ENQUIRY
INTO THE
Nature of the Human SOUL;
WHEREIN THE
Immateriality of the SOUL
Is evinced from the
PRINCIPLES
OF
REASON and PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. II.

The THIRD EDITION.

To which is added, a Complete INDEX.

Ἐγὼ δὲ τί βέλομαι; καταμαθεῖν τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ταύτη ἐπισθαί.
Epiſt.

Ζητῶ γὰρ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὑφ' ἧς εὐδείς, πώποτε ἐβλάβη.

Marc. Antonin.

LONDON:

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MDCCXLV.



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A N
E N Q U I R Y
I N T O T H E
Nature of the Human Soul.

S E C T. I.

An essay on the phænomenon of Dreaming, wherein is shewn from the INERTIA of matter, and the nature of mechanism above explained, that this appearance cannot be the effect of mechanism, or any cause working mechanically; and thence that it must be the effect of a living, designing cause. The several hypotheses for solving this appearance, mechanically, particularly examined, &c.

THE most remarkable Authors, who have asserted the materiality of the soul, have in consequence of that assertion, been solicitous to account for the phænomenon of dreaming mechanically, or so as to keep free of any living and intelligent

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gent cause; as *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, *Lucretius*, *Hobbes*; as also *Aristotle*, tho' he is not explicit as to the materiality of the soul (a), and certainly was no Atheist (b). Others,

(a) He says, it is not body, and yet cannot be without body,—Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δικεῖ μῆτε ἄνευ σώματι εἶναι, μῆτε σῶμά τι ψυχῇ· σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ, σῶμα δέ τι. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ὑπάρχει. *De Anima*, lib. 2. cap. 2. It seems then it is some power or property of body, the subject of other powers and properties. This is poor for the prince of philosophers. He comes nearer the truth in another place, as shall be observed elsewhere.

(b) He ascribes in the following comparisons *fore-sight*, *order*, *government*, and *justice* to God. καθόλου δὲ, ὅπερ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἄρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῷ δὲ κορυφαῖος, ἐν πόλει δὲ νόμος, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ δὲ ἡγεμών· τοῦτο Θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ. And to shew that the comparison comes short he adds, Πλήν παρ' ὅσον, τοῖς μὲν, καματηρὸν τὸ ἄρχειν, πολυκίνητόν τε, καὶ πολυμέριμον· τῷ δὲ ἄλυπον, ἄπονόν τε, πάσης κεχωρισμένον σωμαλικῆς ἀσθενείας· κ. τ. λ. *De Mundo* cap. ii. ubi de Deo. One might make variety of observations from this place, upon the inconsistency of the present *Aristotelian Atheist*. Nor is *Aristotle* himself (tho' no Atheist) consistent, who makes God the sole determining principle in his *incorruptible*, *ingenerable*, *necessary* world [ἐν ἀκινήτῳ γὰρ ἰδρυμένος, continues he, πάντα κινεῖ, καὶ περιάγει, ὅπως βέλλειαι, καὶ ὅπως, ἐν διαφοροῖς τε ἰδέαις καὶ φύσεσιν.] A necessarily existing world could have no determining principle of its manner of existence, no change or vicissitude in it. But all this only by the by, because

because of the inconsistency of our dreams; that is, because the visions then exhibited to the Soul, are, for the most part, not of the same nature, or in the same order of nature, with external objects; for in that, I presume, the supposed inconsistency will be found chiefly to lye; others, I say, because of this, have ascribed the perfection of rational thinking to the matter of the body, which opinion Mr. *Locke* seems to favour. And others, because these visions have no real external objects, of which they are representations, have endeavoured to maintain *that there are no such real external Objects*; at least this was the reason why the real existence of material things was first called in question, or supposed a point which might admit of dispute. These several opinions shew us, that the consideration of this subject is not foreign to the present enquiry, but falls in naturally as a part of it; and therefore may farther serve as an apology, for attempting to account for this appearance consistently with the principles before established, especially the inactivity of matter; and for endeavouring to shew that it infers none of those absurdities, with respect to the rational

nature of the soul, which are commonly urged from it ; but rather proves to us the existence of some separate immaterial agents. Those who are satisfied from what goes before, that the natural powers of matter (as they are called) and of mechanism, have been extended much too far in the solution of the phænomena of nature, or rather that there are in truth no such powers ; will readily allow that they can have no share in producing the present phænomenon : and those who still think, that *this particular appearance* of dreaming is an exception to all that has been said in the preceding part of these papers, will be best satisfied by going on to examine circumstances minutely. If indeed this be an exception to all that is said, *nothing at all is said* ; and if what has been said be solid, this, I hope ; will not be found an exception to it. However, such an intricate subject cannot be cleared up in few words ; therefore let me beg the attention, and candor of those who may have leisure to read *this part* of these papers ; otherwise reasons may be condemned before they are heard. We shall find this advantage from the *above-named Authors* having written upon
this

this subject before, that it will be the more easy to assign, and fix upon, the *symptoms*, *accidents*, and things remarkable about dreaming: and it cannot be unfair to argue from an Adversary's account of the thing in dispute. For this reason, I shall be particular in giving their sense in their own words, lest it might be thought a false gloss had been put upon them. Nor shall I always take the advantage of arguing from such pregnant instances, as *they themselves* allow to be *fact*; but reason from common and ordinary examples. The method insisted on shall be, first to give a natural solution of the appearance itself; and then to answer the objections that may be raised against it. And here all the collateral appearances that might be urged, shall be taken into consideration; and the affinity between possessing the fancy in sleep, or dreaming, and possessing it while awake, shall be remarked; as also between visions in sleep, and visions while awake, which are called apparitions; such as *Plutarch* tells us *Brutus* and *Dion* had offered to them; whose lives upon this account, among others, he compares together; observing only the philosophical consistency, without con-

tending for the reality of such relations. And, lastly, the *mechanical solutions* of this appearance, which the Authors abovementioned have given, shall be examined.

II. It hath been shewn before that the soul would never cease to exert its activity upon a rightly disposed body; unless some defect and want of reparation in the body, forced this principle of life and action to desist, and leave the material organ till the indisposition under which it labours be repaired. The circulation therefore, respiration, and all the other mechanical motions of the body remaining the same, or rather becoming more regular than formerly, by the intermission of spontaneous motion; this reparation is begun to be made by the laws of the animal œconomy, and the efficiency of a *superior Power*; and the body remains without motion or sense (*c*). *In this state,*
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(*c*) Even this shews us, that sense and life are not produceable from the mechanical motions of the body; otherwise they ought to be produced in it necessarily in sleep, as at other times; and more regularly then, being constant and mechanical as their cause, and proportionally perfect with it. Indeed I think sleep would be
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Phænomenon of Dreaming. 7

when all is at rest and silent, and the impressions on the sensory designedly sealed up from the view of the mind; it is easy, as has been observed (N^o 13. Sect. V. Vol. I.) to make new and foreign impressions on the sensory; nothing else acting upon it at the

an *impossible appearance*, if the regular motions of the animal œconomy were productive of sense and life. But see the Note (b) N^o 15. Sect. V. Vol. I. *That the soul cannot be the result of an individual disposition of matter; nor therefore of a right disposition; nor therefore, a fortiori, of a wrong disposition; nor therefore, at last, of any disposition; as also the Note at (f) N^o 17. ibid. concerning the notion of a power not permanent and inherent in any subject, but constantly generated, constantly dying, existing by momentary parts, &c.* Lucretius himself owns that the soul doth not sleep with the body, and that sleep is not an affection of the whole man, as Mr. Locke seems to think. He says,

*Nec ratione aliâ, cum somnus membra profudit,
Mens animi vigilat; nisi quòd simulacra laceffunt
Hæc eadem nostros animos, quæ, quòd vigilamus
Usque adeò certè ut videamur cernere eum, quem
Reddita vitæ jam mors, & terra potita 'st.*

Lib. IV. ver. 761.

This is remarkable enough in one who asserts *material souls*. After this, it must be in vain, one would think, for *latter Writers* to go about to deny, or diminish this appearance; as in many cases they endeavour to do.

same time. And these impressions *must be perceived*; for the soul is still active and percipient; and its perceptivity is now no other way solicited by any thing external. And the register of former impressions being sealed up from its view, these new impressions must be perceived *without memory of what hath passed before*: and therefore they must be perceived *as caused by real external objects*, such as usually make impressions upon the sensory. This seems the *rationale* of the phænomenon in general, as has been already remarked (d); and according to this, we find

(d) This, if impartially considered, seems to account naturally and fairly, for the necessary want of memory in our sleep; which is the circumstance sceptical men chiefly insist upon, as arguing the greatest imperfection in the soul; tho' I have shewn before the *wise* and *necessary* end attained by thus hindering the soul to act, either by itself, or in conjunction with the body, *in the time of sleep and rest*. Lucretius himself is far from making this an imputation on the soul. On the contrary, observing that it could never be an argument for him, he employs his whole address to make it appear consistent with a material soul. He says, immediately after the words last cited,

*Hoc ideo fieri cogit natura, quod omnes
Corporis affecti sensus per membra quiescunt,*

Nec

find such impressions are really made, and perceived *with such qualifications*; inasmuch that the soul hath little, if any cessation, at least in some persons, from such representations. *A set of new objects* is immediately presented to it, and that succeeded by *another*, and that still by *another*, with greater variety and latitude of nature, than what it perceives by the in-let of the senses; for a new creation of things, of different species, and other natures, really beyond the licence of the *Painter* or the *Poet's* imagination, is now offered to it, or forced upon it. It must be owned this is a strange phænomenon, and appears to be altogether unaccountable. *But it is a real phænomenon*; and, I think, much as I have here represented it; and certainly it *must have some real cause*. And it seems contrary to reason, that the

Nec possunt falsum veris convincere rebus.

Præterea meminisse jacet, languêque sopore,

Nec dissentit, eum mortis letique potitum

Jam pridem, quem mens vivum se cernere credit.

Lib. IV. ver. 767.

Indeed the memory was by all means to be made dependent on a corporeal sensory, to restrain the activity of the soul; that it might not become a *different person*, and that the body might have time for reparation.

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more surprizing and strange a phænomenon is, the less the cause that produces it should be, or the less worth enquiring into; though this be the general opinion in the present case.

III. In order to search out the cause and origin of *this appearance*, I shall first endeavour to shew that it is not produced by the soul itself; however some may insinuate, rather than seem quite ignorant, that it is *the sport of the sleeping fancy, the extravagance of imagination, or some such general thing*, which hath no meaning, will not bear an examination, and is in truth contradictory. The soul, as hath been shewn, is forced to abandon its working on the sensory, which is the seat of these impressions, because of the expence of animal spirits necessary to keep the former impressions patent, or to produce new ones. We know by experience, that the fatigue of continuing to do this is intolerable. The animal spirits must be recruited, and of consequence the sensory must be shut up, and the soul leave off acting upon it: and it is inconsistent to think that the soul should be forced to cease working

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ing upon the sensory this minute, and the next minute begin that work again. We are convinced from our own consciousness in this case, that the soul must finally quit all attempts of this kind, before sleep can be brought on; and yet it is often engaged in a dream before we are well fallen asleep; so that we may trace back the perceptions of the soul *in these confines between sleeping and waking*, but shall not find it designing to amuse itself, but rather *suddenly engaged* in beholding things, it knows not how. The soul, it is true, is always active and percipient, or is never without some real perception; but it is most certain it ceases to act and perceive by the body. It might as well employ itself in constant contemplation in the time of sleep, and thinking something regular and useful, as in these odd, whimsical scenes: and yet it hath been shewn above, N^o 13. Sect. V. Vol. I. that it cannot do this. Nor is the Soul indulgent to act by itself, and separately, so as to be a *different Person*, for reasons there likewise given: nor yet would this be *acting by itself*, but on the sensory. Besides, it is inconceivable what the soul could design by these extravagances,

extravagances, always deceiving, and often terrifying itself: no one can have a notion of the possibility of this. In a word, to contend that the soul may still act on the sensory, and produce those scenes of vision in it, is to forget what it was that forced it to suspend its acting on the material organ; and to suppose likewise that it would fatigue itself *madly*, without any view or purpose, when it might rather imploy itself in something profitable, or at least pleasant. These reasons, drawn from what hath been already said, seem to shew with a great deal of evidence, that the soul doth not form, and present to itself those scenes. But to proceed to others.

IV. The actions of the soul must always be accompanied with a consciousness that they are produced by it, as being effected by the will. To say the soul *acts* without *willing* the action, hath been shewn in Sect. IV. Vol. I. to be repugnant: and since *willing* is one species of consciousness, or thinking; not to be *conscious* of our own *willing*, is not to be *conscious* of our own *consciousness*. Constant action and constant thinking require constant willing :

willing: but if we could *will* constantly, without *knowing* that we *willed*, we might act and think constantly without knowing that we acted and thought, and consciousness would be a contradictory notion. Whence it is not only easy to know whether we ourselves produce an action, or some other Being, but impossible not to know it. And in the present case we have still this farther degree of certainty, that the action or effect is not produced by the soul, but by something else; because it is *forced upon the mind violently*: the mind suffers and is made uneasy by it, and would fain avoid being conscious of it, if it were in its power.

V. Now common experience assures us, that most of those representations, which are offered to the soul in sleep, are not only not produced by it, since it hath no consciousness of any act of the *will* to introduce them; but that they are *involuntarily intruded upon it*. It hears, sees, and feels objects at that time, not as it would itself, but such as they are made appear to it; and is just as passive in receiving these impressions, as it would be in receiving the like impressions from
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real external objects, by means of the senses, when broad awake; shewing as much backwardness to them, and suffering as much from them; awaking sometimes with trembling, sweating, and crying; and as much fatigued by night with such visions, as with labour and toil by day. I say, this is common experience; and there is nothing more ordinary, than to be made to fancy, immediately after we fall asleep, that we are placed on some dreadful height, or precipice, or in some slippery dangerous station, where we are in hazard of falling, or are actually *tumbling down*. The apprehensions from this visionary danger are as great as they could be from the reality of the thing represented; for the danger appears real. We awake with a start, or cry; are glad to find ourselves in safety, and the precipice vanished (e). The recovering our waking memory,

(e) *Lucretius* is full in most of these places; and at least doth not dissemble the circumstances, nor contradict the experience of mankind. At Ver. 1009. of Lib. 4. he says,

*Multi depugnant, gemitusque doloribus edunt;
Et quasi pantheræ morfu, sævique leonis
Mandantur, magnis clamoribus omnia complent.*

Multi

mory, and the reviving the real impressions from external objects, formerly lodged in the brain, disturbs these scenes; and so brings us back to our former state, and rescues us from our uneasiness (*f*). Instances of this kind are as various as frequent: sometimes we are threatened in sleep, from *a strange and*

Multi de magnis per somnum rebu' loquuntur,

Indicióque sui facti persæpe fuere :

Multi mortem obeunt; multi de montibus altis

Se quasi præcipitent ad terram corpore toto

Exterrentur, & ex somno, quasi mentibu' capti,

Vix ad se redeunt, permoti corporis æstu.

(*f*) Here I may refer to the experience of most men, if ever they were sensible of greater pleasure, than sometimes when they have awakened out of a dream, and found that it was not real. It is indeed in these cases, like awaking from misery to happiness, and from death to life. A circumstance which but ill agrees with the opinion, that the soul *forms*, and *presents* those troublesome appearances to itself. And sometimes the impressions are so lasting, and the images so lively, that it is with difficulty we can persuade ourselves, after we are awakened, that the things we saw were not real. The reason of this seems to be, that the impressions are so strong, and have so thoroughly possessed the mind with a belief of the reality of the things represented, that it is some time before they can be worn out, or the mind recover itself from the astonishment it was in.

ugly confluence of waters; sometimes from frightful and merciless animals, sometimes we are carried to desert and inhospitable places (g), or placed in other disagreeable, shocking, and unnatural circumstances. Now undoubtedly, in these and such other instances, it is absurd to say *the soul would lay a plot to frighten itself*, and then be foolishly in *real terror* with its own designs. To make this succeed, it ought to be *two distinct Beings*, each ignorant of the other's consciousness and designs; and the *whole compounded soul* be diverted with the contrivance on the one hand, and yet terrified with the execution of it on the other. These are the most common instances; there are others vastly more strange and surprizing, but equally certain: but in them all the soul must necessarily be passive and unconcerned in the production; since, that it should *act* with-

(g) *Virgil* says of *Dido*,

————— *Agit ipse furem*

In somnis ferus Æneas: semperque relinqui

Sola sibi; semper longam incommitata videtur

Ire viam, & Tyrios desertâ quærere terrâ.

Æneid. lib. IV. ver. 465.

This place hath a beauty, which nothing but the imitating nature could have given it.

out

out designing to act, or *design to act* without knowing it designed, or *know that it designed the action*, and yet be terrified at it, is inconceivable.

VI. To this may be added, that many of these scenes are above the power and workmanship of the soul itself (*b*); so that it could

(*b*) That cause which exhibits the vision to the soul in sleep, seems to have a great power over it *in other respects*. Sometimes we are made to think *that we are flying aloft in the air*; sometimes we are *struck with febleness*, that we cannot fly from an enemy, who seems to pursue us. We are *dejected, elevated, and affected all manner of ways*, which one would never ascribe to the soul itself. This is *touching* it another way than by barely exhibiting of vision. But that which is most surprizing shall be mentioned toward the end of the section.

Some of the circumstances of our dreams mentioned here, are well observed by the most natural sort of Philosophers; the *Poets*, I mean. *Homer*, speaking of *Hector's* flying before *Achilles*, and *Achilles* pursuing him, uses the following comparison.

Ὡς δ' ἐν ὄνειρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν,
 "Οὐτ' ἄρ' ὁ τὸν δύναται ὑποφύσειν, οὐδ' ὁ διώκειν"
 Ὡς ὁ τὸν οὐ δύνατο μάψαι ποσσὶν, οὐδ' ὁς ἀλύξαι.

Iliad. χ. ver. 199.

And *Tasso* after him yet more fully,

Come vede tal' her terribidi sogni

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could not produce them, though it were willing, (for those, who are for material souls, and mechanical dreams, will not, I suppose, allow that it hath greater powers and faculties then, than when awake; and those on the other side, who are for exalting the powers of the soul at that juncture, cannot expect their assertion will be allowed them, unless they could bring good proof): but omitting this, I shall only name another, and that a very satisfying consideration, which plainly shews these representations to be the work of Agents distinct from the soul: namely, That whatever part the soul itself acts, when these things are offered to it, as it always acts some part or other, either for its own relief and defence, if the object offered is uneasy, or appears to have bad designs upon it; or if pleasant and friendly, in concurring and forwarding the effect, since

*Ne' brevi sonni suoi l' Egro, ò l' Insano,
Pargli, ch' al corso avidamente agogni
Stender le membra, e che s' affanni in vano,
Che ne' maggiori sforzi, à' suoi bisogni
Non corrisponde il piè stanco, e la mano.*

*Scioglier tal' hor la lingua, e parlar vuole;
Ma non seguan la voce, ò le parole.*

Cant. 20. Stanz. 105.

it doth not lose the principle of self-preservation, or self love; I say, whatever part it acts, *it is conscious of its own acting, and that this action is of its own willing and production.*

And the memory of its acting thus, in resisting or concurring, it distinctly retains afterward, when awakened. Thus if we dream that we are conversing with any person, or doing any thing with them in consequence of that conversation; we are conscious enough what sentences in the conversation we ourselves speak, and what actions we do: and there is the same distinction and difference of consciousness, betwixt *our* words and actions, and *theirs*, as if the whole transaction had passed between *them* and *us* while we were awake. This shews us clearly, I conceive, that the soul is not the productive cause, in contriving and offering these scenes first to itself. Indeed it would be a slippery principle to allow, that in sleep *the soul acted both parts, while it were only conscious that it acted but one*: the notion of consciousness would be rendered inconsistent, as I said just now; or the certainty of consciousness and intuition would, I think, be invalidated: the case might be translated to our waking

thoughts, and something more urged, than D. *Berkley* hath contended for, (he allows that those Ideas, which the soul is not conscious of exciting in itself, are excited in it by *some other thing*, though not the thing that we imagine) and that kind of Scepticism called *Egomism*, would have a new argument to support it. Let reasonable Men weigh these considerations (i).

Aristotle, when he gives a definition of a dream, is very explicit in making it *only extend to what the soul is not active in*: and since he is on the other side of the question, as was said, it cannot be unfair to take his account; and really any considering person will find it to be very agreeable to nature. He makes the dream only the *φαντάσμα*, the *appearance, vision, or thing represented*, arising from the motions excited in the sensory, or brain, (k); and explains several other concomitant

(i) These considerations are suggested here, because of a doubt started against the Argument in this paragraph; of which below.

(k) Ἀλλὰ τὸ φαντάσμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων, ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν ᾗ, ᾗ καθεύδει, τῷτ' εἶναι ἐνύπνιον. lib. de insomniis, cap. 3. He hath taken pains before

concomitant circumstances, that cannot properly be called dreaming: especially this, that during such representations, *the soul hath some very right notions, and makes true conclusions*, which are not to be included in the vision, or made a distinct faculty from its waking reason (*l*): and that it proceeds so far in its exactness sometimes, as to be conscious that the things represented to it are but illusions (*m*); which it should never not do, one would think, if it produced these illusions itself. And he distinguishes the genuine operations of the soul itself, from what it is merely passive in beholding, by comparing our sleeping with our waking state; in

before to distinguish from the φαντάσμα, all circumstances that might be mistaken for it.

(*l*) In the words immediately before these last cited, having concluded——⁷Ὦν ἐδὲν ἐνύπνιον φάσειον. He adds, οὐδ' ὅσαι δὴ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γίνονται ἀληθεῖς ἔννοιαι, παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα. It would be absurd to say any thing is the vision that the soul does itself, *e. g.* To say *I dreamed that I thought* is improper, since I really thought what I thought; nor would it be less improper to say, *I dreamed that I saw*, or *that I heard*; for I had really these perceptions, though their objects did not exist externally.

(*m*) Καὶ ὅτε μὲν, ἡ δόξα λέγει ὅτι ψεῦδος τὸ ὁρώμενον, ὥσπερ ἰγρηφόρος· ὅτε δὲ, καί χεῖρα καὶ ἀκοῦσθαι τῷ φαντάσματι. Ibid. cap. 1.

which, together with our being passive in receiving the impressions of external objects through the senses, we are also active and busy in thinking of them⁽ⁿ⁾. And certainly in dreaming it is so; it is far from being true that the soul then is only percipient, exclusive of being active; for it is just as active as it would be in like circumstances, when the person is awake. Perhaps it was the consideration of its being thus busied then, that hath made some men inadvertently assert, that it produces every thing seen, or heard, in sleep, unknown to itself; having nothing readier to say. This was the *Epicurean* solution of dreams, as I shall have occasion to observe hereafter. But the difference here marked, made *Aristotle* reject that account as absurd; and although *Democritus's* εἶδωλα avoided this absurdity, yet he rejects that also for other reasons. And generally they all reject one another's accounts as unsatisfying: whence it appears there is reason for rejecting them all. Moreover, if

(n) Ἐτι παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ἐνοῦμεν ἄλλό τι, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ ἐξεγερμένῳ αἰσθανόμενοί τι· περὶ οὗ γὰρ αἰσθανόμεθα, πολλάκις καὶ διανοούμεθα τι· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα, ἐνίοτε ἄλλα ἐνοῦμεν, φαντασίη δ' ἂν τῷ τῷ τοῦ, εἰ τις προσέχῃ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ πειρᾶτο μνημονεύειν ἀναγὰς. Ibid.

as we go along, we cast our eyes upon these several particulars observed by *Aristotle*, and examine well in what the soul is only active, we shall not find it so irrational and inconsistent as is generally presumed. It is very inaccurate, to ascribe all the wild representations, that are involuntarily forced upon the soul, and which, as was said in Sect. V. Vol. I. (N^o 10 to 13.) it is under a necessity of perceiving, to the soul itself, and then insinuate that it owes the perfection of rational thinking to matter. Whereas I think it is more philosophical to say, that if the soul were not united to a material sensory, where these impressions are made, it could not have such scenes obtruded upon it: and if its activity were not clogged by the indisposition of matter, so as to hinder its bringing its past perceptions back to view, (see N^o 11 and 13. Ibid.) it would be no more liable to be imposed on then, than at other times.

VII. As these representations cannot be effected by the soul itself, because it is as undesigning, passive, and involuntary, as it could be in seeing the same disagreeable objects while awake; so they are such as re-

quire a living, designing, and intelligent cause to produce them. Thus when one dreams (still to take a common, or at least, an instance no way extraordinary) that a man pursues him with a drawn sword, and with all threatens him, in words, the sound of which he plainly hears, and the sense of which he plainly understands; it is as impossible that these impressions can be made on the sensory, and these ideas excited in the soul, by any thing but a living intelligent cause, as it is that consciousness and spontaneity should belong to any thing but such a cause. Here is *design, life, action; articulate words importing connected ideas*, and those ideas excited in the soul; and all involuntary as to it.—And now let a man think closely upon this appearance; let him try his invention to make out another cause, if he can, consistently with all that is shewn before in these papers. But let him also take this caution along with him: That philosophy doth not hinder him from finding a cause that can do more than produce the effect; though it strictly prohibits him to assign one that cannot do so much: and a free cause doth not always act to the extent of its power ;
nor

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nor will the effect appear so despicable, if narrowly examined.—The only causes (exclusive of an intelligent cause) that can be named, are either *chance*, or the *mechanism* of the Body; since it hath been shewn, that the soul itself is not this cause. But it is scarce to be supposed that any body, understanding the import of those two words, could assert that either of them was the cause of such an appearance. *Chance*, as hath been said, is only a word which we make use of, when we are ignorant of the true cause, whether intelligent or mechanical; as when an effect is produced through a train of causes too long for us to see the beginning of, or where the dependence lyes too deep for us to find out. But to suppose chance a *real, efficient cause*, or *some positive agent*, subsisting by itself, blind and unintelligent, doing it knows not what, nor how; and yet producing effects, where there is design, and an end proposed, and this end attained by just, natural, and compendious means, is to dress up a contradiction in our own mind, and to give it a name, It is not only to make the cause act above its power; but it is to feign a cause, and give

it an imaginary power, where there is none at all (o). As to the *mechanism* of the body, or any other mechanical and necessary cause, it is the most incompetent of all others. (See from N^o 12. of Sect. II. Vol. I.) This could never account for the *life*, the *action*, the *variety*, observable in the appearance of dreaming; nay for the *sentiments*, the *reasoning* in many instances. The impressions then would be determined, and invariable, without life and diversity; just the opposites of what they are. The surprizing and really endless diversity, seems designed on purpose to exclude the *fixt, unalterable measures of mechanism*: and the design, life, and spontaneity, to exclude any *blind, or surd efficient*. If mechanism could produce a consciousness and reasoning, different from that of the soul itself, as is the case where we seem to converse with others in sleep; it might produce the consciousness and reasoning in our soul: For shewing how absurd this is, how far it would put an end to all rational en-

(o) *Lucian* himself says, — Εἰμαρμένη καὶ τύχη ἀντιπέραλα, καὶ κενὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ὀνόματα, ὑπὸ βλακῶν ἀνθρώπων, τῶν φιλοσόφων, ἐπινοηθέντα. *Deor. concil.* It is true he joins in ἀρετῇ, that he may not confess a truth *gratis*.

quiries

quiries whatsoever, I refer not only to the place just before named, but to the beginning of Sect. V. Vol. I. Allow but thus much to the Sceptick, and he will defy all the Philosophers that ever lived, to establish one certain truth in philosophy, or to infer any higher cause of appearances, than what *Lucretius* has assigned. And are not men aware *how much they abet the atheistical scheme by arguing thus?* *Lucretius* was much more clear-sighted, who was justly afraid of this phænomenon. Though *mechanism* is now become a *learned word*; is it any more than only one particle of matter's being impelled by another, as they resist each of them a change of their state; and that still by another, until we come to the particle first moved? And the oftener the motion is thus communicated, the first impressed quantity of it necessarily becomes the less, if it be not kept up to the first height by an extraneous Power. And how stupendous doth the multiplicity of the action of the *first cause* appear to be, in constantly maintaining the mechanism of our bodies! If matter then cannot keep up mechanical motion in itself; can it rise to perfection infinitely excelling
both

both in degree and kind? If it were matter that spoke the threatning words in the present instance, and performed the consequent threatning gestures; that is, if it made those impressions on the sensory that excite these appearances in the soul, would he be much in the wrong, who should say, matter thought and reasoned? I rather think he would not. If we should either suppose that the *sensory* makes these impressions on itself, or that the *animal Spirits* combine to impinge on it in such order, or that the *blood*, as it circulates, stops, or accelerates itself so, as to perform all this; or lastly, that *these several things* conspire together to mimick life and spontaneous motion; in all these suppositions, every thing is *inconceivable, absurd, impossible*. It was observed before, that if the mechanism *were simple*, we should expect no great things from it; but if it be very complicated, we think it not impossible for it to become a *power* to itself: and yet this is a grievous prejudice, for all the reason is on the contrary side. A complicated piece of mechanism wants, if possible, a *power* more, as more of the impressed motion is constantly consumed. And after this
it

it can ill be alledged, that mechanism is the cause of the present appearance. And if it cannot be the effect of a cause working mechanically; it follows that it must be produced by a *living, intelligent cause*: as was asserted (*p*).

VIII. We

(*p*) I beg leave, before I proceed, to take notice here of a difficulty in my way, and the rather, as it proceeds on a common prejudice, which men are but too apt to dwell on, and take only a cursory glance of what is said against them. It is asked, “ May not a peccant or redundant fluid in the body, be the occasion of the soul’s exerting its operations in an irregular or disagreeable manner? And may not the want of what is necessary for our sustenance occasion the soul’s raising delusory scenes in the imagination? May not a hungry man dream that he eats at a full table, or a thirsty man that he drinks plentifully, without the active interposition of some separate spirit?”——A fluid, whether peccant or regular, is only a multitude of sluggish, inert particles, that cannot move themselves, or, if moved, cannot change their direction; but equally resist a change of state as well in motion, as in rest. Therefore the least approach to spontaneity cannot be expected from them. This seems decisive. *Peccancy* is but a *defect*; if a right disposition of dead particles can do nothing arising to life and action, a *wrong disposition* can much less do it. (See the Note (*b*) Sect. V. Vol. I.) That the peccancy of a fluid may be the occasion of the
foul’s

VIII. We may also be satisfied, that it is such a cause from this consideration, that if a real soul's exerting its operations, in an irregular or disagreeable manner, is an equivocal way of speaking. It may be an impediment or *hindrance* to the soul to exert its operations regularly; but it cannot be the occasion that the soul should act *without knowing that it acts*; should form a living spectre to fright and terrify itself; should pronounce words, and think another pronounced them; in short, *should not be conscious of its own consciousness*. The *blood*, the *serum*, the *brain*, the *sensory*, &c. are all but dead matter: we have seen that it requires the constant action of an immaterial power, to move them mechanically, and to keep up that motion in them. If these fluids, or fixt parts, could perform any thing above mechanism, or be the cause of the present appearance; would not the same reason, that obliged us to allow the *mechanical power*, oblige us also to allow *another spontaneous power*? If this was a just inference in a like case above (Sect. II. Vol. I.) it cannot be wrong here. There is the same reason for rejecting the living powers of dead matter, with respect to the fluids, or fixt parts of the body, as with respect to other matter. How unwillingly we quit a prejudice of an old standing! and yet, I think, it must be parted with. A plant doth not grow, a stone fall downward, without a *foreign impulse*: can matter then sport and divert itself, mimick all the appearances of life and reason, while we sleep, as *Lucretius* supposes? Or can it lay the soul under an enchantment,

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a real man, whom every one allows to be a living, intelligent cause, such as is represented

chantment, so that it should perform a thousand tricks and gambols, surprizing in all respects; and still think another cause performs all? *To be not conscious of its own consciousness*, is an undeniable contradiction; it is *to have and not to have* consciousness at the same time. Is not this a firm enough principle to build the conclusion upon, that the soul is not productive of what is obtruded upon it? It is sufficiently conscious of *resisting*, instead of *forwarding* what is thus forced upon it; lest we should say, that it may forget what passes at that time.——

But this, it is said, *is a low occupation for separate spirits to be concerned in.* But if they do perform this, who can help it? What if this be but a prejudice of ours? Hath not every the most despicable *reptile, insect, animalcule*, an immaterial soul joined to it; Is not this as low an occupation, to be confined to move *these atoms*? What if it be an occupation that requires the exertion of *much power and knowledge*? Or is there a scarcity of living immaterial Beings? Have we any other thing to prove this, than our own suppositions? Why so much *dead matter*, without *living immaterial substances* in proportion? Or are they all of equal dignity, equally highly employed? Who told us so? We should perhaps find out other business for living Beings: But we are not the contrivers in this affair, but the God of nature. Is there a necessity of interesting separate spirits in every frivolous trifling scene that is offered to the soul in sleep?

Why

sented to us in our sleep, pursued us while awake, with such a weapon in his hand and
uttering

Why not! Every scene, how frivolous and trifling soever, is a *real phænomenon* in nature, and must be produced by *some adequate cause*. Philosophy doth not regard how far appearances deviate from our rules; but considers them as they are. The necessity is, that we must ascribe this effect to *a cause that hath power to produce it*, or to *dead matter*, which we are sure hath no such power at all. Let any one chuse. This conclusion is a *consequence* of the *inactivity of matter*. Take a parallel instance. Gravity is a constant immaterial impulse exerted upon all matter fluid as well as solid. What so *trifling, frivolous, unregarded* phænomenon is there in nature, as the irregular motions and surface of running water, or of the sea waves? But let philosophy account for this, without the *constant action* of the *very first and highest* Being. It ill becomes us to set so high a value upon those beings, when the power of the highest Being is subservient to those offices in the animal œconomy which we think vilest. Or are we afraid of renouncing altogether the *active powers* of inactive matter; or of acknowledging too much life and power in nature? I am sure we shall never free our philosophy from absurdity, till we have rectified our notions in this respect. Let us reflect that *bare spontaneity* of motion is an appearance, that makes us allow an *immaterial mover* in creatures that have not the least vestige of reason in their actions. Pursue this hint. Every one will allow an extraordinary cause of some certain dreams that are monitory,

uttering such threatening words; the same, and no other impressions, would be made on

the
tory, or significant of some future event. This is right, if these instances are well vouched: but, I think, this is not so much the business of *natural Philosophy*; at least *it is not the design* of this Essay. However those who come thus far (and even *Hobbes* comes thus far, *Aristotle* farther) have got over all that is difficult; since they allow what is contended for, *in some cases*, and *at some times*. And what is *ordinary*, can as little want a sufficient cause, as what is *rare*. I own, I know nothing concerning the conditions and circumstances of these separate Agents; and I contend for no *hypothesis*. Every one may make an hypothesis for himself. Some have been made for time immemorial: men may chuse of these what pleases them best. I only contend for the agency of separate living Agents in the present phænomenon, in opposition to the powers of matter and mechanism; since the soul itself in many cases could not, and in others certainly doth not exhibit the scenes to itself; and of consequence I infer that such Agents must exist. And this by the same kind of argument, that I infer, from the appearance of gravity, that a Being must exist to give that constant impression to matter.

I cannot agree that the want of sustenance, or any other want, should be the occasion of the soul's raising delusory scenes in the imagination; though it may be the occasion of another Being's doing this. The *imagination*, if it be taken as distinct from the power of the soul itself, must be the sensory where the impressions

the sensory, and the same ideas excited in the soul, as by this visionary person in the dream.

are made. That the soul should make impressions here, to delude itself, is not to be conceived. If *imagination* be taken as something belonging to the soul; it is its own *active power* of voluntarily joining ideas together, without objects *ab extra* to cause them. That it should couple together ideas by this active power, without being conscious of its own workmanship, is as little to be conceived; and *if it were conscious of this*, the scene would not appear offered to it as real. In the example of *eating* or *drinking*, we are to distinguish with *Aristotle*, what the soul itself doth, from the *παράστασις*, or *scene exhibited*. The soul as much exerts an act of the will, to eat or drink, as it does at another time; and unless it thought the meat and drink were real, it would not exert this act of the will. This part then of exhibiting the appearance of real meat and drink to it, is the phantasm, nothing of its own production. But this is always accompanied with other *circumstances of persons, actions, &c.* that make the thing plainer. We do not dream that we simply eat and drink, without the circumstances of time, place, company [at a full table, it is said in the objection.] A late excellent Author hath well observed, that the soul would be much distressed, if it dreamed that it were always solitary and lonely in sleep. *Dido's* being alone in her last visions was an aggravation of the uneasiness. Motion then, life, action, persons, are not the effects of mechanism. And though in this instance the soul doth not resist, but concurs in
the

dream. So that we must either deny the man, who pursues us while awake, to be a living, intelligent cause; or allow the cause which excites the same ideas in our soul while we sleep, to be, at least, equally living and intelligent. For though the same effect may be produced by different causes; yet, *the effect being the same*, the causes must be equally powerful and perfect in the production of it, whatever inequality may be between them upon other accounts. If this be not so, where can we stop in doubting or denying?

IX. If we should see, while awake, the picture of a man holding a drawn sword, in a piece of arras; we should conclude, without the necessity of arguments to compel us,

the representation (which, I suppose, is the main ground of thinking it the productive cause of the whole) so that the argument in N^o 5. will not be applicable; yet there is the same difference and distinction of consciousness, betwixt what the soul itself doth, and what the persons in the vision seem to do, as between the Objector's raising the present scruple, and my endeavouring to solve it. Whence the argument in N^o 6. comes up to it. The Notion of consciousness would otherwise be confounded; and the evidence drawn from it, weakened.

that this was the work of *some Artist*, some *living, intelligent cause*, that knew how to work after his own idea, or at least after a copy set him. And if we saw farther a sentence woven, as proceeding out of the mouth of this picture, and were sure that it were of the Artist's own design and composition; we could not help concluding that he understood that language. But if it were possible for him to make his picture *move*; give it *life* and *action*; and make it *pronounce* this sentence audibly, as if the Artist himself had pronounced it; or it may be more sentences than one; and if he could so contrive, that the *motions, countenance, and these words* of the picture, should all *concur* to one uniform purpose and design, so as naturally to represent the actions, words, &c. of a living man; we should then not only conclude that the contriver of this was a living intelligent cause, but highly admire his art and skill, as far surpassing any thing we ourselves could pretend to; if not suspect that something of a supernatural Power had assisted him. Nor would it lessen the wonder of this performance, or be a reason to deny the knowledge and invention of the contriver,

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contriver, though some unthinking Peasant beheld it with as much indifference, as if there were nothing remarkable in it. This instance nearly enough resembles the case in hand, the scene of vision in our sleep. But because such appearances are frequent, we let them pass unheeded: though the intelligence, and power of the cause that produces them, is not the less, whether we consider them, or suffer them to pass without reflexion. Things that are too much above our reach, and ordinary way of thinking, generally pass as little regarded by us, as things that are trifling: witness the *wonderful power* of the Deity, constantly exerted through the material universe; the *vicissitude* of night and day, &c. An object, to engage our attention, must have something of our own *littleness* in it. And yet, which is remarkable, the generality of mankind have been led to the true cause of the phænomenon we have been considering, by hearkning to natural and unbiassed sense; while learning and philosophy have made others mistake it altogether; some without hesitation asserting contradictions, and others not gain-saying them. To refine in a plain

case, is to misapply learning. *Atheism* could never otherwise have commenced. As has been said in a like case before, when speaking of a stone's falling down to the Earth; if a man dreamt only but once a year, how much more would the rare phænomenon be attended to? The night would be expected with impatience, and all the circumstances marked with care. With how much more solicitude, may we think, do those, upon whom the sun rises after some months absence, expect the *glorious sight*, than we upon whom it rises once in twenty four hours, who neither regard the rising or setting of it? But is there any reason for this?

X. The instance above, of a man with a drawn sword, &c. which I have here pitched upon, and argued from, is plain and simple, and hath nothing in it extraordinary. Whereas almost every man's own experience will suggest to him, or his future observation will soon furnish him with examples, of seeing in his sleep more variety of circumstances, and a longer series of action than is here mentioned. And observation and experience, with reflexion on the particulars,
are

are that which will best *convince*: nor is it easy to conceive that any should want thus much experience, when the Authors who maintain mechanical dreams, and material souls, give much more surprizing instances (as will appear below) such as pleading at the bar, fighting, &c. though I designedly avoided arguing from such examples. But this instance before us, simple as it is, or though it had been more simple; nay though it had happened only to *one man*, and that but *once*; provided we could have been certain that it had happened once, and was fairly related, must justify all that is inferred from it here, or designed to be inferred. An effect, though it be *but once* produced, as certainly infers the existence of the cause that produced it, and as necessarily concludes that this cause must have had power, and perfection enough to produce it, as if it had been repeated ever so often. For if a contradiction could be *once* effected, by a cause's producing an effect above its power, nothing could hinder it from being effected *any number of times*. But as it is, such instances are numberless, and as different from each other, as the persons *to whom* they are represented,

or the times *in which* they are represented to the same person; and it is looked upon as uncommon, if the same man hath the same representation twice offered to him: a circumstance that well agrees with the cause assigned; but no way with mechanism, or any other thing that could be named. If therefore we consider the almost *infinite variety* of such scenes, which are either offered to the soul in sleep, or violently obtruded upon it; the *sentiments*, and *reason* in many of them, the *spontaneity* and *life* in most of them, insomuch that there is scarce any production in art or nature, commonly reckoned wonderful, that cannot be parallel'd in some one or other of these instances; not to mention the *deviation from the present natures of things*, which must still appear more wonderful to us, if we are right judges, as will appear by going on: and if we join all these together, we must agree, that whatever kind of reasoning, or argument, shews that the works of art are the works of living designing Beings; or even that this great frame of visible things, is the effect of a *living, intelligent, powerful cause*, will in some degree be applicable to them, to shew that
the

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the cause which produces them, must be living and intelligent (*q*); and that if these are not the effects of a cause that hath life, knowledge and contrivance, we must for ever lose the *distinction* between the actions of such a cause, and of a mechanical, necessary cause, nor pretend in any other case whatsoever, to determine by the effect, of what kind the cause is. For, as has been said, allow the Sceptick but thus much, that such an instance of life, action, and design, is effected by the *temerarious, surd jumble* of dead atoms; and he knows not how to use his advantage, if he cannot defy all the men in the world to establish upon

(*q*) It is only here meant that this argument is of the same nature, and concludes upon the same account, as the arguments *a posteriori*, for a wise and powerful cause of the visible effects in the material world; though not of the same force and conviction. And yet if it could be shewn, that but so much as the instance here assigned, were possible to be effected, without a designing, living cause, it is not conceivable that any thing could be a more *convenient* introduction to the fiercest, the Epicurean Atheism. If the principle, that the effect cannot be perfecter than its cause, could fail in this appearance of dreams, no man can tell how far it might fail in all the parts of philosophy. All truth stands, or falls together.

him

him the necessity of any wise and designing cause in nature. To apply *Galen's* reasoning, with respect to the contrivance and mechanism of the animal body, *to the present case*; What can be the effect of a cause, working with design and knowledge, if the *instance assigned above*, and numberless such others, be the effects of blind chance, or mechanical necessity? It is impossible to answer this question in either case. For the effects of the *first* must be of a quite different nature from those of the *last*: or, the effects of a living, intelligent cause must have no marks of design and contrivance in them. This is to change the natures of things; or else to speak by way of contradiction. What would one conclude (to give another very applicable parallel) if he sometimes saw a *Musician* play on an instrument; and by and by heard the same tunes, and even a greater variety of them, played over on the same instrument, when no *visible Artist* was near? The sensory is the *instrument*, which is sometimes moved by the action of external, living objects; and in darkness and silence, *the same way moved*, or with far greater latitude, and compass of notes, those objects being

being all removed. Indeed to exhibit words and sense requires by far the *most artificial touch* of musick; as to exhibit scenes of life and real motion, is the *hardest kind* of painting.

XI. This is, I think, the genuine and natural solution of this appearance; not liable to any absurdity or even difficulty, with which other methods of accounting for it are pressed; as I hope will be made appear. These seem to lye on those, who ascribe *the effects* of life and action to *dead matter*. And for this reason it is asserted, that there are living Beings existing separate from matter; that they act in that state; that they act upon the matter of our bodies, and prompt our sleeping visions. Matter, in the philosophy of many, has usurped the *power* of the living God, the *power* of the human soul, and the *power of all other living and intelligent causes*: And if reason throws it out in the two first cases, it is hard to say, why it should not in the last. It is a sluggish, inert substance in all cases equally; *inactivity*, and *resistance* to a change of its state, being inseparable from it. If once we
allow

allow of an *infinitely powerful and perfect Author* of the Universe, the very *proportion* and *reason* of things would make us vehemently suspect, that there cannot be *so much* dead substance, and *so few* living Beings created in it. All from brute-matter to the soul of Man, is a curious and wonderful scale of perfection, rising by easy steps; but, certainly, the human soul cannot be the perfectest living creature; unembodied spirits should not, one would think, make a mean part of a rational creation, but rather by much the most considerable part. It may also be supposed, that the higher orders of these Beings may be employed in things proportionable to their nature and perfections; *but not to speak more of that*, the existence of inferior species is evident, I think, from the present phænomenon. This seems the natural lesson we should draw from it; for, as was said, God and Nature do nothing for no end, or for a bad end; only to stumble men: it's an argument against Atheism, and the Atheist himself is terrified at it. Others might have reasoned on this subject from other topicks; and perhaps better: But the theory as in this Essay, is a *consequence*

quence of the *inertia* of matter, which it would have been improper to have omitted.

XII. In establishing this conclusion, *That our dreams are prompted by separate immaterial Beings*, I endeavoured previously, or by way of a *lemma*, to shew that the *φαντάσμα*, or what is properly called the vision, is not the work of the soul itself. This is thought exceptionable, and not evident enough to support the weight of such a conclusion: wherefore before I proceed farther, I shall endeavour to shew the truth of this *principle*. It is said, “ The soul itself is the productive
“ cause of all that we see in sleep, and that
“ from the change which happens to the
“ seat of memory during our sleep, we may
“ remember all the scenes of our sleeping i-
“ magination, and yet have no memory of
“ the soul’s exerting an act of the *will* to i-
“ *magine* those scenes; just as in some disor-
“ ders of the brain, the memory is entirely
“ lost as to certain past actions, and yet pre-
“ served as to others.” But, with submis-
sion, there is a great difference in these two cases; so that we cannot argue from a pa-
rity. After *these disorders* of the brain are
over,

over, we do not remember that we acted one part in a conference, and that the other was involuntarily obtruded upon us; the memory only of certain of *our* past actions is entirely lost, as is said: Whereas in dreams we clearly remember a part which *we ourselves* said or did, and as clearly remember *another different* part, which was forced upon us, or in acting which we had as little concern, as we have when another person says, or does like things to us while we are awake. And this alternate speaking and replying, or this difference, in *our* producing a part of the action, and *another Agent's* producing another part of it, is continued to some length in certain instances. Now the particular that I insist upon is, not only *that we do not remember* that we ourselves acted such a responsory or opposite part; but *that we remember the contrary*. It is one thing to remember that I said so and so to another person, not remembering the rest; and quite another to have such a clear distinction of memory as in the case before us, of what I said to him, and he to me. In the first case *there is a perfect forgetfulness of something*; and in the other, *a perfect remembrance of it*
with

with a contrary circumstance; (*viz.* that not I myself, but another person, put the question, or did the action). I wish this were taken notice of. Thus this objection supposes that the soul *forgets*, not only its past thoughts, but its *present thoughts*, and that at the very time when they are present to it; which is a direct contradiction: nay, that it may have a consciousness that its present thoughts (while present) may be the thoughts of another Being; which increases the contradiction; and because a want of memory of our past thoughts is possible, it infers that a want of consciousness of our *present thoughts* is also possible; and farther, that we may be conscious that our present thoughts are not our present thoughts, but the thoughts of another person. Hence it appears the intended parallel is quite misapplied, because the simple forgetting a thing no way comes up to that clear distinction of memory and consciousness which we have in our dreams.

XIII. All this has been pretty fully expressed in the sixth paragraph above, where I have shewn that the soul can never be said

to produce that which it is conscious another Agent produces, without ruining and confounding all the evidence of self-consciousness. But that this point may be the more attended to, I will take a particular example and reason familiarly upon it; and I shall pitch on such an instance as can be liable to no suspicion. It is known that *Cicero* was professedly an Academick; and that he wrote designedly in his treatise *de Divinatione* against this very conclusion which I maintain; and endeavoured to account for the *appearance* of dreaming the same way, as is done here in the objection. *Cicero* then being of this *doubting sect*, and writing on the opposite side of the question, tells us a dream of his own; which are circumstances, I think, that must free such an *instance* from any reasonable suspicion of *credulity*, or *unfairness* in the relation; and I shall give it in his own words. He brings in his brother *Quintus* managing the argument on the opposite part, and alledging his [*Cicero's*] dream against himself, as also another of his own [*Quintus's*]. I shall transcribe both. *Quintus* after having brought many other examples, some of which are remarkable

enough; says, *Sed quid vetera aut plura quaerimus? Sæpe tibi meum narravi: sæpe ex te somnium audiui tuum. Me, cùm Asiæ provinciæ præessem, vidisse inquiete, cùm tue quo advectus ad quandam magni fluminis ripam, provectus subitò, atque delapsus in flumen, nusquam apparuisses, me contremuisse timore perterritum: Tum te repente lætum extitisse, eodémque equo adversam ascendisse ripam, nòsque inter nos esse complexos. Facilis conjectura hujus somnii; mibique à peritis in Asiá prædictum est, fore eos eventus rerum, qui acciderunt.* This is Quintus's dream, which I shall not stay at present to argue from: any one who reads it will see the marks of involuntary representation in it, or of its being forced upon him; and consequently which of the solutions is most applicable to it. Cicero's own dream follows. *Venio nunc ad tuum* (continues Quintus.) *Audiui equidem ex te ipso: sed mihi sæpius Sallustius noster narravit; cùm in illâ fugâ, nobis gloriosâ, patriæ calamitosâ, in villâ quâdam campi Atinatis maneres, magnâmq; partem noctis vigilâsses, ad lucem denique arctè, & graviter dormire cæpisse: itaque quamquam iter instaret, te tamen silentium fieri jussisse, neque*

esse passum te excitari: cùm autem experrectus esses horâ secundâ fere, te sibi somnium narravisse: Visum tibi esse, cum in locis solis mæstus errares, C. Marium cum fascibus Laureatis quærere ex te, quid tristis esses? Cùmque tu, te tuâ patriâ vi pulsum esse dixisses, præbendisse eum dextram tuam, & bono animo te jussisse esse, Liçtorique proximo tradidisse, ut te in monumentum suum deduceret: & dixisse, in eo tibi salutem fore. Tum & se exclamasse Sallustius narrat, reditum tibi celerem, & gloriosum paratum, & Te ipsum visum somnio delectari. Nam illud mihi ipsi celeriter nuntiatum est, ut audivisses in monumento Marii de tuo reditu magnificentissimum illud S. C. esse factum, referente optimo & clarissimo viro, consule; idque frequentissimo theatro, incredibili clamore & plausu comprobatum: dixisse te, nihil illo Atinati somnio fieri posse divinius. De Divinat. lib. 1.

XIV. This is *Cicero's* dream, and as he tells it himself; whence it appears his Brother and he had often admired the particularity of it in their private discourses. For *Cicero* was prosecuted by *Clodius*, and forced to leave *Rome* in the forty-ninth year of his age,

age, to which expulsion this dream refers; and he lived fourteen or fifteen years after. And I dare say when the thing itself happened, and afterward when the consequence foretold fell out accordingly, he ascribed it to quite *another cause*, than he does now in his *academical Philosophy*. But to apply the objection above to it. Here he remembers that a question was put to him; namely, *Why he was so sad?* and who put it; and what he himself replied, *viz.* That it was *because he had been unjustly driven out of his native country*. Now if he had put this question to himself, why should he have been made believe that *Marius* put it? Or why should he remember that he made the answer *only*; and not only forget that he asked himself the question (as the objection supposes) but remember it with a quite contrary, nay with an *inconsistent* circumstance; to wit, *That another person asked it*, and not he himself, which the objection does not consider? Or what *powerful Demon* can so affect the consciousness of the soul in sleep, that it shall act two different, *and opposite* parts: and yet be not only not conscious of acting the one of them, but conscious of *not acting*

it; or of being passive, *often involuntary*, and of another Agent's producing it! This would bring in the *agency of Spirits*, in as wonderful a manner at least, as that which I contend for. No mechanical cause; nothing less than a powerful, living, designing Being, could make the soul *remember* and *forget* so rationally, in such order.—A man only forgets what it is proper he should forget, so that *two persons* may be made out of *one Agent*!—I seriously wonder how men can broach, or maintain such absurd fancies.—Or lastly, upon *Cicero's* own Principles, *That the soul itself produced the whole action*, where had been the divinity of this particular vision, which *Quintus* says he found in it? *Dixisse te, nihil illo Atinati somnio fieri posse divinius*.—To say *a dream is divine*, is to say it has a divine original: and to say *nothing could be more divine* is yet a stronger assertion of some divine power exhibited. He should, consistently with his own notions, have instantly recollected that there was *nothing new* or *surprising* here. Which shews, as I observed just now, that the pregnancy of the instance, while recent, made him forget his *acade-*

mical conclusion. Besides, *Marius* took him by the hand; bid him be of good courage; ordered one of his *Lictors* to take care of him and convey him into his own [*Marius's*] monument; and told him that his present troubles should be relieved, and he find safety there. Was all this, *the Lictor; the taking him by the hand; and the exhortation to be of better courage*, only the imposture of the soul itself to deceive itself? If at this rate we make but *one person* of *two*, there is no reason why we may not contrarily make *two* out of one, and pretend that whatever we do while awake, may still be done by one or more different Agents. And thus, as I said before, (N^o 6. and 13.) this assertion, *That the soul itself may produce what it thinks (or is conscious that) another Agent produces in sleep*, destroys the evidence of self-consciousness, which is the surest and most intuitive foundation of all our knowledge; or rather it takes away *self-consciousness* altogether, and leaves no distinction between *our own consciousness* and that of *another person*.—I think *another person* speaks or acts so and so; yet it is really *I myself* who speak and act.—Contrarily therefore, I think *I*

myself say or do such a thing; yet it may be *another person*. Thus we must not loosen the foundations of this evidence of self-consciousness in one case, and then confine the consequence of it to that case only: The contagion will spread; and the event will be putting a rod into another man's hand to chastise ourselves. If my consciousness of writing this at present, is not enough to ascertain it mine; my *not consciousness* of doing what I see another person do, is not enough to ascertain it *not mine*. Let the *Academick* see where this will end. I know the *modern Academick* hath learned to doubt, [or pretend to doubt] whether the *EGO* of this present time, be the same with the *EGO* of any past or future time (see my Lord *Shaftsbury's Characteristics*;) But the opinion asserted in the present objection goes farther, and would pretend to shew that the *EGO* and the *TU* of the present time, may both be but *one* and the *same person*. Thus *Des Cartes's principle*, *Cogito, ergo sum*, may no longer be true; for while I fancy *I think*, it may be *some other thing* that thinks, while I am not so much as existing. And all these are no more than the genuine consequences
of

of supposing that the soul may act and say in sleep, what it thinks another Being acts and says at that time : Whence the certainty of the contrary principle, established in N° 6. is fully evident.

XV. But what does *Cicero* answer to this particular instance? *Mibi* (says he) *temporibus illis multum in animo Marius versabatur, recordanti, quàm ille gravem suum casum magno animo, quàm constanti tulisset. Hanc credo causam de illo somniandi fuisse.* De Divinat. lib. 2. What a poor unsatisfying shift is this! Had he not *Camillus* and *Scipio Africanus* also in his mind? Why not have dreamed of these? especially since there was a greater affinity between his banishment and theirs, than between his and *Marius's*, who had but what he deserved; for they bore their exile with much more constancy and greatness of mind than he did. But allowing he had thought of no other banished Roman but *Marius*, was this thinking of *Marius* enough to have put words in *Marius's* mouth? to have given him life and action? to have given him such particular action; such particular words? A thousand different kinds of

action, and a thousand other forms of speech might have been imagined, all as apposite to the purpose, as those he used. And must there not be a *determining cause* assigned, which out of such a variety pitched on what was so odd? I would have this *determining cause* a little more thought of, and not passed over so lightly. Indeed *chance* is the *determining cause* in the greatest part of our philosophy; and with the assistance of that *we make any thing do any thing*. But what if he had not thought on *Marius* at all, and yet had dreamed of him? for this is a very common circumstance in our dreams. What then would have become of his *banc credo fuisse causam*? I cannot help making a reflection here, *that the Academick, (either ancient or modern) is often to be pitied, who by his principles, and to maintain the credit of never being convinced, is obliged to dispute against every thing, even the plainest truths. This is a drudgery one would not be bound to undergo, and must of course make the Academick often absurd, and sometimes perfectly ridiculous.*

XVI. As to the prophetic or monitory nature of this particular dream, I have nothing

thing to do with it ; that lies at *Cicero's* own door, who relates it as having happened to himself. (For it is he that puts these words in his brother's mouth——*Nam illud mihi ipsi celeriter nuntiatum est, ut audivisses in monumento Marii de tuo reditu magnificentissimum illud S. C. &c.*) Though I am far from thinking such instances impossible. But should he not have said something in order to have accounted for this wonderful circumstance of it ? He gives us a very singular instance from his own experience, that a thing was foretold to him in his sleep, which came to pass as it had been foretold ; and upon reflection owns *That nothing could be more a proof of something divine:* and yet after all says, *there was nothing more in it than that he was thinking on a certain person the Day before.* Was that enough to give this person a prophetical vertue ? Or to endue his own soul with a prophetical vertue ? Which soever of the two he says, provided he relates his own dream fairly, there seems to be no less a cause concerned in it, than that I contend for. If a man's own spirit is sometimes enabled to foresee things to come, I do not see how it can be affirmed
to

to be the cause of such a vision ; supposing it produced all the rest. And if it cannot produce such a vision when the event follows ; why should it produce the same, or a like vision, though the event should not follow. The event's following or its not following, hath no connexion with the physical cause of the vision ; which therefore should be the same in both cases. I am sure the assigning any less cause, than I have mentioned, infers that which would utterly confound all knowledge, and put an end to all future enquiry ; *viz.* That the effect may be every way more perfect than the cause that produced it ; of which I have said enough before. He says, *many dreams are not monitory* ; this indeed is, I think, as it should be, the cause of them being considered ; and *that in a long life he had only this one dream—Mibi quidem præter hoc Marianum, nihil sanè quod meminerim. Frustra igitur consumptæ tot noctes tam longâ in ætate.* Ibid.—What follows? Can a thing that only happens once, be without a cause? or without an adequate cause? He says of *Democritus*, upon his accounting for our dreams by *simulacra* (of which below) *Nec cognovi*

cognovi quemquam qui majori auctoritate nihil diceret. Ibid. Others will determine how far this is applicable to himself; but if what he says of his only having had this one dream be true; *Plutarch* in his life, and *Suetonius* in that of *Augustus*, makes him contrive a refined piece of flattery to make his court to *Julius Cæsar*, in telling a fictitious dream of his own concerning *Augustus*, then but a young unknown stripling. — *M. Cicero C. Cæsarem in Capitolium prosecutus, somnium pristinae noctis familiaribus forte narrabat : puerum facie liberali demissum cælo, &c.* Sueton. in *August.* cap. 49. *Plutarch* tells this dream still more circumstantially, with the consequences that followed upon it. But whether *Cicero* had really forgot this remarkable dream; or dissembles it now, in his dispute; or whether these *Writers* unjustly father it upon him, I cannot say: But it is certain these Books *de Divinatione* were written after the death of *Julius Cæsar*; that is, after the time he is said to have had this strange dream concerning *Augustus*.

XVII. There is another argument I mentioned before, against this notion that the soul

soul contrives, and presents to itself all those things we think we hear, and see done in dreams; to wit, *That it could not impose on itself by this method.* This I shall explain a little, and shew a farther reason why it is impossible: which is, That in the instance above, and others of the like nature, *it is necessary that the person's soul who dreams, (if it contrived and presented all to itself) should still be busy in forming and producing the parts of the vision all along as they succeed to each other:* just as a man, when he contrives a fable *extempore*, has his invention at work all the while, which certainly must hinder him from taking it for a true narration told by another, in which he has no other share but giving attention to what he hears, or beholding what is done in his presence. In short, it would not be enough for the soul *to make the disposition* in the beginning of the representation, and order *once for all*, such and such a scene, which should afterwards come in view successively, and of itself. It is a childish inattention to make such a supposition: the soul must all along form the transient and successive parts of the representation; as when a man repeats a
speech,

speech, he must repeat it to the last word; or if he mimicks another man's action, he must personate him to the last gesture. It is therefore neither to be supposed, that the soul should *forget this it's own constant action*, which must continue all the time of the dream; nor that it could impose on itself, while thus constantly employed: and much less could it terrify itself in good earnest, as at the presence of real danger.—*Méque contremuissè* (says *Quintus*) *timore perterritum*. — Would it not be a strange fancy, that a Poet might contrive a *Drama*, which should have a spontaneous power to exhibit itself in order, while he were ignorant of the whole contrivance, and imagined he had no other hand in it but as an idle spectator? This seems to be big with contradiction. And yet in effect the objection contains in it a no less absurd supposition. For if the soul by one simple act of the will, could produce a *series* of successive action; the things seen and heard would be what we might call *automata*, or have life and spontaneity of themselves. So necessary is it to admit of a living active principle here, that while we deny it, we are forced to suppose

pose things lifeless and inanimate, to have spontaneity and life. This is remarkably verified in *Lucretius's* account of dreams to be examined hereafter. And if we say that the soul itself continues to invent and contrive the parts of the vision, as they constantly succeed each other; it is impossible it should not be conscious of this its constant invention; or forget it, as if it were but *one transient act*. There is not a more painful act of the mind than *invention*, even while we are awake; as a late ingenious Author hath well observed: and it is certain that sleep *binders* and *deadens* the active power of the soul. Therefore, if it be a contradiction that the soul should exert this painful and laborious operation, while we are awake, and yet know nothing of it; it must be more impossible that it should perform this in sleep, with such ease, as to take all for the work of another being, as the same Writer supposes [*Spectator* 487.] This is to make a prodigious wide leap in reasoning, from one extreme to another; first to own the difficulty, and then to assert the great facility, though in more disadvantageous circumstances.

XVIII. There is still another circumstance which plainly shews, that the soul cannot contrive those things for itself which we see and hear in dreams ; *viz.* That it could not impose on itself as a *reality* then, what must appear an *impossibility* to it at all other times : and this is a quality attending many representations offered to the soul in sleep. It is in this respect our dreams are said to be *chimerical* and wild. And if this observation be just ; *the very inconsistency and wildness of our dreams agrees least with the supposition made in the objection.* Alexander the Great had a very remarkable dream of this kind, when his friend Ptolemy was wounded with a poisoned dart ; namely, That a serpent came to him with a root, or herb in its mouth ; and told him where the herb might be found, what its vertues were, and that it would save the life of his friend, &c. as is related by most Historians in the life of that Prince. Cicero himself, in the place beforementioned, takes notice of this dream, and allows it might have been such as narrated, (which is strange enough, for I am sure it by no means agrees with his solution)

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and wonders that his brother *Quintus* did not urge such a *singular instance*. Now it would shock us to hear at any other time, and while we are awake, that a serpent should speak, and that too while it held a root in its mouth. *Cicero* takes notice of this very *impossibility*, and yet owns that it might have appeared a *reality* to *Alexander*. But how could it, if *Alexander's* soul invented this absurd fancy to itself? Any one who considers will never affirm it. It is plain *Alexander's* soul must have coupled together these ideas, by the same power of imagination that a painter employs, when he paints a *Harpy*, or a *Centaur*: and therefore he could no more have been persuaded that this was a real serpent speaking to him, than a painter could think in good earnest, that the picture he had drawn was a living creature. I do not mention here the importance of what the serpent told *Alexander*, (let those who give the narration answer for that); but insist only upon the circumstance that a serpent should appear to speak to us in a dream, which certainly is no very incredible thing. *Cicero* thinks he has accounted well enough for this when he says, *Non enim*

enim audiuit ille draconem loquentem, sed visus est audire, & quidem quod majus sit, cum radicem ore teneret, locutus est; and adds, Sed nihil est magnum somnianti. But was it not enough that the serpent seemed really to speak, though it did not really speak? There is no difference between *visus est audire* and *audiuit*, as to the reality of the perception; as every one will allow. And that being so, the difficulty I insist upon is obvious: for the soul *really perceives* in dreams what must appear impossible to it at all other times. And this itself would be impossible, if the soul formed such chimæra's to itself by its own power. When he adds, *Sed nihil est magnum somnianti*, it is, I think, as if he had said, "But after all, the objects seen in dreams are so strange, that there is no accounting for them this way." Or it is tacitly owning that the solution doth not remove the difficulty of the thing pretended to be accounted for; as if I should say, it is very common to see things in dreams, which are above the energy of the soul itself, or the powers of motion and matter; for, *nihil est magnum somnianti*.

XIX. I shall leave *Cicero's* account of dreams, after observing that the motive, which seemed to hinder him from owning that separate, intelligent Beings excited our visions in sleep, and which is still a motive with most men, is not justifiable in good philosophy; it is this, That men would grow idly and foolishly superstitious, and fearful of *superior powers*, if this were owned. He says, speaking still of that dream about *Marius*, *Omniū somniorum, Quinte, una ratio est, quæ, per deos immortales, videamus ne nostrâ superstitione et depravatione superetur.* What! *Omniū somniorum*? This beseeching, without offering reasons for what he maintains, looks like begging That men would not argue from such instances as he owns to have happened to himself, for fear of certain consequences; That they would not be too difficult to be persuaded, but *wink*, and turn away their eyes at proper places. To search after, or find out the true cause of any natural appearance, need make no man superstitious, or fearful of superior powers, who hath no other reason to be afraid: and if I have another reason to be

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afraid,

afraid; what will it avail me to turn Sceptick with respect to the existence of separate, invisible Beings? If this conclude any thing, it concludes that I should turn Atheist altogether. And I find this Author saying elsewhere; *Quis enim potest, cum existimet à Deo se curari, non & dies & nocteis Divinum Numen horrere? Et, si quid adversi acciderit (quod cui non accidit?) extimescere, ne id jare evenerit.* Academic. Quæst. lib. 4. Thus we see this guilty fear drives men to hate that, which should be the only comfort of all *reasonable creatures*; to wit, that a Deity of infinite reason and perfection should govern the world. And one might carry this unpleasant remark still higher. For *Cicero* says in the words immediately before, that *Strato* relieved him from *much terror*, when he taught that God *neither made, nor took care of the world; but that surd matter did all that was done.* It is true, a little after he endeavours to bring himself off, by the *great Academical principle*, saying, “ he neither asserted to *Strato*, who denied a God; nor “ to *Lucullus*, who asserted one.” But this seems somewhat contradictory to *his being relieved of his fears.* In short, nothing should

influence our searches after truth, but the love of truth itself. *Truth can have no ill consequences, but by our own fault*; which, methinks, should take off the argument against searching out an adequate cause of the present phænomenon of dreams, from a fear lest superstition should prevail: since that can be no argument in *reason*, whatever it may be in *policy*, or in some other consideration. If we are not to enquire whether there be a variety of immaterial separate Beings in God's creation, as there is of organized bodies in the material world, lest some men should turn fanciful and superstitious; by a parity of reason, we are not to enquire whether a Being of infinite reason manages the Universe, lest unreasonable men should hate him, as being against their interests; as *Cicero* allows they will. "Men would be
" easier (says a certain great Author) if they
" were assured that they had only *mere*
" *chance* to trust to." And again, "No
" body trembles to think there should be no
" God, but rather that there should be one."
But I hope he is mistaken: and I am sure *they* apostatize from the interests of reason, and a rational nature, who had rather trust
to

to *blind chance*, than an *infinitely wise, perfect, and reasonable Being*, or tremble at the thoughts that there should be such a Being. Only the malice of an infinitely evil Being could rejoice that there were no such thing as an infinitely good one, or that infinite reason should be cut off from nature. Finally, if *superstition* be such a *dreadful evil*, the best way to guard against it is, *to search things to the bottom*, and find out their *causes* impartially; and thence to estimate the grounds of *hope* and *fear*. And, after all, it doth not appear that *chance* and *atoms*, that is, *dead matter*, and *unguided motion* is such a firm principle of security, as to find out from the principles of reason that *an infinite intelligence guides the affairs of the world*. And if an infinite intelligence guides the affairs of the world, we need not then be afraid, what, or how many creatures the world may contain.

XX. If it were material, it might be observed here, that *Cicero*, in his second Book *de Legibus*, contradicts all that he had advanced in his *Treatise de Divinatione*; though he hath spoke better sense in it upon every

other particular than that of our dreams. But he saw, and was convinced, that men would make better members of society, if they were religious, than if they were Academicks. As Philosophers he teaches men to be Scepticks, or to maintain *that truth is not to be perceived*: forgetting, or at least over-looking the inconsistency of teaching them, what by consequence he allows is against the interests of society: for certainly *practical truths* are incontestable. If it were possible that speculative and practical principles could be opposite, I should by all means close with the latter; but it is impossible they should be opposite; for *all truth* is consistent with itself, as proceeding from the same infinite Mind, where undoubtedly it is consistent. But it is long since it hath been observed of this *great Man*, that his *Academical Writings* are at variance with his other works; and that he may be confuted out of himself, and in his own words.

XXI. Thus I hope *this principle*, that the visions, or *φαντάσματα*, offered to the soul in dreams, are not the work of the soul itself, is firmly established; and that the objection

jection which supposes the contrary cannot be urged a second time, I endeavoured also in N° 7. to lay down another previous principle; to wit, That the scenes presented to the soul in sleep, in which there is so much *variety, action, and life*, nay oftentimes *speech* and *reason*, cannot be the effect of mechanism, or any cause working mechanically. This still appears to me self-evident: but an exception hath been made to it, and an hypothesis offered, in order to account for dreams *mechanically*, [as I think.] This I shall also consider, and endeavour to point out the several particulars which seem to render it inconclusive. It is said, “ Though history
“ and reason make it highly probable that
“ in some cases separate spirits act on the
“ souls of men in dreams, and at other times;
“ yet it seems more reasonable to explain the
“ common phænomena from the *union* of
“ the soul and body, and the necessary connexion
“ thence arising between ideas in the
“ mind and certain motions in the body, or
“ in those parts more immediately united to
“ the soul: That this indeed will not make
“ dreams more mechanical than the other
“ actions of external objects, or rather, than

“ the motions in the sensory on the soul ;
 “ but it makes them all proceed from one
 “ *principle* or *law*: That though there
 “ seems to be a difficulty in accounting for a
 “ train of reasoning, which is very frequently
 “ in our dreams, from this general solution;
 “ yet if what some Philosophers have said
 “ of *traces* in the sensory, be true, and the
 “ relation that may be between them, when
 “ the ideas have a connexion which may
 “ make the animal spirits flow from the one
 “ to the other; a train of ideas which may
 “ excite in us what is equivalent to a dis-
 “ course, may arise from it: That the con-
 “ fusion and incoherence of many, nay,
 “ most of our dreams, favours this account,
 “ the succession of ideas in our minds, when
 “ musing awake, is very near to this; and
 “ the phenomenon of memory may illu-
 “ strate it.”

XXII. This account is as specious as the
 hypothesis can admit of, and touches on
 every hint that may give it a remote degree
 of probability: But a wrong hypothesis
 will not bear close reasoning, nor an appli-
 cation to particular instances. Here it is
 owned,

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owned, that history and reason make it highly probable, that in some cases separate spirits act on the souls of men in dreams, and at other times. So far I think is right. But if this be allowed, it will not follow that an hypothesis which gives a contrary account of the common instances, can make them all proceed from one principle or law, as is asserted of this. Thus, unless this concession is again retracted, there must be two very different hypotheses for the solution of this phænomenon; *separate spirits* and *mechanism*: and I do not see that it can be retracted. And if there be any beauty, or philosophical simplicity, in assigning one cause for one kind of appearance; this hypothesis doth not reach that. In another case it was said, that by reducing more phænomena to one principle, cause, or instrument, the beauty of nature was set in a greater lustre. But there remains a greater difficulty, if we allow two such different causes as *separate spirits*, and *mechanism*, to excite our dreams in sleep: For what shall we make the *criterion*, or mark of distinction between the effects of the *intelligent cause*, and of *mere mechanism*? May it not appear strange to advance such a solution,

lution, as that we cannot distinguish the *one of these* from the *other*? When *history* is mentioned as affording instances of the first kind; it seems such dreams as are followed by the event, are allowed to be exhibited by separate spirits. But if one should dream *that a person came and spoke to him*, and this really happened next day; and again, if he should dream *that a person came and spoke to him*, and no such thing happened: the first of these would be the work of *intelligence*, and the other of *mechanism*; and yet the effects are equal, or both the same. And it cannot be said that this supposition is absurd, or even improbable. We have often clearer, more significant dreams, and in which more reasoning is contained, on which nothing follows, than those are in which we see something that afterward comes to pass; as I believe is consistent with the experience of most men. Thus the work of mechanism, that is, of mere matter and motion, shall be more perfect than the work of intelligence and design. I ask, if this would not make strange work in philosophy? If one should say, *All clear, reasoning visions are the work of intelligence*, and
confused

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confused ones of mechanism, or traces in the sensory; let him consider that the gradation, from clearness to confusion, is so imperceptible, that he will never be able to fix a limit this way. We allow an immaterial mover to the meanest insect that has spontaneous motion; otherwise, the gradation is so imperceptible, we should not allow one even to man. The case is the same here, I think; every thing seen which the soul doth not produce, and which matter, or signatures in it (that is, traces) could not produce, should have an immaterial mover, and this from the bare consideration of spontaneity. Hence our dreams must be all mechanical, or all immechanical. That they are all mechanical, no man will maintain; for mechanism might then have life, spontaneity and reason. And there is this farther reason why they should all be immechanical, which I mentioned before in that seventh paragraph, viz. Philosophy doth not hinder us from assigning a cause that can do more than produce the effect; but strictly prohibits us to assign one that cannot do so much: For assigning the latter would be to own the atheistical principle; which if it could be true in the least assignable instance,
the

the Atheist would gain his point universally. I wish this might be considered. If I were persuaded that the effect might have some perfection, that its cause could not communicate to it, no argument for the Being of a God would ever be able to convince me.

XXIII. It is farther to be observed, that the union of the soul to the body, which is insinuated here to be the cause of dreams, only renders them possible. If the soul, or percipient being, were not united to, and present with the sensory, any impressions made, or motions excited there, could never be perceived: the sensory, by what was said in Sect. II. Vol. I. being but dead matter. But still the *cause* that *makes* these impressions, or *excites* these motions, is wanting. There is certainly a connexion between such impressions made on the sensory, and certain ideas being excited in the soul: that is, such impressions made will excite such ideas, and no other. But pray, what is that to the purpose? Because every impression hath a *fitness* to excite such an idea, it will not follow that the idea may be excited without the impression is made. The *fitness* therefore

fore or *connexion* between the motion impressed, and the exciting such an idea, will never supply the cause that impresses the motion. This may be illustrated by a familiar comparison. When a bell hangs in an outer room, and a cord tied to it is conveyed to another place; it would not here follow that the bell could ring without a hand, because there was a *connexion* or *communication*, by means of the cord, between it and the next room. Just so, the *moving band*, I think, is wanting in this solution: But, if that *cause* which moves the sensory be allowed, it accounts for all the rest. *Union* and *connexion* of themselves are no efficient causes, and will never answer for the origin of the motion. This *solution* is indeed a general explication, how, whatever affects the sensory excites some idea or other in the soul; whether *the thing*, acting on the sensory, be some *external object* while we are awake, or *some other cause* while we sleep: but it does not account for *that thing* itself, which so affects the sensory. Or, if *union* and *connexion* supersede the necessity of such a *cause* in our dreams; why may they not in our waking ideas? And then (as Dean *Berkley* contends) there may be no *external objects*.

XXIV. It is said, “ this *solution* will not
 “ make dreams *more mechanical* than the
 “ other actions of external objects, or ra-
 “ ther than the motions in the sensory on
 “ the soul.” But I beg leave to observe that
 there is no parity, either in mechanism, or
 in any other respect, between the sensory
 (which is but *dead matter*) representing in-
 numerable *living scenes*, without the action
 of *external living objects*, and the external
 objects themselves acting on the sensory, and
 thus conveying notice to the soul. In the
 last case, the sensory is but the *medium of*
conveyance, and in the first case it should be
 the *Agent*. This makes a wide difference.
 A word might have been dropt concerning
 the cause of the motions in the sensory. I
 have shewn good reasons against *self-moving*
matter; and cannot allow it here. If the
 same motions were excited in the sensory,
 as would be if these words

[ὦ Θεμιστοκλεις, ὑστέρει κεφαλῇς λεόντων, ἵνα
 μὴ λέοντι περιπέσῃς.] (r)

(r) O *Themistocles* ! take up thy quarters short of the
 lion's-head; lest thou fall really among lions. *Plutarch*,
 in *Themist*.

were

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were pronounced while the person is awake; it is agreed on all hands, that the same ideas would be raised in the soul: but if these motions may exist in the sensory fortuitously, or without any adequate cause in dreams; then *any thing might do any thing*: or let it be shewn me where we can stop. If an *eccho* should repeat several words, which it never received, (pardon the impropriety) it would be no satisfactory account of this to say, It is the property of such and such figures, to reverberate the undulations of the air, so as to imitate articulate words, and raise the same ideas as if the words were spoke by a living person. The great question here would be, How the *eccho*, whose known property it is to convey what it *receives*, could convey what it *receives not*. The case of words in dreaming is pretty near this. And I might argue the same way as to objects of sight. If a mirrour represented images when their objects were not present; how far would it be from satisfaction to tell me, that it reflected the incident rays of light in such a manner, that all the rays proceeding from one point of the *object* concurred to form the like point of the *image*? For if

no

no object were present, there would be no *incident rays* to be reflected: so in this case, if no object acted on the sensory, no motion could be excited in it, nor idea raised.

XXV. It may perhaps be supposed, that we might trust to the circulation of the blood, or the mechanical motion of some other fluid, for doing so much as to excite these motions in the sensory. This indeed is generally supposed the cause of these motions; but I may venture to say that scarce any supposition can be more absurd. Let us first suppose these motions orderly; and, secondly, that they may be disordered. Now in the first case, no man is able to imagine that the same fluid, pursuing its own course mechanically, constantly, equally, should at this instant represent *nothing at all* by its motion; and in the twinkling of an eye, cause *a house, a field, a giant* to start up; and then a little after, things of quite a different nature. Who sees not that such a mechanical cause, if it represents things at all, *must always represent the same things*, or nearly the same; with an *even, uninterrupted tenor*; without such *long pauses, or monstrous*

strous transitions to things of opposite and contrary natures? When this is thoroughly considered, no man is able, I say, let him do what he can, to imagine it possible. Every transition must have its *determining cause*, according to all the laws of reasoning; and the wider the transition is, and the more opposite the natures of the things joined are, the farther will this appear from being the effect of a *necessary mechanical cause* to any rational Enquirer. We propose to ourselves a *frugality of causes* in the works of nature, which philosophy doth by no means countenance. *Borelli* hath shewn that nature makes use of prodigious motive power to move small weights. No change is produced in the state of matter without a *living agent*. The motion of the smallest reptile requires the power of the *First Cause*. Only here matter may change its own state, and do wonders beside! One may say indeed *that the single principle of gravitation performs all the various phænomena in the material world*. But how, I pray, doth it this? Is it not by the various, constant, universal impulse of the God of nature?

Let us in the next place imagine that the motions of the fluids in the body are disor-

dered, and thence that the motion of the animal spirits, or of any other matter we please to fancy in the body, is likewise disordered. How much is this able to perform? If *order* can do nothing, *disorder* can do less. In a regular motion of the fluids (or of any other particles of matter which they may be supposed to move) the scenes of vision should go on regularly, mechanically, constantly; and such images only should be represented whose *traces* were still in the brain, and most patent there. Now in the disordered motion of these fluids the scenes exhibited should still be *the same scenes*, but only broken and disordered. This is a just inference; yet it is far from being the case. Could the disorder of inert particles of matter, make them jump into the regular formation of something they could never otherwise have represented, so as to imitate *action*, *life*, and *even reason*? This would in effect be *Epicurus's dance of atoms*! We might as well suppose that the small particles of dust, which are carried about by the motion of the air in a sun-beam, should form of themselves the figure of a man, with life and action; as that the animal spirits, tossed either by the
regular

regular or irregular motion of a fluid, moving along its own channel, should perform such an effect. Let us remember that animal spirits, according to all the notion we have of them, are only very small particles of matter which are the immediate instruments of the will, when the soul would excite motion in any part of the body; but here they are supposed *to act of themselves* independently on the will, and contrary to it: and certainly, if they are matter at all, this is a contradictory supposition; and if they are not matter, they are *spirits* in a literal sense. It is insinuated that, *if the traces in the sensory have a relation* (which is when the ideas have a connexion) this may make the animal spirits flow from the one to the other of these traces. But I ask, *where*, or *how far* one can suppose them to flow? For *words, actions, persons* that never were heard or seen before, can have no *traces* in the sensory. Why should ideas be joined that were never joined in nature? Or why should ideas be disjoined, which have been always before presented together? If I never saw a person but once and that *on horseback*, or *sitting in his night-gown*; I must always think on him

while awake, as in that posture, or that dress. In short, if it should be said, that the reason why the animal spirits flow from one of these traces to another, is *because they are not related*, or really *not existent at all*; it would be every wit as true! We take things in the gross, and satisfy ourselves with a distant hint; but when exactly viewed, the whole scheme proves contradictory to experience.

XXVI. It is said, “ what is equivalent to a discourse, or reasoning, may arise from the flowing of the animal spirits into these traces.” But I refer to the common sense of all men, if this were the case, whether the discourse, or reasoning in the dream, should not be the same with what we had heard, or some time or other held, in our waking thoughts: or whether it is not certain, that we sometimes hear discourses, and see persons in dreams, which we never heard, and whom we never saw before. And since this cannot be denied, how shall we account for this discourse and reasoning from *mechanical motion, particles of sluggish matter, and traces or signatures* on a material organ? The attempt seems

seems desperate; and we might as well undertake to account for the formation of a world; from *atoms* and *chance*. *Reason* is the greatest perfection we can have any notion of; and a *reasoning being* is one of the highest effects infinite Power can produce. For it is one thing to make an effect according to reason; and quite another to make *such an effect* as shall be itself a *reasoning being*. And can matter and motion (that is, inert particles, moved mechanically) rise to this perfection? And no living being (neither the *soul itself*, nor *separate spirits*, nor *the Deity*) is supposed here to interfere. We may perhaps think a sentence spoken in a dream a contemptible phænomenon. But what a compass of ideas must even a single sentence include, refer to, or shew the being to be possessed of? If a person can answer *but one* question pertinently, we immediately own that he is a *thinking reasoning being*. And could animal spirits fall into their *proper order*, give themselves the due *impulse, direction, succession*, as to seem to say but thus much, *I am, O Brutus! thy evil Genius: but thou shalt see me again at Philippi?* And thus much I am sure hath been spoken to us in a

dream; whether *these words* were ever spoken or not. And if thus much had been but once spoken, it would shew that more might have been spoken. And in truth how much more is spoken to us every night? These particles of matter called *animal spirits* are indefinitely small, and incredible numbers of them must concur to produce such an effect; and every one of the particulars I just now mentioned is to be *determined*; viz. their *number, order, succession*, as to time, *impulse*, and *direction*; without any of which the effect could not be produced: and there is nothing in the supposition to *determine* these several particulars but dead matter. Whence I conclude, unless the reasoning in the first and second Sections of the first Volume is wrong, this hypothesis is demonstratively false.

XXVII. If this hypothesis were true, our dreams would have quite other circumstances and qualifications than they have. The several differences I shall here mark. First, there would be always a connexion or relation between the ideas excited in the mind in dreams; and such a connexion, and
cause

cause of transition from the one to the other, as there is while we are awake : for the ideas having been joined together while we are awake, is supposed the cause why the one should excite the other while we are asleep. But commonly there is no such connexion, and the transition is so *wild* and *arbitrary*, as surprises, and leaves us quite in the dark, how it could come about. 2. No new object could be thus offered to the soul, but such as had some time before occupied our waking thoughts. And yet in every instance it is otherwise. 3. All our dreams then ought to be according to nature, and the real existence of things from without. And yet they are *never* thus qualified ; but *persons, places, circumstances*, are quite changed. 4. The strongest ideas, and those that have been most in our thoughts of late, should always be offered to us in our dreams : for the traces of those are deepest, and most patent in the sensory. 5. The mind could never be surprised with these familiar ideas, which have been often before coupled together : and much less could it be terrified with them. 6. But chiefly there should be no diversity, or distinction of consciousness

in our dreams, as when many persons seem to act their respective parts. How could *the awakening these traces* hold conference with us; ask questions of us, and not only *personate* our acquaintance, but *strangers* also? For these traces, like a train when kindled, should run on mechanically in their own course; and not stop at proper places, and wait for a return. This is a prodigious difference, if we consider it right. It is as if I should suppose that the words of a book (which I may call traces in it) should extemporarily change themselves from the subject treated of; and become *question* and *answer*, according to whatever I should say. Lastly, if ideas excited other connected ideas, and *one trace* awakened another, according as they were related; *what should hinder us from being quite awake?* And least this *exciting* and *awakening* should go quite round, as far as there were traces thus related. And yet we see *new* and *foreign* ideas excited, while the traces of waking ideas are kept close sealed up. A man dreams that he is in new circumstances; every night; though he should necessarily dream, according to these traces, that he is in the circumstances,

in which he really is; for the traces of these are without all doubt most strongly connected in the sensory. Thus experience directly contradicts this whole affair of exciting ideas by connexion in our dreams. If this hypothesis had been applied to any one instance, where a person seems to discourse with us in our sleep, it would have appeared how insufficient it was. Let it be tried by the example of *Marius* or *Alexander* above, (N^o 13 and 18.) It is easy to make hypotheses that perform nothing.

XXVIII. The confusion and incoherence of most of our dreams, rather *disproves*, than favours this account; for as on the one hand, they could not have the *life*, *action*, and *design*, we observe in some of them; so neither on the other, could they have that extreme and monstrous opposition of ideas, observed in others of them. There would always be a relation and connexion between those ideas, according as they had been joined together, while we were awake; since this connexion is made the *formal cause* of their being stirred up. The animal spirits are but inert particles of matter, that having no spontaneity of
their

their own, to join *extremes*, and pass over *intermediate traces*. On Memory, so far as we are active, no way illustrates this solution: for here the soul is passive in all that is offered to it. When one *musés*, the soul moves its attention gradually from one object, or one idea, to another; but still with consciousness that it doth so, and according to the connexions which have been formerly made between them. There is no hurrying from one thing to another, without coherence or relation. Whence this particular illustrates the incoherence of our dreams as little. Men are not passive in *memory*, or in *musings*, but with respect to the first idea brought in view, by some external cause: in all the rest of the train, the soul is active more or less. In brutes it is otherwise. If memory could illustrate this account, or if the ideas were excited in our dreams according as they were connected at other times; then, as I have already observed, *being asleep* would very little differ from *being awake*, as to the state of our thoughts: for our waking ideas would all come in view, according to the order and clearness of these connexions. This account therefore answers

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neither for incoherent, nor any other sort of dreams. For upon this supposition a man could never have wilder dreams than his waking thoughts, or his traces could furnish him with: yet in some cases, all is enchanted and præternatural; the soul is suddenly thrown into wild and uncouth circumstances; objects are metamorphosed under the eye, which no traces in the sensory, by being awakened, could ever effect. It seems to be in the hands of a powerful Magician, who creates strange sights, and inverts nature at pleasure. This particular hath not yet been attended to: but whoever pleases to consider the whole *Appearance* at leisure, will see that the very *wildness* and *extravagancy* of our dreams, as little agrees with a mechanical cause, as the *coherent* and *rational* part of them. If this had been observed, mechanical solutions would never have been offered. And if the rational part is not the work of the soul itself, nor *the very wildest part* the work of mechanism; where shall we find *a cause* for *this effect*? For undoubtedly it must have some cause. If a man assigns any other cause, than what I have assigned above; there are such instances
at

at hand, as immediately shew the impossibility of what he asserts.

XXIX. I have been the more particular in answering these two objections, as the answers to them establish the two *principles* I had previously laid down in N^o 6 and 7; and that men may see what it is they advance, when they assign at random these causes of our sleeping visions. And since all the other hypotheses for the solution of this phænomenon of dreaming, are reducible to these two; the conclusion in N^o 11. is rendered, I presume, unexceptionable. However, that the strength of the conclusion may the better appear, I shall bring it out in another method, and by a very short and clear argument; which is this: The appearances offered to the soul in dreams, all *idle, trifling, incoherent, absurd*, as they are, must either be the work of *separate living Agents*, or the immediate effects of the GOD OF NATURE. This may surprize: yet there is no medium. For first, *chance* can do nothing in God's world. And *secondly*, whatever is performed by *mechanism*, is done with design; since matter can neither move itself, nor alter its direction,

direction, nor effect the least variation from the end proposed. *Thirdly*, no mechanism is spontaneous, or the work of *the soul* itself. *Fourthly*, God is the sole Mover in all mechanical motions, especially in the animal body. Therefore, whatever possible way dreams are produced, if the agency of separate spirits be refused, we must ascribe them to the immediate power of the Deity. Let this be considered; which, as I take it, is demonstrative, and adds a new force to all that has been said: and those who reflect on what was shewn, Sect. I and II. Vol. I. will not contest it, as being a fair consequence of the *inertia* of matter, and of the universal influence of the *first Mover* upon it.

And this conclusion is not affectation in me; for I am not able to avoid it: nor will any other man who thinks accurately, be able to avoid it. The only way to avoid this conclusion, would be, either to incur universal Scepticism, mentioned in N^o 12. by losing *the sense* of our own consciousness, or *the distinction* between our own consciousness, and that of another being; or else to incur direct Atheism, by allowing that *dead matter*, and *unguided motion*, may not only perform

perform the effects of *reason*, but be itself a *reasoning thing*; or thirdly, to *think nothing at all about it*. The last of these it is very hard to do; and a reasonable man will never do either of the two first. Therefore I shall not dwell long upon the little cavils that may be raised. The supposed absurdities may lye more in our prejudices, than in the nature of the things themselves. Objections indeed from reason and philosophy ought always to be listened to; and for such I shall always preserve a due regard, and either answer or submit to the force of them when urged against me: but *prejudices* are only *prejudices*; and the history of Philosophy acquaints us, that many *points* have been reckoned *absurd, heretical, damnable*, which yet the strength of their own evidence has afterwards made popular, and caused to be universally received. However, some of the more common prejudices it may be proper afterwards to take notice of, so far as to shew how they may be removed, by what hath been already said.

XXX. Nor is this conclusion *new*; the *constancy* and *universality* of the appearance, seems

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seems designed to remind us of it *at all times*; and accordingly men in the earliest ages, long before *Atheism* was broached, or learning thought to consist in *doubting*, generally agreed in it, as a truth pointed out to them by nature herself. And ever since we have had any records of history, or writings of any kind, it hath been admitted by the wisest men. *Homer*, the first and chief writer of that sort, to preserve probability, in bringing about and celebrating the revenge of *Achilles* on the *Greeks*, makes the *pernicious dream* to be sent by *Jupiter* to *Agamemnon*, to persuade him to draw them out again to battle (s). *Achilles* says, that *dreams come down from Jupiter*: and that possibly the reason why the pestilence was sent into the *Grecian* camp, might have been discovered to some in a vision. And *Agamemnon* tells the *Chiefs* convened in council, that *the divine dream came down to him, through the ambrosial night* (t). This shews that it was then both the learned and po-

(s) ——— Ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή,

Πέμψαι, ἐπ' Ἀλγείδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι οὐλον ἔνευσον.

Iliad. 2.

(t) Ἄλλ' ἄγε δὴ τινα μάντιν. — Iliad. 1. and

Κλίτε, φίλοι, Θιῶς μοι — Iliad. 2.

pular opinion, Hence the *Poets* generally, whose aim it is to follow nature, when they have any great incident to prepare, or some strange event to bring about a *dignus vindice nodus*, as *Horace* calls it, often make use of the agency of spirits in dreams, as the surest way to preserve the imitation they propose (*u*). *Ovid*, in his way, accounts for the strangeness of dreams, by making three cunning Deities the cause of three different kinds of objects offered to the fancy in sleep; *one* that represented men, and could act rationally; *another* that imitated brute creatures; and a *third* that put on the forms of inanimate things (*v*). And indeed, bating the poetical

(*u*) To pass over a thousand instances of this kind, even the severest will pardon my mentioning that in *Shakespear's Macbeth*, where the lady in her sleep endeavours to wash off the *stains of the King's blood* from her hands, which it is impossible to read, without a dreadful expectation of the future catastrophe, and a horror of the cruel murder.

(*v*) *At pater * è populo natorum mille suorum
Excitat artificem, simulatoremque figuræ
Morphea. Non illo jussos solertiùs alter
Exprimit incessus, vultumque, modumque loquendi.
Adjicit & vestes, & consuetissima cuique
Verba. Sed hic solos homines imitatur. At alter*

* *Semius.*

poetical dress, and names, and assigning a certain number (though in the same place, he seems to allow an indefinite number [*mille*] of such spirits), there can be nothing more true and philosophical, than this account of the cause of dreams. For here it happens that *that* which is easiest to be conceived, and is most entertaining to the imagination, is the only consistent cause that can be given. *Atheism* is equally unentertaining to the *fancy*, and to the *rational faculty*; disagreeable to our nature in every respect; beginning and ending in *universal deadness*; a world of brute matter, tossed about by chance, without a governing mind, and living immaterial beings in it, affords a lonely unpleasant prospect to the soul. If things were thus, we

*Fit fera, fit volucris, fit longo corpore serpens.
Hunc Icelon superi, mortale Phobetora vulgus
Nominat. Est etiam diversæ tertius artis
Phantasos. Ille in humum, saxumque, undamque,
trabemque,
Quæque vacant animi feliciter omnia transit.
Regibus hi, ducibusque, suos ostendere vultus
Nocte solent: populos alii plebemque pererrant.*

Metamorph. lib. II. ver. 633.

The sourest Philosopher must admire this description, and *Morpheus's* part.

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should

should want scope for the imagination, and even for rational enquiry; and must soon come to empty chance, or unsupported necessity, which extinguishes ideas, and puts an end to all pursuit. How much more agreeable is it, to be led by all that we see here, to an infinite Reason, than to have this dark and gloomy prospect of nature! Undoubtedly, unless infinite perfection imply a contradiction, it must be necessary because it is best (x).

XXXI. Moral philosophers, whose business it was not to search out the causes of things, but to teach *how to act*, especially the eastern philosophers, took it so much for granted that the transactions which are carried on with us in our sleep, were to be ascribed only to the efficiency of separate spirits, that they gained both *authority* and *probability* to their doctrine, by delivering it under the form of *vision* or *dream*, where-with they were prompted by some friendly intelligence (y). Again, in the most learned,
politest

(x) See the reasoning, N^o 25. Sect. II. Vol. I.

(y) Every one will call to mind here the excellent
pieces,

politest nations of *Asia*, we find that interpreting of dreams was accounted a part of wisdom and philosophy, and that these men were in great esteem in the courts of Kings (z). Now I shall allow (though perhaps I need not, for even natural reason tells us, that the same being, who designs a warning to any person, may enable *another man* to understand and explain it, and not *him* to whom it was sent; thereby bringing it about, that the *last* shall regard, and be directed by the *first*.) I shall allow, I say, that this art might be but a bold pretence, founded in wrong principles, and that the *pretenders* to it never spoke but *by guesses*: but what I would

pieces, done in imitation of this manner of writing, by the late Mr. *Addison*.

(z) Of this kind were the μάγοι ἐννευστοπόλοι in the court of *Astyages* King of the *Medes*, who interpreted his two dreams to him, concerning his daughter *Mandane*, the mother of *Cyrus*. *Herodot.* lib. 1. cap. 107, 108. They were in great honour and esteem with him, as appears by their speaking to him thus. — Σέο δ' ἐννευστοῦ βασιλῆος, ἐόντος πολιητέω, καὶ ἄρχομεν τὸ μέγιστον, καὶ τιμὰς πρὸς σέο μεγάλας ἔχομεν· οὕτω ὢν πάσις ἡμῶν σέο τε, καὶ πῆς σῆς ἀρχῆς προσπίπτον ἐςί. — cap. 120. And according to this Author, they interpreted both these dreams rightly.

have to be observed is, Whether or no men, from their own experience, in seeing in their sleep what really came to pass afterward, were not first brought into an opinion, that some *superior being* sent these friendly warnings; and that clear and extraordinary visions had a significance in them; and thereby first made this an *art*, and encouraged these *bold pretenders* to impose upon them? I am afraid, if we do not grant thus much, we shall not only *deny the faith of history*, but *contradict experience*. And this shews, that the conclusion here drawn seemed to be a principle generally agreed upon in the world, and in the earliest times. And it is hard to think how it could be otherwise; men always dreamed, and some men would reflect upon them. It is also farther to be observed with respect to those very interpreters, that though they seemed to be the first favourites, yet their post was not very desirable; for if they happened to mistake in some great matters, it was at the peril of their lives (a). So
that

(a) The same *Magi*, because they could not distinguish between a *mock-monarch* and a *real one*; but advised *Astyages* to send home *Cyrus* in safety to his parents,

that it would seem they were sometimes in the right.

XXXII. I shall farther observe, that long after *Atheism* had been broached, and the licentious wits of *Greece* had set themselves to refine on that new scheme; *Plutarch* thinks that in good philosophy, we must have recourse to the principle of separate spirits, to account for these appearances, from the two instances only of *Brutus* and *Dion*, mentioned above. The place is remarkable; therefore I shall quote it. He had been speaking of the common arguments against this principle, that women and children, and other people, were only liable to superstitious fancies; and adds, “ But if *Dion* “ and *Brutus*, men of great solidity, and philosophers, neither weak, nor credulous, “ were so affected with these visions, as seriously to relate them, and consult their “ friends upon them, I am afraid we must
 rents, the danger being past, he having exercised his kingdom among the children in the cottages; were afterwards put to death, when *Astyages* heard that *Cyrus* was preparing an expedition against the *Medes*—Πρῶτον μὲν τῶν μάγων τοὺς ὀνειροπόλους, οἱ μὲν ἀνέγνωσαν μετὰ ἑα, τὸν Κῦρον, τούτους ἀνισκολόπισε. cap. 128.

“ return to the opinion of the old philoso-
 “ phers [τῶν πάνυ παλαιῶν], and own that
 “ there are bad spirits, who envy good men,
 “ and endeavour to stumble them, lest go-
 “ ing on in the ways of virtue, they should
 “ enjoy a happier lot after death than them-
 “ selves (b).” These are the words of *Plu-*
tarch of *Cheronea*, and purely in point of
 philosophy. Sure they are not women nor
 children only, who have such visions in their
 sleep. Thus much of the antiquity of this

(b) Εἰ δὲ Δίῳν κὲ Βερῦτος, ἄνδρες ἐμμεριθεῖς καὶ φιλόσο-
 φαι, καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀκροσφαλεῖς, οὐδ’ εὐάλωτοι πάθος, οὐ-
 τως ὑπὸ φάσματος διεβέησαν, ὥστε καὶ φράσαι, πρὸς ἑτέρους,
 οὐκ οἶδα μὴ τῶν πάνυ παλαιῶν τὸν ἀτοπώτατον ἀναγκασθῶμεν
 προσδέχασθαι λόγον, ὡς τὰ φᾶνλα δαιμόνια καὶ βάσκανα,
 προσφθοροῦντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνιστά-
 μενα, τάραχος καὶ φόβους ἐπάγει, σείοντα καὶ σφάλλοντα τὴν
 ἀρετὴν ὡς μὴ διαμείνουτες ἀπτότες ἐν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀκέραιοι,
 βελτίονος ἐκείνων μούρας μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τύχωσιν. *Plutarch.*

in *Dion*. As if he had said——I do not see but we
 must admit that opinion of the oldest Philosophers,
 which is yet more wonderful; not only concerning
 the simple existence of such beings; but that a wicked
 and invidious species of those Demons, envying good
 men, &c. The pregnancy of the instance seems to
 extort this supposition from *Plutarch*; which these new
 Writers should remember, who bring in his Authority
 to support the position, *that Atheism is not near so great*
an evil as superstition.

pinion ;

opinion ; not that any body denies it, but to remind men of the reason of its being so ancient. We may next consider the remaining objections against it.

XXXIII. There are persons who say they never dream ; and some authors give us accounts of such. *Suetonius* tells us, that *Nero* never used to dream, till a little before his death he began to be terrified with portentous visions in his sleep (*c*). *Aristotle* says
some

(*c*) *Terrebatur ad hæc evidentibus portentis somniorum, nunquam antea somniare solitus.* *Sueton.* in *Neron.* cap. 96.

Some Writers go so far as to tell us of whole Nations that never dream. *Pomponius Mela*, speaking of certain people in *Africa*, says, *Ex his qui ultra deserta esse memorantur, Atlantes solem execrantur, & dum oritur, & dum occidit, ut ipsis agrisque pestiferum. Nomina singuli non habent : non vescuntur animalibus : neque illis in quiete qualia cæteris mortalibus visere datur.* *De Sit. Orb.* lib. 1. cap. 8. But the certainty of this is put upon hear-say only ; and we may judge what credit it deserves, from other relations in the same place, where he tells us of some Nations who are without heads, and have their faces in their breasts, &c. *Blemmyis capita absunt : vultus in pectore est. Satyris, præter effigiem, nihil humani. Ægipanum, quæ celebratur ea forma est.* There is nothing that could make a human body monstrous, which

some men never dream in their whole
lives;

is not related by *Geographers* and *Travellers* as real, in some part or other of the earth. Thus this Author goes no farther than *Germany*, or rather *Holland*, to find men who have feet like horses feet, and others who have their ears so large, that they wrap them about their bodies, instead of cloaths. — *Esse equinis pedibus Hippopodas, & Panôtos, quibus magnæ aures, & ad ambiendum corpus omne patulæ, nudis alioqui pro veste sint, &c.* lib. 3. cap. 6. Upon which *Vossius* pleasantly enough says, “ Since these ears served them for cloaths
“ by day, for coverings by night, and for umbrellas in
“ the heat, it is a wonder these Authors should not
“ add, that the people made use of them as wings to fly
“ withal.” This indeed would have completed the prodigy. Not far from the *Atlantes* who never dream, *Mela* tells us of another Nation, who it seems dream very seriously — *Augilæ manes tantum Deos putant : per eos dejerant, eos ut oracula consulunt ; precatique quæ volunt, ubi tumulis incubuere, pro responsis ferunt somnia.* And this appears more probable ; for, as was said before, the phænomenon of dreaming, (misunderstood indeed, and misapplied) seems to have given the first rise to *Superstition* and *Polytheism*. It is true, Voyages and Books of Travels tell us of several Nations, in different parts of the world, who have no sort of Religion, no name, nor notion of any supreme Being : but if this be so, as Mr. *Locke* would have us believe, it seems the inhabitants of these countries never dream. Since we can scarce conceive that this single phænomenon

lives (*d*); and that young children do not dream; nor people come to years immediately after eating (*e*). Mr. *Locke*, in a place referred to above, tells us of one who was bred a scholar, and had no ill memory, who never dreamt in his life, till about the twenty fifth or twenty sixth year of his age, when he fell into a fever. If this be so, dreams that are not, need not be accounted for; and such persons will want that which gives the surest conviction in this case, namely experience; and the reasoning above will be to them conditionally true only; that is, if there be such appearances, they must be from such a cause. And thus far it must

non should not be enough to kindle up the notion of some *Religion* or other in the minds of men, though we could suppose all religion once entirely lost in the world. However, the *matter of fact* itself begins now to appear false; and these *monsters* gradually vanish, as the countries they were said to be in are more resorted to, and become better known. Nature seems to be every where of a piece with herself. But this is not the place to speak more on this subject.

(*d*) Ἡδὴ δὲ τισιν συμβέβηκεν, ὥστε μὴδὲν ἐνύπνιον ἰορακέναι, κατὰ τὸν βίον. De insomn. cap. 4.

(*e*) Διὸ καὶ μετὰ τὴν τροφὴν, καὶ πᾶμπαν νέοις οὖσιν οἶον τοῖς παιδοῖς, οὐ γένοιται, ἐνύπνιον. Ibid. cap. 2.

conclude,

conclude, even to those. But the concurring testimony of all the rest of mankind, should weigh something with them over and above: for these instances are told but as rare (*f*). Perhaps some may affirm this, who do not take the trouble to reflect on the state of their mind while sleeping, because of their insenseness on their waking thoughts and business, or otherwise. *Aristotle*, in a place cited before, makes it a condition of the circumstance's appearing, εἴ τις προσέχῃ τὸν νῦν, καὶ πειρᾶτο μνημονεύειν ἀναστὰς; if he be attentive, and endeavour to recollect upon awaking. But that which chiefly invalidates their assertion, is, that it hath been shewn contradictory, in N^o 23. Sect. IV. Vol. I. that they should be certain of what they affirm: we can have no memory, or experience of a state, which, by the nature of it, is a negation of all memory and experience. Some delirious persons, whether in fevers or otherwise, when they come to themselves again, remember nothing of what they said and did then; yet they were active and percipient all the while. It cannot be affirmed

(*f*) *Aristotle* says, Σπάνιον μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτόν εἶναι, συμβαίνει δ' ὅμως. Loc. citat.

to be impossible that some kind of dreams, or the dreams of some constitutions, may not be thus qualified. As to *Aristotle's* observation, *that after eating, &c.* I think it is contrary to experience; and the reason he assigns for it should conclude just the contrary. For if the motions in the sensory continued after the objects are gone, be the cause of dreaming, as he affirms (g); a frequency of that motion would make dreams indistinct, (which seems to be the case, and doth not contradict the solution here given) but could not occasion a not-dreaming. Lastly, those who think they say a great deal against this conclusion, by telling us they never dream, may please to observe, that their case agrees much better with the assertion. That our dreams are

(g) The reason he assigns, why we do not dream then, is just the same that he assigns, why we dream at other times——Πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς διεσφόρητα· and yet these κινήσεις ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων, are the only cause of dreaming. If a κίνησις is the cause, a πολλὴ κίνησις may cause a confusion, and not remembring, but cannot be the impediment. Besides, since *sensation* and *dreaming* have the same original according to him; why is not sensation, while awake, impeded after eating. But this is the least objection against *Aristotle's* mechanical dreams.

formed

formed and represented to the soul, by an intelligent and free cause, than that they are mechanical, and necessarily produced. For then, dreaming must be caused by the mechanical motions of the animal œconomy, and therefore equable and constant according to that; or an effect of some material action in *Lucretius's* way; and therefore still mechanical and necessary: whereas if the exhibiting those scenes to us, depends on the will of free, intelligent beings, and these again are subordinate to the government of a supreme over-ruling Being; it were easy to assign reasons, no way inconsistent, why this appearance should not be always after one uninterrupted tenor: or rather this last *cause* seems naturally to point out to us such a variation. We contract a habit of *forcing our reason to submit to our prejudices*: but let a man consider, as it were for the first time, this appearance; if any thing can less agree with the *surprising variety* of the scenes offered to the soul in sleep, than a mechanical cause; or with the *art and contrivance, the life and action*, nay the *ideas and reasoning*, contained in what we hear and see during that time, than a *dead and undesigning cause*: or rather

if

if any thing can be more opposite. If a man speaks to us while we are awake, we conclude that he hath ideas in his mind; that he is free, reflects, reasons, methodizes: if something speaks to us while we sleep, what are we to conclude concerning it?——

Nero's beginning to dream before his unhappy death only, makes more for one side of the present question, than his not dreaming all his life before (supposing the fact true) can make for the other. Reasons neither contradictory nor improbable, might be assigned for this: but such particularities are designedly avoided. Neither *chance*, nor *mechanism*, become more powerful before these *dreadful events*, than at other times. Who doth not admire *Virgil's* making *Dido* see those gloomy visions, in a like case, as something extremely natural?

XXXIV. On the other hand, there are men who tell such *improbable, romantic stories* of their dreams; out of a vanity we all have, as if remarkable things happened to ourselves beyond others; that even sober people, and equitable judges, are on their guard what they believe. This is no less
offensive

offensive to the truth, than running into the other extreme: for the *Sceptic* hath too great a scarcity of other arguments, to let one of this sort pass (*b*). *Plutarch's* rule in

(*b*) *Lucian* has displayed all his art, in that Dialogue which he calls the *Philopseudes*, to make the folly and weakness complained of here, stand for a demonstration that there are no separate spirits. He brings together the chief men of the several sects of the Philosophers, to talk such wild and weak things of apparitions and visions, as shock common sense; and introduces a Sceptic, who of course must have all the sense and learning in the company, to confute such silly stories, and shew us the wisdom and sobriety of believing nothing. This part he acts well enough, till one of the company desires him to give his reasons for constant doubting. It was not so easy to acquit himself in this case. Their vanity and folly were his best arguments. All he says is, that *Democritus of Abdera shut himself up in a monument without the city, writing and studying night and day; and when some waggish persons would have frightened him into a belief of spirits, with a counterfeit apparition; without vouchsafing to look about at them, he desired they would not disturb him.* "Οὕτω βεβήαιώς ἐπίστευσε μηδὲν εἶναι τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν ἑξω γενομένας τῶν σωμάτων. And with this flourish he artfully leaves the company, and avoids answering to the troublesome question about oracles. He believed that it is only matter which thinks in us, while we are alive; and that therefore the soul is nothing at all when out of the body.

a paral-

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a parallel case comes to this; *Nec omnia, nec nihil* (i); and a sober man will make it his rule.

(i) I shall quote his reason for this rule, as well as the rule itself. It is in the life of *Camillus*, where having spoken of several prodigies, he adds, Ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν σφόδρα, καὶ τὸ λίαν ἀπιστεῖν, ἐπισφαλές ἐστι, διὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπων ἀσθένειαν, ὅροι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ κρατοῦσιν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἐκφερομένην, ὅπως μὲν εἰς δεισιδαιμονίαν καὶ τύφον, ὅπως δὲ εἰς ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν θείων, καὶ περιφρόνησιν. The rule he lays down for this is, Ἡ δὲ ἐυλάβεια καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν, ἀριστον. Whoever pleases to consider the catalogue of prodigies in this place, where he lays down the rule, will see they are none of the least size. In short, this δεισιδαιμονία, that is, a fear of spirits, hath been much abused by vain or weak people, and carried to an extreme, by designing and crafty men perhaps: but that it should entirely be cast off, I think the most rigorous philosophy will not justify; though Mr. *Bayle* says in a like case, *Aussi faut-il avouer, qu'il n'y a qu'une bonne & solide philosophie, qui comme un autre Hercule, puisse exterminer les monstres des erreurs populaires: c'est elle seule qui met l'esprit hors de page.* (*Pensées Diverses. Sect. 21.*) If this *solid philosophy* of his is founded on the *natural powers* of matter, it will never answer the end. So we find *Lucretius* boasting of his philosophy as an excellent remedy against the fear of any Being,

*Hunc igitur terrorem animi, tenebrasque necesse' est
Non radii solis, neque lucida tela diei
Discutiant; sed naturæ species, ratioque.*

Lib. 1. ver. 147.

rule. But albeit we may *pretend* experience which we have not, or *dissemble* that which we have, to one another; none of us can conceal his own experience from himself, which is therefore the surest conviction (*k*).

It is true, no evil can happen to us in God's world, but by our own fault; but that subordinate beings are never permitted, or commissioned, to be the ministers of his will, is a hard point to be proved. And that *direct Atheism* is better than this *Deisidemony*, is horrid. It is to say, *rather than to believe that God may allow inferior Powers to be the ministers of his will against us; it is better to maintain that he hath no perfection, no power, is nothing; nay, better to maintain, that there is no such thing as reason, or truth, or goodness in nature.* For, as hath been said, without the existence of such a Being, all these go out in everlasting darkness. I might farther observe, that in the late remonstrances against this *Deisidemony*, the Deity himself seems to be included, as one of those spirits we need not stand in awe of: so that at any rate *Atheism* is better than to admit of a God who could do any thing but protect us in our folly, or who could punish our acting against the law of our nature, reason. But of this elsewhere.

(*k*) I can't help thinking it would be well if we were a little more curious in examining those instances that happen to ourselves, and weigh the particular circumstances of *spontaneity, life, language*, against the *inertia* of matter, or the *inflexibility* of mechanism, and this perhaps would convince us at home.

And

And in some cases the experience of one man becomes that of another; as when we see people start, cry, get up, lay about them, and do abundance of other extravagant actions in their sleep. *Lucretius*, in a place cited before, says

*Tollunt clamores, quasi si jugulentur ibidem :
Multi depugnant, gemitusque doloribus edunt.*

However this humour of telling vain stories is the reason that a man cannot give such instances, as consist with his own knowledge, or might otherwise be depended upon; because however true, they have something in telling, that favours of the chimney-corner: and therefore I have purposely avoided even so much as the mentioning them. And though the examples given by *ancient Authors*, will better bear telling, as having stood on record for many ages; yet I have declined laying the stress of the argument on these. That reasoning is most convincing, which is most universal, and draws nearest the experience of every body. Yet I shall venture sometimes to mention *these last*: but still, without insisting on the certainty of the par-

ticular facts, only hypothetically, and so far as they are not impossible to happen, nor unlike to what does still happen at this day. Some of them are singular; and great events have been consequent upon them; a qualification which still puts them farther beyond exception: and generally this is the reason why they are at all transmitted to posterity. It had been childish to have inserted any thing of this kind without some such reason, and as it had a relation to the events treated of. But if there had been any thing unnatural, or absurd in them, they would have been entered with a *note*; as the more judicious sort of Writers always do traditions seemingly fabulous.

XXXV. But there are other more material objections against this conclusion; it may be said, That since many bodily distempers are accompanied with strange contradictory scenes of vision, even while we are awake, they seem rather to proceed from the disorder of the brain, than to be excited by immaterial Agents; or if we should allow that they are so excited, those beings must be very trifling, idle, absurd, ignorant, weak; or such as we cannot well conceive separate
spirits

spirits to be. That it is absurd to suppose such beings busied in suggesting imaginary phantoms even to brute-animals, as we must say they do, if this conclusion be just with respect to men. That the most part of the things we fancy we see in sleep, are so wild and inconsistent, that one cannot help thinking chance hath a great share in their production, &c. To speak to each of these singly, we may observe first in general, that there are few truths, except those seen intuitively, against which objections, founded on seeming probability, and old prejudices, may not be raised; if we suffer the reasons to slip out of our mind from which they were concluded, and retain in view only our former way of thinking about them. It is an easy, but a fallacious method, to run away with a flux of words: we may draw up such a specious shew of *probabilities*, supported by prejudices, as shall make a dreadful appearance taken all together; and yet turn to nothing at last, when *examined* and *sifted* separately. When an *exact Person* makes objections for the love of truth only, he will be severe in examining his own objections in the first

place, and endeavour to throw them into the rigorous form of an argument, proving all his assertions as he goes along, and not expect that any thing should be allowed him, purely because he is on the objecting side. When we take this way, we generally save ourselves and others a good deal of trouble, by finding out where the mistake lay. For it is a sure principle to trust to, *That two contradictory assertions cannot both be true*; and if we can find no fault in the reasons that establish the conclusion on the contrary side, we should suspect our own objections. Those indeed are the most promising objections, that attack directly the reasons on which the thing is founded; but if they leave these standing, and turn to *by-considerations*, much is not to be expected from them. In that case, *viz.* when a conclusion is founded on such reasons, as are liable to no exception; and difficulties from other considerations are only offered: it follows from the *consistent nature* of all truth, and the *necessary harmony* between all true propositions, that satisfaction enough is given them, if it can be shewn that it is possible and consistent enough,

enough, that the thing objected may be for such a reason, and in such a manner; though it cannot be positively said or proved, that it is for this very reason, and in this particular manner. The point then comes to this. Such a circumstance or appearance, which is on all hands allowed to be real [as that many of our dreams are chimerical and wild] would not be, if such a conclusion as is pretended to be established [to wit, that they are exhibited by separate spirits] were true. And in answer to this, a possible and consistent reason is given, why it might be so, notwithstanding this conclusion; and a manner is shewn, in which it might so come to pass; though it cannot be proved, that this is the very manner, or that the very reason. Then it follows that the appearance, contended to be inconsistent with the conclusion, is consistent with it *more ways than one*; on supposition that the reason given, or manner shewn, is not the real reason or manner that obtains. And a thing that is possible *two ways*, cannot be impossible. It was but necessary, in such an intricate subject to premise thus much concerning the

nature of objections to a legitimate conclusion. The design of all reasoning whatsoever (as was hinted above,) is in order to avoid contradiction; and if denying the cause assigned of the present phænomenon, forces us upon it; to have recourse, to wit, to the *powers of dead matter*, or of *mechanism*, for the appearances of life; or to suppose that effects may be perfecter than their cause; to raise objections here will not appear so easy to a considering person.

XXXVI. From these considerations, a general answer might be given to the difficulties mentioned; for unless it could be shewn that this instance here argued from, is such as never happens to any man; or that the reasoning upon it is faulty; neither of which, it is presumed, can be done; it will follow, such difficulties notwithstanding, that in this, and such other like instances, the agency of separate spirits is plainly necessary; which is the chief thing asserted. And, as was argued N^o 10. if we could be certain that such an instance had happened *but to one man*, and that *once only*; the conclusion would still be certain, with

with respect to that one instance; that some living, invisible being effected it, and therefore existed. *A contradiction once happening*, is itself a contradiction. Nay, let it be observed, though a Sceptic could fairly prove, that in other examples, not thus qualified, another cause obtained; even this would not invalidate the conclusion made. For reason would always force the same inference, from the same conditions and circumstances, whatever might be in other cases. And any one will readily allow, that the instance here assigned (or rather that part of an instance) draws nearer to the common and ordinary sort of dreams, than to those that are very clear and significant. We frequently dream that we are in company with other men, *who act and speak like men*. This adds the appearance of *language* and *rational action*, to life and spontaneity. But that which will determine a man, who considers this affair justly, and hath an eye always upon the *inertia* of matter; to ascribe all the scenes offered to us in our sleep, to the same cause, is, That matter is as little capable of *spontaneity* and *life*, as of reason itself. The impossibili-

ty of its ever becoming a *self-moving substance*, was that which we first discovered concerning it. And every thing that we hear or see in sleep, is full of *spontaneity* and *action*; if not of reason. Let any one explain to me, how the particles of the sensory could, of themselves, and without external impulse, represent an *animal pursuing us*; a *crawling serpent*, or *flying fowl*. And the particles of the sensory, if any thing, must do it; for it is that to which the soul is united, and which communicates the impressions immediately to the soul. Let him not tell me of *mechanism*, or *chance* here; for it is absurd to speak of them; upon the same account as it would be absurd to ascribe the *real motions* of the living creatures themselves to these principles. It is the spontaneous principle that we want, the necessity of which makes us allow an *immaterial Mover* to every living thing. But farther; if we have a vision represented to us, where there are *rational agents*, or men; brute, or *irrational creatures*; together with a *scene* or system of *inanimate things*; as every representation must have a place, or scene where
it

it exists: we cannot say that invisible beings form and exhibit only the *two first* particulars, (the rational and spontaneous parts) and leave the soul itself, or chance or mechanism, to form the inanimate parts or *scene of action*. All is, as it seems, the work of the same agent, and exhibited at once. Therefore I think it was extremely accurate in *Ovid*, to assign a third Deity who should represent immovable rocks, standing forests, running waters:——

Ille in humum, saxumque undamque, tra-
bemque,
Quæque vacant anima, feliciter omnia
transit,

And if we should consider *the exhibiting of monsters*, and things quite without the verge of existence, the difficulty of finding another cause for them is not lessened but increased, as they recede farther from the course of nature, and stated laws of mechanism: yet these are made the main arguments for chance. Thus we see the philosophical consideration of dreams doth not so much regard, whether they are consistent
schemes,

schemes, according to the course of nature, as *the impossibility* of their being physical productions. There is enough in the most incoherent of our dreams, or even in a part of these, to shew that they are things quite above the powers of matter or mechanism. Nor is it philosophical, I think, to seek for different causes of the same kind of appearance, though the several instances may not be all alike. It is a *maxim* in philosophy, when effects are all of one kind, though perhaps not equally perfect in degree, that they proceed all from the same kind of cause (*l*). Artists equally good might produce pieces of work unequally perfect, for a thousand reasons that could be named. Often we see a cause confessedly the same, produce effects not equally perfect.

(*l*) *Effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis eadem sunt causæ: ut descensus lapidis & ligni ab eadem causâ procedit, &c.* Introduct. ad ver. Phys. Lect. 8. Axiom. 6. Every body would allow that some dreams are exhibited to the soul by invisible beings; but that others are the effect of some other thing (they know not what :) This, though enough to my purpose, is not enough in philosophy, I presume, if the reasoning in this paragraph is right; which therefore ought to be well considered.

From

From this we would not infer, that some pieces were the effect of art, and others of chance. And often the nature of the thing produced doth not require so much skill to be employed. Thus to instance in the present case, from the same description of *Ovid*; we may conceive less art is necessary to his *third Deity*, to represent to the fancy in sleep, mountains, houses, rivers; than to the *second* to exhibit the motions and *spontaneity* of animals, though mute: but that it is still harder than either of these for the first, to represent men *speaking* and *acting* like rational creatures.

XXXVII. As to what is urged, that bodily distempers may be the cause of these representations, enough hath been said already (*m*). *No man* can seriously persuade himself, whatever he may say, that the simple indisposition of the brain, or any other part of the body; that is, a mere *disarrangement* of material parts, can be a sufficient cause, why a scene of vision is obtruded on the soul, where there is life and reason: nor doth he really understand

(*m*) See the note (*n*) in this; and (*b*) in Sect. V. Vol. I.

himself when he says so. How, I pray, is it possible that the mere disarrangement of the parts of matter should perform this; when it hath been shewn absolutely impossible, that any arrangement of them should perform such an effect? But what strange causes have men adopted into their philosophy! We could then be certain of nothing, if a *defect*, the *utter negation* of a cause, could perform things of such a high nature. It is true, these visions are ofteneft (though not always) obtruded on the fancy, when the body labours under some previous disorder: but let me ask; Is it not quite a different thing for these scenes of spontaneity and life to be effected *purely by the disorder*, and to be exhibited to the soul only *upon the occasion of the disorder*? Or is it less contradictory, that they should be produced without a sufficient cause, when the body is indisposed, than when it is otherwise? And what shall we say, when they are effected without any previous disorder? Both *order*, and *the want of order*, cannot be the cause.

XXXVIII. This, if duly attended to, will satisfy us, that the indisposition of the
2 body

body can as little produce these visions *while we are awake*, as while we sleep, or rather less; so that an *Objector* seems to argue with more disadvantage in bringing in this as a *parallel case*, to shew that our dreams proceed from a bodily distemper. But to apply the argument particularly: it follows from what has been said, that if a man, under an indisposition of body, from what cause soever it may arise, should see what other people about him do not see, and cannot see; if the object seen is such, as cannot be produced without a living spontaneous cause; if he sees it with fright and reluctancy, and if it gives him uneasiness and pain, so that the soul itself cannot be this cause; provided, I say, he sees it so, and such, it follows from the reasoning above, that a *living intelligent cause* as certainly tampers with his organ *then*, and makes these impressions upon it, and maintains them there, notwithstanding the action of external objects upon it at the same time, as if the same thing happened to him in his sleep only. If the thing seen be of that kind, and hath all the conditions requisite to infer the conclusion concerning a vision seen in sleep,

sleep, the circumstance of *being awake* can make no alteration, nor change the necessity of the reasons in the former case; it only requires a greater degree of the same kind of power to be exerted: or rather the circumstance of being awake makes the conclusion more evident and plain in this last case; for then we have our memory unclouded, and all our former ideas and experience, to have recourse to, whereby to disprove (as we might think) the reality of the objects offered, as existing *ab extra*; and it is common for persons in such circumstances, to reason consistently enough about such other matters, as have no relation to the thing in question: whereas in sleep we are deprived of those helps, by the nature of that indisposition. Now, as it would require greater art and cunning, to impose on a man of judgment and sense, than to deceive an unexperienced infant: so in the circumstance of being awake, it is evident more power must be exerted, and that less than the cause assigned could not produce the effect. Thus it is easily conceivable that these visions might be offered to the soul, not only while we sleep, but while we are awake,

(as

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(as the objection supposes) and not only while the body labours under some indisposition, but while it labours under none: and that they may consist of one particular object seen, and for a short time; or of greater variety, and for a longer space; so that these beings could tyrannize over the soul, and maintain their illusions stubbornly, the body being no way previously indisposed. And yet we call this *madness*. The words *desipere*, *delirare*, *insanire*, carry with them a sort of imputation on the soul itself, as if it fell into those disorders through some fault in its own constitution. The persons so affected meet with contempt instead of pity: but who can promise himself immunity? As I said above, he hath not rightly considered the affair, who thinks he could stand his ground.

Sic temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam.

The soul in itself is an uncompounded, simple substance, and hath no parts, and therefore properly *no constitution*, neither is it liable to *any change* or *alteration* in its own nature, (Sect. III. Vol. I.) The *inert matter*
of

of the body could never affect it thus. That could only *limit* its faculties *farther* and *farther*, or deaden its activity, (Sect. IV. Vol. I.) but not animate it after such a *terrible* manner. Hence there is no other way of accounting for its being affected *in this* manner, but by the *cause* I have already assigned; unless men would run up to the very *First Cause* for effecting the present phænomenon. See the argument in N^o 29. Let them chuse. Thus these material sensories, to which, in the opinion of some, we owe the perfection of rational thinking, subject the soul to terrible accidents (*n.*)

XXXIX. But

(*n*) Some things, only transiently hinted at in this paragraph, would carry one a great way in speaking intelligibly concerning the disorders *our reason* is subjected to from some *external cause*; but any man, who is not still *head-strong* in ascribing disproportionate effects to certain imaginary powers in *matter* and *mechanism*, may from what is said, reason consistently concerning the several cases that might be objected, without suffering himself to be entangled with sceptical arguments. There is indeed a great difference, and variety, in the several *phænomena* of *reason disturbed*; but universally, the *disease* could not be lodged in the soul itself; nor could the *matter* of the body affect it any other way than by
deadening

XXXIX. But farther, *the transition from* one of these states to the other, seems almost to lye, I think, within the reach of our conception. It is matter of fact, and we need not be afraid of being deceived, when we allow it, that some people *rise* in their sleep, and *do certain actions*; that they *speak, threaten, fall a fighting*; without being awakened with all the motion they give themselves; and that they are with difficulty brought to themselves again, even though their eyes are wide open. (See the Note (f). N^o 5.) Now this can proceed from nothing else but a scene of vision's being

deadening its activity, which, I think, is never the case in these appearances. In short, the disorder of matter might make a man a *stupid idiot*, subject him to *sleep, apoplexy*, or any thing approaching to its own nature; but could never be the cause of *rage, distraction, phrensy*, unless it were employed as an instrument by some *other cause*, *i. e. it cannot of itself be the cause* of these disorders of reason. If the *inertia* of matter infers any thing, it infers thus much. And all this together, considered equitably, vindicates the rational nature of the soul from depending on matter for its perfection, or any other way than as it limits its faculties, or may be made an instrument to disturb it.

strongly printed on the imagination, and obstinately maintained there, by some living intelligent being, notwithstanding that external objects act upon the sensory at the same time. And if the power of such a being is unrestrained, it will equally possess the fancy with these delusive scenes, without waiting for the occasion of sleep to introduce them; and obtrude them forcibly upon the organ, amidst the action of external objects. For it requires but a greater degree of the same power, to make *delusory impressions* upon the sensory, while real external objects are making *true impressions* upon it; than it would require to make the same impressions, while no other impression from external objects is made upon it at the same time. If one is made to see in his sleep a man pursuing him with a drawn sword; there are certain *proper vibrations* excited in the optick nerves, or such impressions made upon that part of the brain, on which the optick nerves act, as if these vibrations were excited in them. And if the same vibrations are *more powerfully* excited in the optic nerves, while the eyes are open, *than those* excited by external objects then

acting, the man pursuing with the drawn sword will still appear, even though the eyes be open (*o*). And thus by easy steps we see, *that dreaming may degenerate into possession*; and that the cause and nature of both is the same, differing only in degree; for *dreaming*

(*o*) *Aristotle*, though in this whole affair he assigns a different cause from that here given; yet he describes the formal manner, why *ecstatic persons* (as he calls them) see what others do not, and cannot see, nearly the same way: because, to wit, the ordinary motions in the sensory are overcome, and drowned as it were, by foreign motions; of which therefore these persons are chiefly sensible. Τῷ δ' ἐνὶς ἐκστατικῶν προσορᾶν, αἴτιον ὅτι οἰκεῖται κινήσεις ἐκ ἐνοχλήσεων, ἀλλ' ἀποριπίζονται τῶν ξενικῶν ἐν μάλισα αἰσθάνονται. And a little below of *melancholic persons*, he says, 'Οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ, διὰ τὸ σφόδρα (ob vehementiam) ὥσπερ βάλλοντες πόρρωθεν εὐστοχοί εἰσι (he had been speaking of such as are εὐθυόνειροι); the reason is—Διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα ἐκ ἐκκρέλει αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις ὑφ' ἐτέρας κινήσεως. Which is as much as to say, the strongest impression predominates. But what is wonderful here is, that *Aristotle*, believing there were ἐκστατικοὶ and εὐθυόνειροι, should offer to account for this mechanically. He might as well have said, that the reason in natural philosophy, why some men are rich, and others poor, is *the different colour of their beards!*

is but *possession in sleep*, from which we are relieved again when we awake, and external objects begin to solicit the perceptivity through the senses: but the other possession is more stubborn, and not to be displaced so easily. We may conceive, when such a being is allowed the ascendant over our ordinary sensations and ideas, it will keep up that power as long as possible. There is somewhere, I think, in Dr. *Tillotson's* sermons, a pious reflexion to this purpose, “ That if our imaginations were
“ let loose upon us, we should be always
“ under the most dreadful terrors, and
“ frightened to distraction with the appearances of our own fancy: but that an
“ over-ruling power restrains these effects.” Now it is not easy to conceive what can be meant by not *letting our imaginations loose upon us*, unless it be understood of restraining the power of these invisible beings, which would otherwise incessantly distress the soul with such unpleasing sights. If the matter of fact in the beginning of the paragraph, from which this transition is made appear conceivable, should be contested, or denied, though *Lucretius* himself vouches

vouches the like instances (*p*); yet taking it only as a bare possible *supposition*, contrived on purpose to argue from, the reasoning on it as a *supposition*, will be still as intelligible, as if it were real; and the degenerating of the one appearance into the other equally possible to our way of conception; which is all that is intended by it. For it is by no means pretended that this may be the only way, by which separate spirits may affect us in our present state.

XL. What is here said with respect to the objects of *sight*, is easily applicable to those of *hearing*: these invisible beings have the same power over the sense and organs of hearing, as they have over those of seeing. In sleep we as well hear words and sentences spoken, as see objects of sight represented; and it is as conceivable how our dreams should degenerate into possession, in this respect, as in that. Therefore I shall venture farther to say, that some of those relations of apparitions we meet with in *Historians*,

(*p*) *Multi depugnant, gemitusque doloribus edunt: —*
And

Vix ad se redeunt, permoti corporis æstu.

whether the facts be true or false, have nothing inconsistent in the telling. For those spirits may, upon some important occasions, be licensed so to affect the sensory, according to the exigency of the affair, that all the scene of vision, which is then thought to have an existence from without, may be the effect of impressions made on the brain only. Thus, for instance, that apparition mentioned before, which *Plutarch* tells us was offered to *Brutus*, before he came over from *Asia*, and came again to him the night before the battle of *Philippi*; which is there described as a *dreadful spectre*, of a *monstrous and ugly appearance*; and *that noise* which he heard as of one entering his tent; and *these words*, it is said to have spoke to him. “ I am, O *Brutus*, thy evil Genius; but thou shalt see me again near *Philippi* (q);”

(q) *Brutus* was sitting in his tent, musing, and considering something with himself, when he thought he heard some body entering; and upon looking about he saw δεινὴν ἢ ἀλλόκοτον ὄψιν ἐκφύλας σώματος, σιωπῇ παρεστῶτος αὐτῷ. and asking unconcernedly, What *Being* it was, *God* or *Man*; and what it wanted with him? The spectre answered, ὁ σὸς, ὦ Βρῦτε, δαίμων κακός· ὃς δέ με περὶ Φιλίππου.

might

might all be but inward representation upon the sensory: and any other person present might neither have heard or seen any thing. However, this is suggested as probable only, or easily conceivable, from what is said above of the like spectres and visions offered to us in our sleep; and the easy transition there is, from making us see them in sleep, to the making us see them while awake; and because this is more conformable to our own experience and to philosophy, than the assuming condensed bodies of air. Yet it is not meant as if there were any thing inconsistent even in that supposition. Either of these ways is more conceivable, than that by which his friend *Cassius* accounted for this vision the next morning, when *Brutus* went and consulted him upon it, from the notions of *Epicurus*, in which there is nothing intelligible, and some things contradictory (r): or the way that *Hobbes* hath accounted

(r) Ἡμεῖς δ' ἡμέρᾳ τραπόμενος πρὸς τὸν Κάσσιον, ἔφραζε τὴν ὄψιν· ὁ δὲ, τοῖς ἑπικέραι λόγοις χρώμενος, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἔθος ἔχων διαφέρεισθαι πρὸς τὸν Βρῦτον. Ἡμέτερος ἔτος (εἶπεν) ὦ Βρῦτε, λόγος, ὡς εἰ πάντῃ παύσομεν ἀληθῶς, εἰδ' ὀρῶμεν, κ. λ. As if the soul

accounted for it since, who makes *cold produce dreams and visions of fear*, without either reason or experience to support his assertion; and for no other end, I think, but to obviate this difficulty (s.) For, as was argued just before (N^o 37.) allowing that we

did not suffer, what it thinks it suffers; or had not the ideas it hath. And afterwards he says, the soul of man hath in itself both the art, and materials, to make such visions; as if it acted, without knowing it acted; or absurdly laid a plot to terrify itself; as hath been argued before. Surely this vision was but a bad instance to apply *Epicurus's* notion to, and yet this is in part the notion that still obtains. It is that which *Cicero* falls in with, which was spoken to before; so that more needs not be said of it.

(s) “ And since dreams are caused by the distemper of
 “ some of the inward parts of the body; divers distem-
 “ pers must needs cause different dreams. And hence
 “ it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear, and
 “ raiseth the thought and image of some fearful object
 “ —We read of *Marcus Brutus*, &c.” *Leviath.* ch. 2.
 He makes *Brutus* to be sleeping; but *Plutarch* tells us,
 he had slept the first part of the night, immediately after
 eating; and had risen to digest something in his own
 mind. So that it had the disadvantage to *Hobbes's* scheme
 of being a *waking vision*, and that without any previ-
 ous distemper outward, or inward, that we read of.
 But it is convenient sometimes to wrest a circumstance.

Dion

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we saw terrifying and fearful objects, only when we were cold, which yet is the most
unsup-

Dion also was sitting meditating and thoughtful, in the porch of his own house, when the spectre appeared to him.

I shall give the relation of it in *Plutarch's* own words, since there is something very strange and remarkable in it. It happened while the Assassins were contriving his death, a little before he was cruelly murdered——

Συνισταμένης δὲ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς (says the Author) φάσμα γίνεσθαι τῷ Δίῳ μέγα καὶ τερατῶδες· ἐτύγχανε μὲν γὰρ ὁφθαλμοῦ τῆς ἡμέρας καθεζόμενος ἐν πασάδι τῆς οἰκίας, μόνος ὢν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὴν διάνοιαν· ἐξαίφνης δὲ, ψόφου γενομένου πρὸς θατέρω πέρασι τῆς σοῆς, ἀποβλέψας, εἶτε φωτὸς ὄντος, εἶδε γυμναῖκα μεγάλην, σολῇ μὲν καὶ προσωπῷ μηδὲν ἐριννύος τραγικῆς παραλλάττουσαν, σαίρουσαν δὲ καλύνῃ τι πλὴν οἰκίαν· ἐκπλαγεὶς δὲ δεινῶς καὶ περίφοβος γενόμενος, μελεπέμψατο τὰς φίλους, καὶ διεγείτο τὴν ὄψιν αὐτοῖς· καὶ παραμένειν ἐδεῖτο καὶ συννυκτερεύειν, παντάπασιν ἐκστατικῶς ἔχων, καὶ δεδοικῶς μὴ πάλιν εἰς ὄψιν αὐτῷ μονοθέλει τὸ τέρας ἀφίκηται.

It was far from being *Dion's* character to be easily shaken and dispirited; and his being in such dread lest the vision should appear to him again, and his begging his friends, to remain with him in the night-time, hath something terrible in it. Men who do not fear death, may yet fear something more than death itself. What is it that puts the soul in such an agony in these cases?

Or

unsupported assertion imaginable; is it not quite a different thing, that those objects should

Or why should they happen before *bloody* and *tragical* events? Or not happen at the approach of natural death? Let one of those men, who affect to call themselves *strong spirits* [*les esprits forts*] suppose himself in *Dion's* place, and then think whether he could be proof against terror from supernatural *causes*. Did never a dream shake him, divest him of all his boasted intrepidity and firmness of spirit? If so, he may draw a consequence from hence, how little the human soul could be a match for *certain causes* that may be in the universe. He hath not taken the just measure of his own courage, who thinks he could be a match for *any thing*; and yet he who reckons all terrors *false* and *vain*, ought to think himself a match for *every thing*. I own *chance* and *atoms*, or an *unguided world of matter*, is but an unpleasing prospect at best; and a man who was seriously persuaded of such a world, would need no ordinary stock of courage on many occasions; but in such *distresses*, these Philosophers begin to think of their Adversary's arguments, and wish at least that they may be true, which shews they are not proof against *the fears* of their own scheme. But there is something more dreadful, than *chance* and *atoms* still behind. In a word, there is a great difference between the fear of death, and *other kind of fears* which the soul may feel, and is often subjected to; and which all the fortitude of human courage is not able to stand, let men boast as they will. Otherwise let them
shew

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should be exhibited to the soul, by a designing intelligent being, upon the occasion of cold; and that they should be produced *by cold*, as an *efficient cause*? Cold is but a mere want of something requisite, retarding the briskness of the motions in our bodies. *Heat* would have been a more probable *cause*. *Indeed, not the philosophy of the Sceptic alone, but of the generality of men, is full of negative efficient!* It would

shew me how it is possible, that the soul may remain *unterrified* even in a dream; or that it may not be placed in as weak and dejecting circumstances while we are awake. A *man* may bravely fight his *Enemies*, and not be conquered even in death; but in the case we are speaking of, there is no kind of arms with which we could defend ourselves, and our fright proceeds from finding ourselves *every way* in the power of *some being* superior to us.

I know not how Mr. *Hobbes* would have accounted for *this instance*, if he had tried his hypothesis upon it. *Dion* was awake when this happened to him, and thinking on something quite different from that which so suddenly surpris'd him. These circumstances, and the character of the man, far from having a weak or visionary head, make it difficult to find an invasion. No men in antiquity are less liable to the suspicion of weakness and credulity, than *Brutus* and *Dion*; or rather farther removed from those *follies*, the Sceptic seems to complain

would not, I think, be a greater absurdity, if we should say that a horse, if he be found, can but *walk*, or *gallop* at most: but if he be lame, it is not impossible but that he may sometimes *fly*! For it seems equally absurd, to suppose that our bodies, which when best disposed can only be moved mechanically, should, by their indisposition, become the cause of *life* and *spontaneity*.

XLI. As to the particular, Why these terrifying objects should be frequently exhibited to the soul, when the body labours under some disorder; reasons neither contradictory, nor improbable might be offered; which therefore, from the considerations in N° 35. take off the weight of this scruple. These spirits may possibly be under a restraint, and wait only an opportunity to gratify their enmity to us. Let us consider the disease called the *Incubus*, or *night-mare*, which many persons are tormented with in their sleep (t). It is generally accompanied with

complain of. *Plutarch* says they were "Ἄνδρες ἐμπεριθεῖς ἢ φιλόσοφοι, ἢ πρὸς ἑδὲν ἀκροσφαλεῖς, οὐδ' εὐάλωτοι πάθος.

(t) See the word *Ephialtes*, in Mr. Chambers's *Cyclo-pedia*,

with frightful, ghastly apparitions, which are then obtruded on the imagination; so that the *party* is made to fancy that the distemper itself proceeds from *their* pressing him down with a weight like to stifle him. And for this very reason, the *Latins* call this disorder the *Incubus*; as if we should say, *the overwhelper*, or *oppressor*: and the *Greek* name, ἐπιβάλλης, imports much the same thing. And this, I believe, is allowed to be a casual distemper of the brain, by which the animal spirits are obstructed. But now the bodily indisposition here, and the disagreeable vision made to accompany it, are *two very different things*: and as it would be absurd to make the *disorder* of the material organ the *efficient cause* of the apparitions that are exhibited along with it; for these are often *ugly phantoms*, which to fright us the more, appear to have bad designs upon

pedia, or *New Dictionary*; where an account of a surprising instance of this disease is given. *Macrobius* says of it—*In hoc genere [somnia] est ἐπιβάλλης, quem publica persuasio quiescentes opinatur invadere, & pondere suo pressos ac sentientes gravare.* In *som. Scip. lib. 1. cap. 3.* He means the ugly phantoms, which are made to accompany the pain felt.

us,

us, threaten us, wrestle with us, get us down, all which infer a designing, intelligent cause: so, their being exhibited along with it, and adapted to it, shews us, I think, that these beings wait for, and catch the opportunity of the indisposition of the body, to represent at the same time something terrifying also to the mind. Farther, we may observe, that the more pregnant instances, where people are subjected to illusions of the fancy, and such things as disorder their imagination, generally happen after the brain hath been discomposed with *anger, fear, disappointment*, or other violent passions; unquestionable examples of which might be given, if one needed to assign them: but they occur to every man's own observation. And it is, I think, because the previous indisposition generally gives an opportunity to these beings to affect the imagination, that the *disorder of the brain* stands in common discourse, for this *consequent trouble*; and that we reckon it the efficient cause of these visions, having nothing readier to say. I shall venture to give an instance, which seems to confirm this, related both by *Plutarch*, in the life of *Antony*, and *App. Alexandrinus*,

andrinus, in his history of the *Syrian War*, (if the latter may be reputed a different work.) *Antony's* army in their return from *Parthia*, were in great scarcity of provisions; and among other roots and herbs, which their necessity forced them to have recourse to, without knowing their natures, they eat of a certain *poisonous herb*, after which they became delirious, with this particular kind of phrensy, that, forgetting all other kind of business, they thought it of the last consequence, to turn over, and dig up all the stones they could find in their march: and the Historians say, *the whole field was filled with the soldiers, bowing down, digging up, and removing the stones* (u.) And in this occupation numbers of them miserably perished. Now shall we say that this, or any other herb, had a quality to possess their minds with this absurd notion? It is cer-

(u)——Τραπόμενοι δὲ πρὸς λάχανα καὶ ῥίζας, ——— ἡφανίό τινος πόας ἐπὶ θάνατον διὰ μανίας ἀγέσης· ὁ γὰρ φαγὼν ἔδεν ἐμέμνητο τῶν ἄλλων, ἔδὲ ἐγίνωσκεν, ἐν δὲ ἔργον εἶχεν, κινεῖν καὶ σρέφειν πάντα λίθους, ὡς τι μεγάλης σπουδῆς ἄξιον πρᾶττόμενος· ἦν δὲ μεσὸν τὸ πεδίον κεκυφῶτων χαμάζε, καὶ τὰς λίθους περλορυτίοντων καὶ μεθισάντων.

tain it could do nothing, beyond indisposing their bodies, by a change of the parts of matter in them. Nor can this, or other like instances, I conceive, be accounted for, but by allowing that these beings laid hold of the indisposition, which the poison had wrought in their bodies, to occupy their minds with this strange delirium.

These considerations, together with what was mentioned before, N^o 38. make it probable that such beings lay hold of the indisposition of the body, to distress the soul, and insult human reason, by occupying the imagination unnaturally: that the several kinds of *the disorders of reason* (in which we suppose the soul itself to be distracted) are but the effect of this unnatural occupation, by spirits, who have not power enough to invade the quiet of the soul, till its organ be previously disordered: that sleep, whose first and greatest effect is to darken the region of memory, and all former impressions (*v*), is
one

(*v*) I have before observed in the Notes (*c*) and (*d*) that *Lucretius* was gravell'd to account how the memory should be darkened, and yet a material soul be still awake.

He

one of those disorders which affords them most frequent opportunity, as recurring every night : that if it were not for the right disposition of the organ at other times, and that the perceptivity is regularly solicited and occupied by the natural action of external objects, they would never cease to torment the soul : and that, even perhaps *at certain other times*, when the organ is not indisposed, the curb that restrains their power may be taken off, for reasons that cannot but be good and wise ; so that, notwithstanding the presence of real external objects acting on the sensory, they may terrify the soul with unpleasing sights, visible

He could not deny either part of the appearance, and at last is forced to break the knot which he could not loose.

— *Cum jam destiterint ea sensibus usurpari*

At reliquas tamen esse vias in mente patentis,

Quà possint eadem rerum simulacra venire.

Lib. 4. ver. 971.

It is strange to conceive some passages left open in the soul, while the rest are shut ; or how one part of a material soul should be asleep, and another awake. It seems the several parts of the soul relieve one another sleeping by turns ; as the Poets tell us of *Argus's* eyes,

Inde suis vicibus capiebant bina quietem :

Cætera servabunt, atque in statione manebant.

only to those against whom they are thus let out; as the Poets tell us *Pentheus* and *Orestes* were pursued by visible furies, the one for sacrilege, and the other for parricide (x). Upon the whole then, as there are manifest contradictions in any other account that can be given; so there is in all this such a degree of probability, as makes the mind rest satisfied with the reasonableness of the supposition, which is enough for taking off the objection in hand, according to the remark that was made N^o 35. *The soul cannot have a disorder lodged in itself, nor be subject to any disease; a man who considers the simple nature of it, will never affirm this: and when he farther considers the only remaining way in which matter can affect it, which is by deadening its activity*

(x) *Eumenidum veluti demens videt agmina Pentheus—
Aut Agamemnonius scenis agitatus Orestes,
Armatus facibus matrem, & serpentibus atris.
Cum fugit; ultricésque sedent in limine diræ.*

Virg. *Æneid.* lib. 4.

And again, though upon a different occasion he expresses the same thought, saying

*Apparent diræ facies inimicaque Trojæ
Numina.* —————

and

and powers; he will scarce be able to hinder himself from assenting to these several particulars (y). It is certain *these disorders of reason*

(y) The soul can admit of no disease from matter, as having no parts to be disordered. It can suffer no alteration in its own substance, if that substance is not annihilated, as was shewn in sect. III. Vol. I. And if it should be contended, that a *simple substance* might be affected with disease, or disorder, at least by *immaterial beings*, that would still allow *these beings* to be the cause of the disorder, out of a too eager desire to shew that the soul might be capable of disease in its own nature. We would have the soul to *grow up*, to *decay*, to *sleep*, to *be mad*, to *be drunk*: who sees not that all these are ridiculous fancies too gross to be entertained concerning a *simple, uncompounded substance*? If the soul were mad, or had the disease lodged in itself; what could cure it again? The *virtue* of herbs perhaps! These could only effect a change in the disposition of parts, which it hath not. It would therefore still remain under this disorder, which must be *essential* (if I may so express it) to its simple substance; and we could not conceive any alteration, rectification, or change wrought in it, but by the power of the Being who created it. Thus it would be incurable by the power of all *second causes*: and that very argument brought to prove *that it is delirious and mad*, to wit, that it may be cured again, shews plainly, as it appears to me, that the disorder is not lodged in itself; since then it would

reason appear after grief, love, or some other great disappointment have discomposed the brain. And why should they appear then? — When we consider *that cause* which is the *power*, [the *mover*] in all mechanical motions, whether regular or disordered; there is no refusing this conclusion concerning these beings, without formally ascribing the effect of *disordering our reason*, to the very *Highest Being*, as has been said before. If the blood, or any other fluid, or matter in the body, moving after a new and unwonted manner, were the sole cause of this disorder, (which indeed is impossible to be conceived, if we call to mind what was said above, N^o 25.) the *First Cause* being the only *mover* in these motions, this absurd and impious conclusion would be unavoidable.

And then, if the simple nature of the soul can admit of no disorder, or disease in

be incurable. And since dead matter could never affect it thus; there is *no other cause* left in the nature of things to produce this appearance, but that which I have assigned. It is a self-evident truth that, *if a thing can admit of no change or alteration in its own nature, all change must be external to it.*

its own constitution; the power of medicine cannot be said to cure it, as it cures the body: So that the insinuation [*mentem sanari, corpus ut ægrum, cernimus,*] is fallacious and equivocal in every respect; as was promised to be shewn in N° 11. Sect. V. Vol. I. Would it not be absurd to say, *That the soul is mad every night, and that awaking in the morning cures it again of its phrensy?* And yet there is as much reason to affirm this of dreaming, as of any other circumstance it can be in. We are injurious in debasing the nature of our souls all manner of ways. We would have the soul material: if it be not, yet we would ascribe the perfection of rational thinking to matter: and if that cannot be granted, we would then have the soul capable of disorder in its own constitution. But the several particulars above, if seriously considered, ought to correct our prejudices. The argument may be reduced to a narrow compass. The *inactivity* of matter infers the immateriality of an active living being; the *immateriality* infers its *simple and uncompounded nature*; and its being simple and uncompounded infers *that it cannot be liable to any disorder or disease in itself*: The

disorder of matter can only hinder its activity; and if we should say, it may be affected with disorder or disease from immaterial beings, we incur the thing we would deny by this assertion.

XLII. That this notion of our dreams degenerating into a waking possession is not entirely new, we may see from those Authors, who have written on this subject before. Whatever way a man accounts for these two phænomena, he will readily give the same solution for both; there being such an affinity between them. *Aristotle* makes but a very little variation of general hypothesis, to account for that which he calls *ecstasy*; as hath been observed in N^o 38. and in this he says men foresee things to come, as well as those whom he calls *ἐνθουσιαστοί*. The place is remarkable. And Mr. *Locke*, after giving a definition of dreams in his way, adds——“ And whether that
“ which we call ecstasy, be not dreaming
“ with the eyes open, I leave to be examined (z).” By which way of speaking it

(z) Having described sensation, remembrance, attention, he adds——“ And dreaming itself is, the
“ having

it is plain he thought them nearly related. *Hobbes* supposes the same visions may happen to us *while waking*, as sleeping; *viz.* in great distempers of the organs; and proposes his solution of dreaming as including this particular case in it; of which below. And how explicit *Lucretius* is in this, hath been noticed above, N^o 10. of Sect. V. Vol. I. *Et quæ res nobis vigilantibus obvia mentis terrificet*—Indeed fright and terror is the general concomitant of these appearances; for but few persons, with *Horace's* *Argive*, are entertained then with gay sights, and pleas-

“ having ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped,
 “ so that they receive not outward objects with their
 “ usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any
 “ external objects, or known occasion; nor under any
 “ choice or conduct of the understanding at all. And
 “ whether that which we call ecstasy, &c.” Let *Aristotle's* definition of a dream, that it is only the *φαιδίσμα*, as in N^o 6. be remembered here; and it is as absurd that the bare representation, or things offered, should be under the *conduct* or *choice* of the understanding, as it is that we should see what we please only, when we look out of our window to the neighbouring fields. As to the soul's own thoughts in dreaming, See N^o 6. and what is cited from *Aristotle*. The soul reasons full as consistently, as an unexperienced stranger would do, about new and unknown objects.

ing objects. However *Lucretius's* fear was lest the soul should not be dead enough; and he proposes his solution to cure that. Again, *Aristotle* would have us believe, that the illusions obtruded on the imagination, while the person is feverish, arise from mechanical motions excited in the sensory; by telling us that the living creatures sometimes seen then on the walls, are nothing but a few strokes, or draughts, which bear a distant resemblance (*a*). But he should have remembered, that we hear and see things then, though all is dark and silent round us. We put some questions, and answer others, as if some body was talking with us. But have sounds their images to represent them, or are those images visible in the dark? Such circumstances plainly shew a cause more powerful than a few strokes on the wall of the chamber, dealing with the imagination. And in the former part of the paragraph, he assigns the like poor and unsatisfying reasons for distractions arising from *love, grief, fear, &c.* From hence then it appears, I think,

(*a*) Διὸ καὶ τοῖς πυρέτλουσιν ἐνίοτε φαίνεται, ζῶα ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις, ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιότητος τῶν γραμμῶν συνιδεμένων. cap. 2. de Insomn.

that if *these Authors* had accounted for this phænomenon by the agency of living invisible Beings, they would have concluded that waking spectres were also formed and represented by them; since they thought *dreams, possession or ecstasy, and apparitions,* all proceeded from the same cause, and were to be solved the same way.

XLIII. As to what is urged next, that these spirits must be ignorant, absurd, idle, weak, &c. otherwise our dreams would not be so trifling and inconsistent; a little consideration will shew us, that they are not such, and may yet represent our dreams as such. Their knowledge surely is surprizingly great, with regard to our nature and constitution. They must understand, not only how spirit acts on matter, since they themselves so act on our organs (*b*); but also how matter acts
on

(*b*) I have all along supposed, that impressions are first made on the sensory when we dream; and that the soul is made percipient of the representations, by means of these impressions; just as it is of external objects, while we are awake, by like impressions. The reasons for this are, *first*, the authority of *those writers*, whom I have cited on this subject, they all suppose motion and material

on spirit, since they so affect these organs, that they affect the soul, in the manner by them designed. They must have an intuition of the secrets of material nature, to us inscrutable in our present state; and know the occult methods which the God of nature hath instituted, by which the nerves affect

terial action the cause of dreaming; and therefore that the organ is primarily affected. *And then* the manner of our reminiscence of dreams; we remember them when awakened, by the help of those impressions; just as we do other things: a man's face, for instance, is the same way remembered in both cases, and leaves the same impressions. *Lastly*, that the soul should be directly affected by these spirits, and the impressions by which we remember, reflected back by it on the sensory, recedes farther from our philosophy, and manner of conception, and the method of nature, which God hath instituted, which is the very reverse of this. Yet if any should contend, that this last method is the true one; it would rather heighten, than diminish the wonderful power and knowledge of these beings, that they should effect the same things, by a contrary method to that which the God of nature hath instituted, and more strongly prove all that is inferred in this whole section. *To grant that the matter of the sensory is not first and directly acted upon, would be to assert, I think, instead of denying, an immaterial cause of dreams.*

the sensory, and it affects the soul; since they imitate these so well, that the *natural objects* themselves could not produce the representation more to the life. If we justly admire the subtilty of God's work; what may we think of *imitating* or *copying* it? Can this be the work of *chance*, or *unintelligent mechanism*? I really think it is a species of Atheism to affirm it. The divisibility of matter soon carries the fine operations of nature out of our view; because we receive information, only through organs of the same matter. It is impossible therefore such organs should help us to discover the nice workmanship and contexture of their own parts, or any thing in any other object below particles of a certain size in themselves. No optical improvement will ever effect this. Such is the necessary imperfection of material organs: but the manner in which vegetation is performed; the whole theory of the animal œconomy; the secret springs of motion in our bodies; the imperceptible tremor of each little fibre; what share it hath in producing the effect; and how it is to be otherwise struck, that it may produce such a variation from the common method, as best suits

suits the representation they design, (inso-much that the very *deviations* and *monstrously things* they represent, seem to shew most skill;) these things, I say, must lye open and pervious to their view; since their perception of them doth not depend upon particles of any size.

XLIV. Their power and knowledge doth not reach to the exciting of vision only; they affect the auditory nerves themselves, or that part which those nerves affect, so as to produce the same sensation in the soul, and excite the same ideas in it, as if the words of that language which we understand, were audibly pronounced, to the hearing of bystanders. This is a strange appearance, and full of conviction! It cannot seem to us to be the effect of ordinary power and knowledge, if we consider the matter attentively. It is in this particular that *reason* itself is represented, and rational ideas *conveyed*: which could not be done but by *a rational being*. Articulate sounds stand for ideas; and these consistently put together are the effect of ratiocination. What cause but a rational one could do this? Moreover, it is not because
the

the same beings could not do the same thing, in any other, or all other languages; for men of all languages hear *these internal discourses*, each in his own, without an interpreter: but because we could not understand another. Thus the *knowledge* of languages, which is accounted so high an accomplishment among men, which costs them so much pains, and consumes so much of their time, though possessed by these beings in perfection, costs them no study; nor is to be reckoned any part of their natural endowments; since by nature they do not stand in need of it (for separate spirits do not communicate perceptions by articulate sounds) but is as small an *accessory* to those perfections which are natural to them; as any thing we know can be to their knowledge. What shall we say, when the soul is made to read several coherent sentences of a book in a dream, which is no more than some people really, not to say frequently, experience(c)? The soul certainly doth not lay these

(c) I shall here give the observations of a late ingenious Author on this particular, from *Spectator* 487. concerning which I spoke something N^o 17. above.

——But

these sentences in print, and then read them, as if it knew nothing of its own industry, and

—But in dreams it is wonderful to observe, with what a sprightliness and alacrity she [the soul] exerts herself. The slow in speech make unpremeditated harangues, or converse readily in languages that they are but little acquainted with. The grave abound in pleasantries, the dull in repartees and points of wit. There is not a more painful action of the mind than invention; yet in dreams it works with that ease and activity, that we are not sensible when the faculty is employed. For instance, I believe every one some time or other dreams, that he is reading papers, books, or letters; in which case the invention prompts so readily, that the mind is imposed upon, and mistakes its own suggestions for the compositions of another.——Although he is mistaken, as to the efficient cause here; yet it is not to be supposed, that a person of such candor would have written so, without experience of the things in which he instances. But if the example of N^o 7. on which the argument there proceeds, had been so full and explicit, it would possibly have been suspected, as contrived on purpose. Therefore I have all along chosen to argue from cases a little under the truth. The soul could not act in sleep, and not be conscious of its own action. And if what it is conscious of doing itself, be above what it could do while awake, as speaking readily in a language it is but little acquainted with, haranguing, &c. which is perhaps not impossible; I should think

and action (*d*). All Mr. *Locke's* reasoning,
against a man's thinking without being consci-

ous

even this could not be accounted for, without interesting some *superior cause*: since certainly its own natural powers cannot be rendered greater, or quicker in sleep than otherwise.

(*d*) There was a particular objection raised against the argument in N^o 6. which because it refers to something spoken of in this paragraph, I have reserved to be considered here, as I promised in the Note (*i*). It is as follows. "Against your argument brought to prove
" that the soul itself cannot be the cause of troublesome representations in dreaming, there seems place
" for an exception; that by the force of its own imaginative power it can represent such things to itself
" while awake; as *conversing with others, being upon a precipice, recalling the memory of imminent danger,*
" and the like; which it can work up to cause troublesome passions, such as fear and horror; *Why then*
" *may it not be supposed, by the force of imagination,*
" *which exerts itself in sleep, to do the same?* There
" is a memorable story to this purpose, of a Gentleman who in the time of snow rode over the Lake
" of *Geneva*; and being told at his arrival in the city, of the danger he was in, it made such an impression upon him, that he instantly died. It is
" owned that in your forty fourth paragraph, there
" are some instances, which it seems not easy to reduce to this supposition."

But

ous of any thought at all (in which it is strange if he had any adversary) may be applied directly

But with much submission, *when the soul represents to itself while we are awake, objects of fear and horror, it is conscious that it doth this itself; in sleep it is quite otherwise: whence there is no parity to infer that it is equally active in both cases. That the soul exerts its imaginative power in sleep, without knowing that it doth it, is the point in debate, and ought to be proved. The instance of the Gentleman who died upon reflecting on the danger he was in, seems quite different, and must be differently accounted for. Allowing this particular example to be literally true (since many such stories are told) the reason of his sudden death, seems to be the same, as when one dies with a sudden excessive joy. There are two instances of this kind given by Livy, after the overthrow at Thrasimenus: Two Mothers having heard that their sons were killed in the battle, upon seeing them return safe, dropt down dead with the sudden excess of joy. [—*Fæminarum præcipuè & gaudia insignia erant, & luctus. Unam in ipsâ portâ, sospite filio, repente oblato, in conspectu ejus expirasse ferunt; alteram, cui mors filii falso nunciata erat, mœstam sedentem domi, ad primum conspectum redeuntis filii gaudio nimio exanimatam*, lib. 22. cap. 7.] And accordingly some caution is to be used in acquainting persons with unexpected news that are extremely good, or extremely bad, lest the bare relation of them should prove fatal. The reason of this I leave for others to assign; but*

it

rectly to this case. To be able to do this, it ought to be *two distinct Agents*, as has been said

it seems to be a sudden and instantaneous effect, where there is no room for *working up the memory of past danger, to cause the troublesome passion of fear and horror*, as the objection supposes. If a man should read a *letter*, look upon a *precipice*, hear an account of the death of a friend, &c. which should have this fatal effect upon him; the soul would be *passive* in receiving these *impressions* which produce it. Perhaps the *quickness of the surprize* causes the soul [mechanically, and necessarily] to make such an *effort* on, or give such a *shock*, (if I may so express it) to the animal spirits, as stops at once all the vital motions. Something like this seems to happen, though in a less degree, on *several other sudden surprizes*; the body starts, or is suddenly shaken with this *effort* or *shock*, the heart palpitates for some time, and the pulse beats quick; all which it is impossible to prevent; the soul is passive or necessary in this case, and doth not *work up the passions*. And from this last particular we may conceive how the constitution of the brain itself may be disordered or shattered, (so to speak) and the exercise of reason be disturbed for ever afterwards; as in many cases we see it is, by sudden *fear, love, grief, disappointment*, &c. concerning which I have spoke N^o 41.

In all these cases then, the soul is *first acted upon* by some object which causes these subsequent emotions, that prove fatal or hurtful; but this cannot be appli-

said before. And to make *these books*, and this *written subject*, the effect of *chance*, or of any cause working mechanically, is some-

cable to shew that the soul may present to itself painful and uneasy objects in sleep, without knowing that it doth so. It is here likewise *first acted upon* by some object from without; and the objection, when rightly considered, seems rather to confirm than weaken the argument it is brought against. To say *the force of imagination exerts itself in sleep* without the consciousness of the soul, is to suppose *the soul unconscious in its operations*; in which case we may *affirm* or *deny* any thing concerning it at pleasure; or if in sleep the imaginative power exerts itself, without the will and consciousness of the *imagining Being* [the soul] it must be a *distinct agent*, instead of a faculty belonging to an agent. And not to be conscious of one part of its own consciousness, at the same time *precisely* that it is conscious of another part of it, is altogether absurd, and destroys the evidence which arises from self-consciousness, as hath been often said. If the instances in this paragraph do not agree with the supposition in the objection, (as is candidly owned) why should any other agree with it, where there is *the same distinction and diversity of consciousness*? If the soul doth not form and present to itself *the sentences in a Book*, why should it form and present to itself, any other object seen in sleep, in beholding which it is conscious of being passive, and often involuntary? But of all these particulars enough hath been said above.

thing

thing like *Ennius's Annals* being compiled by a fortuitous jumble of letters. To be reduced to say any thing like this, is a sign that a man hath a bad cause in hand; and can allow himself to say things, without being convinced of them; which is the worst disposition in the world for finding out truth. And such considerations as these made me say, N^o 10. that the same kind of argument, that proves the material world was made by a *living, intelligent cause*, proves also that our dreams are contrived, and represented to us by *such a cause*.

XLV. Thus it by no means appears, that these Beings are ignorant, or weak; and from this it follows, that we cannot say they are absurd or contradictory; though we cannot find out the reason of every incoherent scene they present to the soul in sleep. They may have the spiteful design to endeavour to insult and confound human reason by some of them. They cannot excite in us contradictory, or self-destructive ideas; for the wildest ideas in sleep are as consistent and real ideas, because actually perceived, as the soberest ideas we

have while awake. But they may excite in us ideas inconsistent with the nature of external material objects; and therefore with the ideas these excite in us, designing to entangle and perplex our reason. However, it will no more follow from this, that the idea of a monster, with one eye as large as a shield, many hands, and so tall that a tower might stand between his legs; with as many other deviations from the present form and stature of a man's body, as we please to add; it will no more follow, I say, that such an idea is *contradictory*, because it is not the idea of an ordinary man; than that the idea of a man is contradictory, because it is not the idea of such a monster. Both ideas are equally real, though the objects of both do not equally exist *ab extra*. It would not be a just inference, that the idea of a *Negro* is a contradictory idea, because it is not the idea of a *white man*: and the other is no better. This objection from the contradictoriness of our dreams, sounds big at first, and seems very unpromising to be accounted for; and yet it hath nothing terrible in it but the bare sound; only we are too often surprized, and grant a thing through inattention, which we should

should not. Nay farther, we may observe that there is no impossibility, why such a monster as is just now supposed, might not exist *à parte naturæ*. Whatever is *conceivable*, may be performed by some power; and nothing is a mark of impossibility, but a self-destructiveness in the idea; such as, that a part may be bigger than the whole. And no Being can prompt us with such an idea, whether asleep or awake. For it is at first impossible to the conception. If it were possible to conceive such an idea, the object of it might be made to exist from without. Thus these powers may endeavour to confound human reason sophistically, by surprising us through inattention, to allow that an object seen, inconsistent with another real object, is absolutely inconsistent; and to render suspected the foundations of evidence and certainty, by engaging us to consent to *false facts* and *unreal appearances* in the unguarded hours of sleep: But we may see through the artifice when we are awake; and it is our own fault if we take part with them then (e).

XLVI. This

(e) It will perhaps be said that all this concerning the invidious nature of these beings, is only a supposition.

XLVI. This imputation on the rational nature of the soul, from the inconsistency of

But I answer, 1. It is not a contradictory supposition, and therefore, is sufficient to account for the possibility of the point objected to. 2. It is not *my supposition*, but as old as any thing whereof we have records. *Plutarch* tells us it was τῶν πάνυ παλαιῶν λόγος, that there were φαῦλα δαιμόνια ἢ βάσκανα, προσφθονῆτα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, &c. I might bring many instances to shew that the word δαίμων, as it is used by the best writers of antiquity, constantly infers this supposition; and that from hence came the words εὐδαίμων and κακοδαίμων, to express a fortunate or unhappy man. I might give *Hesiod's* authority;

Τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλης διὰ βελὰς,
Ἐσθλοί, ἐπιχθόνιοι, Φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

But, lastly, I would beg leave to observe that this is not *a bare supposition*. For as the existence of such Beings in general, cannot be called a supposition, when it is proved by *natural phenomena*; so the *diversity of their natures* cannot be called a supposition, when it is shewn by the *diversity of these Phenomena*. It is from the nature of the *effects*, that we come to know the nature of the *cause* in any case. Would it not be absurd to ascribe *hurtful effects* to a *beneficent and good cause*? and still

more

of our dreams, will thus appear sufficiently taken off, if what hath been said in several parts above be here remembered. For, first, these scenes are only inconsistent, considered with respect to objects that really exist; but not *absolutely contradictory*, as hath been shewn just before. Secondly, They are not the work of the soul itself, but involuntarily obtruded upon it; and it is as passive, and as much under a necessity of beholding them, as of beholding the greatest beauties in the creation. Thirdly, It hath been shewn not only convenient, *but even necessary*, upon the account of the body, that the region of memory should be covered up in sleep, so that these objects, though fantastical, must ap-

pear more absurd to ascribe these effects to the very *first Cause*? And yet there is a plain necessity of falling into this absurdity, without allowing a cause of a different nature. Men do not consider that by denying secondary and imperfect causes, they load the perfectest of Beings with all that is *mean* and *unworthy*. The truth is, they have not been accustomed to think any cause at all necessary; and therefore reckon a man extremely unreasonable to pretend to insist on the necessity of a cause to produce an effect; or of a different cause to produce an effect of quite an opposite nature.

pear real. Fourthly, The soul may be made to behold the like fantastical objects, even while we are awake, and to take them for real. The objections seem to make it *a reproach on the soul*, that any Being in nature should be superior to it, or able to impose upon, or terrify it. Why should not *Brutus* or *Dion*, have taken the visions that were offered to them for something real; since as real impressions were made on the sensory to produce them, as if the objects had existed externally? These impressions are the *marks* from which we infer the real external existence of *any object* at *any time*. Let a man suppose that like imaginary scenes were offered to him, and then weigh the matter fairly with himself: if he thinks he could not be deceived, he must suppose himself to have some supernatural faculty of *distinguishing*, which men are not endued with. But allowing he should not be imposed upon, but know the objects seen to be only imaginary; what would he think of such a vision that was thus offered to him? He must certainly conclude that *some very extraordinary cause* produced it, and perhaps would then be no less terrified than if it were otherwise.

wife. And lastly, what the soul itself does or thinks in sleep, is much the same with what it would do or think in like circumstances if we were awake. And indeed if a man will consider the different accidents of this kind that happen to persons both while asleep and while awake, (and the latter perhaps without any previous disorder of the body) he will conceive it very possible, that our *waking thoughts* might be all as inconsistent, as now our dreams are; and our thoughts in sleep as consistent as our thoughts are now by day. *So incompetent a principle is the matter of the body, or the right disposition of that matter, to ascribe the perfection of rational thinking to!* Mr. Locke, in a place taken notice of above (*f*), seems to charge this as consequent upon the assertion of some of his adversaries; and yet immediately after, I think, he makes it appear to be his own opinion. He says, “ This I
“ would willingly be satisfied in, Whether
“ the soul when it thinks thus apart, and
“ as it were separate from the body, acts
“ less rationally than when conjointly with
“ it, or no : if its separate thoughts are less

(*f*) Sect. IV. N^o 21. Vol. I. Note (*g*).

“ rational,

“ rational, then *These Men* must say that
 “ the soul owes the perfection of rational
 “ thinking to the body : if it does not, 'tis a
 “ wonder that our dreams should be, for
 “ the most part, so frivolous and irrational.”

Here this absurdity is first made a *consequence* of what *These Men* say ; and immediately it is surmised that the quality of our dreams shews this absurdity to be fact. This is really a strange way of proceeding, to shuffle over the odiousness of an insinuation upon *others* ; and in case *they* should disown it, and *that circumstance* from which he would infer it, (*viz.* that the soul thinks without being conscious of it) to endeavour to prove it, by an appearance, which he has ready at hand. *These Men* deny that the soul thinks less or more rationally, without being conscious of it ; and therefore any consequence of such a position : but who is it here that appeals to the *frivolousness* and *irrationality* of our dreams to shew, that the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body ? Mr. *Locke* should have told us what were his own sentiments of this affair ; and, if it were an absurdity, shewn us how it was to be avoided ; but

first to endeavour to turn it over upon his adversaries, as something very unjustifiable, which therefore shewed the absurdity of their opinion, and then to endeavour to prove it, was altogether singular. Here he supposes that the soul itself produces all it hears and sees in sleep, that it thinks apart and separately at that time, and exerts the utmost perfection it is capable of, when destitute of the help of the body. How unjust and inaccurate a representation of the appearance is this?

This phænomenon of sleep and dreaming therefore, which hath been made use of to exalt the nature of matter, and depress the perfection of the soul, rightly considered shews the very contrary. It is upon the account of the body that the activity of the soul is restrained, that the region of memory is covered up, and by the means of the body that the soul is liable to be imposed upon. The opposition of appearances observable in this state, (of *fatigue* and *activity*, of *insensibility* and *life*, at the same time) cannot fail to shew us the opposite natures of the two constituent parts of our composition. If *this* opposition of appearances had been less, or
our

our constitution more perfect, perhaps we could not have observed these different natures with so much ease and certainty. If all had been a *blank* of thought and consciousness in sleep, the *soul* would have seemed to be of the same nature with the body: if there had been *no difference* of thought and consciousness then and at other times, the *body* would have appeared to be of the same nature with the soul; nor could the *thinking principle* have been so distinguishable. There are so many useful and instructive appearances belonging to this phenomenon, that I am sure a curious, fair *Enquirer* would not wish it removed out of nature. Whatever the Sceptick may say, he seeks to *deny*, *diminish*, or *pervert* every circumstance relating to it. How uncomfortable would it be to lye down in a temporary state of non-existence! How delightful is it to think that there is a *world* of spirits; that we are surrounded with intelligent living Beings, rather than in a *lonely, unconscious Universe, a wilderness of matter*! It is a *pledge* given us of *immortality itself*, and that we shall not be extinguished all at once, nor cut off from existence,

It is true, we are sometimes insulted with painful illusions : but we are at other times gratified by more friendly powers. It is pleasant to think that infinite goodness rules over all ; this is a rational security. Were there no other thing, the discovery itself is worth all the pain we suffer. This appearance is offered to us as a *counterpart* to dead matter. I cannot repeat it too often, *Every thing is best as God hath ordered it*. Nothing so ordered is void of instruction. Who that is rational would *chuse* to be without these intimations of an after-existence? But to return and shew other reasons, why the scenes offered may be wild and incoherent.

XLVII. The *indisposition* of the body may hinder the *perfection* and *consistency* of the schemes designed. For, since these Beings immediately affect the organ, and by it the soul ; some indispositions of the organ must indispose it for their designs, and mar the inconsistency of their schemes. We see an indisposed organ often hinders real external objects from raising the same sensations in the soul. Some indispositions of the head so
affect

affect the eyes, that the *perspective* of all objects is much marred; the images are *distorted*, or the objects are thrown off to a great distance, or they seem to *dance* and *wheel round*, though the outward impressions are the same as at other times. And hence, more probably the confusion of dreams after eating; than a *not-dreaming*, as *Aristotle* says. When the *natural* method of perception may be thus vitiated; we may warrantably say, the like must happen to the impressions made by any other cause. The rapid motion of the blood in a fever must of course disturb such *representations*; as the moving of water shatters the images it would otherwise represent entire (g). Sick mens dreams

(g) It is worth one's while to consider the following explication of this particular from *Aristotle*, which is no less applicable here, than to his hypothesis; and which therefore I shall transcribe at large. "Ωσε (says he) καθαπέρ ἐν ὑγρῷ, εἰάν σφόδρα κινή τις, ὅτε μὲν ἔδεν φαίνειναι εἶδωλον· ὅτε δὲ φαίνειναι μὲν, διεσραμμένον δὲ πάντων, ὥσε φαίνεσθαι ἄλλοιόν, ἢ ὅτ' ἐστίν· ἡρεμήσαντος δὲ, καθαρά κ' φανερά. Οὕτω κ' ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν, τὰ φαντάσματα, κ' αἱ ὑπόλοιποι κινήσεις, αἱ συμβαίνουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων, ὅτε μὲν ὑπὸ μείζονος ἔσης τῆς εἰρημίνης κινήσεως, ἀφανίζονται πάντα· ὅτε δὲ τελαραγμένας

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dreams are proverbially wild. *Horace* compares a *poem* to them, where no part is of a piece with the rest (*b*). In the morning, when the indisposition that causes a confusion in the brain, is well near worn off, our dreams begin to be more clear and intelligible; as the same *Author* observes, and our experience confirms (*i*). And these confi-

μέναι φαίνεσθαι αἱ ὄψεις, ἢ τερατώδεις, ἢ οὐκ ἑρρωμέναι
τὰ ἐνύπνια, ὅσον τοῖς μελαγχολικοῖς, ἢ πυρέτῃσι, ἢ
οἰνωμένοις. cap. 2. De in infomn. See here N^o 33, above.

As this is remarkable, I shall give a *translation* of it for the sake of those who may not understand the *original*, “As any liquor (says the *Author*) if it be jumbled, sometimes represents no *image* at all, and sometimes represents the *image* distorted, and different from what it should be; but if the liquor be undisturbed, the *image* appears plain and conspicuous; so in sleep, the φανιάσματα and *impressions* sometimes disappear altogether, when the aforesaid motions are strong; and sometimes the *visions* misshaped and monstrous, and the *appearances* but slender, and weakly impressed; as happens to *melancholick* and *feverish* persons, or those who are *drunk*.”

(*b*)———*Vclut ægri somnia, vanæ*

Finguntur species——— De Art. poëtic.

(*i*)———*Quirinus*

Post mediam noctem visus; cum somnia vera.

Sat. 10. lib. 1.

derations

derations not only answer the *present difficulty*, but explain *another*, in shewing that all the arguments for our dreams being mechanical, agree well enough with the present conclusion. What is mechanical will bear to be explained *this way*; but what is spontaneous, living, rational, will never endure to be explained *mechanically*. Again, they may at other times offer to the imagination such wild and frightful figures, as they know must naturally terrify the soul; which seems probable from the *frightful appearances* that are made to accompany the disease called the *Incubus*, spoken of before. Besides, as there may be a contrariety among themselves in their inclinations and designs, so they may industriously mar each other's representations, and impede the effects of each other's power: for there may be emulation and opposition among them, according to the difference of their natures, and extent of their power. Now, according to the observation in N° 35. since the fundamental truth is certain; it is enough to take off the present difficulty, that there is *no open absurdity* in these suppositions: not to say that there is a great deal of probability in them all.

XLVIII. As to what is said of the absurdity of supposing such Beings busied in suggesting imaginary scenes to brute animals; it is replied that, strictly speaking, this is *but a supposition*, and nothing that we can be certain of. If any one was to go about to prove it, he could not possibly do more than make it probable. The point is thus. We men have scenes of vision obtruded on the soul in sleep, where there is *life, action*, nay and *reason too*: the soul is unconcerned in the production of these: therefore we conclude that a living cause produces these visions, and offers them to the perceptivity, a capacity in which we are passive and necessary. Now some beasts give signs, by the motions of their bodies in sleep, that their perceptivity is not vacant then, and that's all (*k*): for surely they do

(*k*) *Lucretius* says, lib. 4. ver. 987.

*Venanturque canes, in molli sæpe quiete,
Fæstant crura tamen subito, vocesque repente
Mittunt; & crebras reducunt naribus auras,
Ut vèstigia si teneant inventa ferarum.*

This is so: but when he says, birds dream that the hawk pursues them, and that they fly to the sacred groves, &c. it seems rather a poetical embellishment.

do not tell us so. Whence we suppose, (with probability indeed) that they have objects also presented to them. And from this again we conclude, supposing these objects are such as could not be produced without a designing cause, and that they are forced upon their perceptivity, as we know the case is with us; they must be produced by such a cause. Here *the conclusion* is not more certain, than *the matter of fact* that leads to it: and as certain it must be. This certainty is not so great; as when we make the conclusion with respect to ourselves; for then we infer from *our own consciousness* and *experience*; but in this case from *probability* only, and from *conjecture* in part. And in this there is no apparent absurdity. As to the reasons (supposing all that is desired) why these superior Beings should be busied in this low occupation; it is not necessary to the conclusion, to pretend to know, or assign them. Yet it could not be shewn to be an absurdity, or even any thing unphilosophical, if one

*At varix fugiunt volucres, pinnisque repente,
Solicitant divum nocturno tempore lucos
Accipitres somno in leni si prælia, pugnasque
Edere sint perfectantes, visæque volantes.*

Ibid.

should say they may be confined by an *overruling Power*, to act under such limitations, or on such subjects; so that some of them may be tied down to illude the perceptivity even of brutes. And if so, it cannot be a small punishment, nor an ordinary degradation, to Beings of such high reach and faculties, to be forced to act in such a groveling sphere; to accommodate their representations to the capacity of a dog, or swine. More might be said; but perhaps it is better to omit these things (1).

XLIX. The

(1) If this difficulty be considered in another light, we may perhaps think it not so absurd, as at first it would appear, to allow that separate spirits may be thus occupied; when we remember that the *First Cause* submits his infinite power, to *perform* the spontaneous motion of *brute animals*, as much as of men; as hath been shewn in Sect. II. Vol. I. and that he vouchsafes to guide the *very lowest and most contemptible species* of them, immediately by his own unerring reason. For where sense ceases to guide the lower creatures, *instinct*, that is, his *immediate direction*, leads them to *all the ends* of Life and Being. However contemptibly we may treat them in our philosophy, they are *a part* of his creation, and *immediate care*. We may farther observe with respect to the dreaming of brutes, that *Aristotle* allows the appearance, but makes it a reason why our dreams are not sent by God. His words are; Ὅλως δ' ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν ἀλ-

XLIX. The last objection I shall mention, is an insinuation, *that our dreams are no more than the thoughts and business of the day recurring* : or which it may be supposed the soul itself some way or other resumes, without the interposition of such a cause as is here assigned. Mr. *Locke* says, “The dreams

λων ζώων ἐνερότητι τινὰ, θεόπεμπτα μὲν ἔκ αὐτῆς τὰ ἐνύπνια, ἔδὲ γέγονε τέττα χάριν· δαιμόνια μέντοι· ἡ γὰρ φύσις δαιμόνια, ἀλλ’ ἔθεία. Where it is, I think, very remarkable, that the nature of this surprizing appearance made it otherwise probable, that our dreams were suggested by some *intelligent efficient*, had not this particular hindered him from concluding so; but as they are accounted for here it hath no weight. The distinction φύσις γὰρ δαιμόνια ἀλλ’ ἔθεία is an affected way of speaking; our dreams are truly δαιμόνια, in the proper sense of the word. Nature is θεία in right philosophy; but a *fatal or necessary constitution of nature* (if that be not contradictory) is not so much as δαιμόνια. He hath elsewhere another reason why our dreams are not sent by God; because they are only ἀγενεῖς ἄνθρωποι, and οἱ τυχούτες, that have *true and significant dreams* (see his Book Περὶ τῆς κατ’ ὕπνον μαντικῆς.) But undoubtedly, if a *poor man* hath a true, significant dream, it must have a *sufficient cause*, as much as if his pupil *Alexander* had dreamed it.

“ of

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“ of sleeping men are, as I take it, *all made*
 “ *up* of the waking man’s ideas, though for
 “ the most part oddly put together (m).”
Lucretius says only *fere* and *plerumque* (n).
 It is true when *Dionysius* dreams that one of
 his captains killed him, and therefore puts
 him to death as a conspirator; this might be
 of a piece with his day-thoughts, he being
 a suspicious, bloody tyrant (o). But notwith-

(m) Book 2. cap. 1. sect. 17.

(n) *Et quoi quisque fere studio devinctus adhæret,—*

In somnis eadem plerumque videmur obire :

Causidici causas agere, & componere leges :

Induperatores pugnare, ac prælia obire :

Nautæ contractum cum ventis cernere bellum :

Nos agere hoc autem, &c.

Lib. 4. from ver. 959 to 982.

It seems he himself wrote over again his Book *De rerum natura* in his sleep. Farther on, he says, sometimes after the *publick shows*, the spectators dream over again all the theatrical performances, dances, musick, &c.

(o) *Plutarch* says of him—Καὶ Μαρσύαν δὲ τινὰ τῶν προηγημένων ὑπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ τελαγμένον ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας ἀνείλεν, δόξαντα κατὰ τὰς ὕπνου σφάττειν αὐτόν· ὡς ἀπ’ ἐννοίας μεθήμερινῆς καὶ διαλογισμῷ, τῆς ὀψέως ταύτης εἰς τὸν ὕπνον αὐτῷ παραγενομένης. He thought, *he himself* could not have had such a dream, unless *Marfya*, had really plotted against him to take away his life.

standing this, it argues much inattention to be able to suppose, that the force put upon the soul in such a scene, was the work of the soul itself: or that the spontaneity, life and design in such a vision, was not the work of a living, designing cause. Or though we could some way or other imagine, that *Caligula* fancied, he was to be assumed to a share of the government of the Universe; and therefore dreamed before his death, that *Jupiter* kicked him down from his throne (*p*); the same exception is to be made to it. But was it ever before in *Astyages's* waking thoughts, or of a piece with them, ἐκ τῶν αἰδοίων τῆς θυγατρὸς φῦναι ἄμπελον, *that out of his Daughter there grew a Vine, which over-shaded all Asia?* Or again, that she discharged such a quantity of urine, as made a general inundation in it? Or when *Lucullus*, dreamed that one *Autolycus* desired to speak with him, a name he had never heard of before, and whose history he learned only next morning from the inhabitants of the place; can it be said that any of his waking thoughts had suggested this to him? We are

(*p*) (Vid. Sueton. in Calig.)

placed in circumstances every night, and see things, which for the *newness* and *strangeness* of them, we are surprized how they could enter our fancy. *This observation* of Mr. *Locke's* is so far from being exact, that if he had made *just the contrary* observation, it would have been equally true: which is remarkable enough in a man of his accuracy and judgment. Now, our natural curiosity should rather have prompted us, I think, to search out the cause of these *new* and *strange* visions: allowing that the soul might some way or other, *unknowing to itself*, turn over all objects in sleep, formerly familiar to it; nay and terrify itself with some of them. Or if our curiosity had not led us to examine the *foreign* sort of dreams, but rather to enquire into the nature of the other kind, yet how could the *soul*, upon Mr. *Locke's own principles*, form to itself in sleep a scene of our waking actions and thoughts, and *the man* be still ignorant of it, without being two distinct persons? And since they are the thoughts and actions of us rational Beings, could they be introduced to the soul again, but by some *rational* and *intelligent cause*? If a *Lawyer*, to take *one* of *Lucretius's in-*
N 4 *stances,*

stances, answers the objections of the opposite party in his sleep, and if he made these objections against himself, should he not be as conscious that he made them, as that he made the answers to them? If objections are made, the efficiency of a rational intelligent cause is interested, from the nature of the instance: and if the person himself answers the objections, the soul reasons sometimes in sleep, or *hath ideas under the conduct of the understanding*.

L. That these separate Agents should sometimes represent to us *familiar and known objects*, and immediately after something *new and strange*, hath nothing inconsistent in it; it is really rather an *argument* for, than an *objection* against the conclusion here made. If all our dreams were of *one sort*, more might be alledged than can be, as things now are. One may farther say, if these Beings suit the visions they offer to us, to our *profession, age, complexion, business*; they suit them also to our *passions, evil habits, vices*. Men have been sometimes in danger of killing a *real friend*, instead of an *imaginary enemy*. *Lucretius* tells us maculating dreams accompany

pany youth (q). The covetous, revengeful, lascivious, have thus opportunities thrown in their way, of indulging their vicious inclinations, without restraint from *men*, or *human laws*. And it is in this respect we are most exposed to the power and cunning of these Beings. We ought then to keep our bodies regular, and our minds pure, ~~that~~ we may not afford them a handle. *Democritus* advises to pray, that only good and propitious visions may be formed to us in our sleep out of those fortuitous films and simulacra, which constantly rise from the surfaces of material things, and float up and down in the air (r). But it is not wonderful what a man

(q) *Tum quibus ætatis freta primitus insinuantur,
Semen ubi ipsa dies membris matura creavit;
Conveniunt simulacra foris, e corpore quoque
Nuntia præclari voltus, &c.*

Lib. 4. ver. 1024.

(r) Δημόκριτος μὲν γὰρ εὐχέσθαι φησι δεῖν ὅπως εὐλόγῳ εἰδῶλων τυγχάνωμεν, καὶ τὰ σύμφυλα καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν, ἐκ τῶ περιέχοντός, ἢ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ σκαιὰ συμφέρεται, [certainly to be in continual dread from chance, which neither prayers nor tears can bend, is the worst kind of Deisidemony; as *Plutarch* observes in the following part of the sentence] λόγον οὕτ' ἀληθῆ, καὶ

man can pray to, who believes there is no other thing besides matter; neither God nor Spirit? It is natural for such a creature as man to pray, when he is in want, fear, distress; nay, I think it is impossible not to pray at such times; but it is shocking to pray to *chance*, or to address *fatal necessity*. Is it not better philosophy to pray to that Being who keeps these spirits in subjection, that their malicious designs upon us may be frustrated?

LI. We may next take notice of the solutions of this appearance, given by those who taught the materiality of the soul: and after what hath been said just now, perhaps no consideration can better shew us *the necessity of assigning a living intelligent cause for it*, than to review the wild and unsupported things these men have said to explain it, without the help of such a cause. This is the chief design and subject of *Lucretius's* 4th Book *De rerum natura*; in the first part of which he endeavours, in his own way, to

καὶ πρὸς ἀπεράντους ἐκφέροντα δεισιδαιμονίας εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀβάλλων. In Æmil.

shew

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shew the manner by which external objects act upon the senses, and produce perception in the mind; resolving to shew how this is applicable also to the perception excited in us in our dreams. He supposes that from the surfaces of all material things there are continually flying off thin membranes, pellicles, or similar surfaces (*s*). These he calls *simulacra*, *membrana*, *cortex*, *effigiæ*. Colours themselves he makes to be thin colour-

(*s*) *Nunc agere incipiam tibi quod vehementer ad has res
Attinet, esse ea quæ rerum simulacra vocamus :*

Quæ quasi membranæ summo de corpore rerum

Direptæ volitant ultro citroque per auras :

Atque eadem nobis vigilantibus obvia mentis

Terrificant ; atque in somnis, cum sæpe figuras

Contuimur miras, simulacraque luce carentum.

Ver. 34.

And again,

Dico igitur rerum effigias, tenuesque figuras

Mittier ab rebus, summo de corpore earum ;

Quæ quasi membrana, vel cortex nominanda 'st ;

Quòd speciem, ac formam similem gerit ejus imago.

Quojuscunque cluet de corpore fusa vagari.

Ver. 46.

One might ask here by the by, Whence came these *simulacra luce carentum*, after the bodies were burnt or buried? The surface of the urn only or tomb, should have appeared !

ed

ed pellicles, incessantly issuing from the coloured body, and tincturing whatever they fall upon with their own die (*t*). Such *tenues, consimilésque formarum effigiæ* cannot be observed singly, he says; but by their constant flux a number of them may, especially from a *speculum* (*u*); but that upon wood, stone, &c. the spectres are shivered and broken (*v*). Hitherto this is not much amiss; at least there is fancy and poetical imagination in it; only he seems to be under some difficulty when he would prove that there are thin surfaces thrown off by bodies, because *grass-*

(*t*) *Verum de summis ipsum quoque sæpe colorem, &c.*

Ver. 72.

(*u*) *Sunt igitur tenues formarum consimilesque*

Effigiæ, singillatim quas cernere nemo

Cum possit: tamen assiduo crebroque repulso

Rejēctæ, reddunt speculorum ex æquore visum; —

Nec ratione aliâ servari posse videntur

Tantopere, ut similes reddantur quoique figuræ.

Ver. 103.

(*v*) — *Sed in aspera saxa,*

Aut in materiem ut ligni pervenit, ibi jam

Scinditur, ut nullum simulacrum reddere possit.

At cum, splendida quæ constant, opposta fuerunt,

Densaque; ut in primis speculum 'st, nihil accidit

horum.

Ver. 148.

hoppers,

hoppers and *serpents* cast their *exuviae* at certain times of the year; and because smoke, vapour, flame, rise from bodies (x). Besides, he is not aware that, if these pellicles fly off in the dark, (for it is then we see them in dreams) colours and objects must be seen as much, and as well in the dark, as in the light; and if they fly off incessantly, they must be equally visible to us while awake as while we sleep. But then this is not enough, that these *similar surfaces* are incessantly emitted from all bodies; but farther many *simulacra rerum* are spontaneously generated, which do not rise from any body; these are still floating up and down in the air; still changing; and by odd combinations and encounters, make up the shapes of

(x) *Principio, quoniam mittunt in rebus apertis
Corpora res multæ; partim diffusa solutè;
Robora seu fumum mittunt; ignesque vaporem;
Et partim contexta magis, condensaque; ut olim
Cum veteres ponunt tunicas æstate cicadæ;
Et vituli cum membranas de corpore summo
Nascentes mittunt; & item cum lubrica serpens
Exiit in spinis vestem:——
Hæc quoniam fiunt; tenuis quoque debet imago.
Ab rebus mitti, summo de corpore eorum.*

Ver. 52.

Giants,

Giants, monsters, and wild beasts; no other-wise than we see strange figures and shapes in the clouds (y). Farther on he explains this particular, that these *simulacra* sometimes spontaneously exist, and sometimes arising in parts, from the bodies of real living creatures, they happen to encounter in the air, and produce monstrous *compounds* between them; as the *surfaces* arising from the bodies of a man and a horse, by sticking together make up the *simulacrum* of a *centaur* (z). And thus he got a fund of these

(y) *Sed ne forte putes ea demum sola vagare
Quæcunque ab rebus rerum simulacra recedunt;
Sunt etiam quæ sponte suâ gignuntur, & ipsa
Constituuntur in hoc cælo, qui dicitur ær;
Quæ multis formata modis sublimè feruntur;
Nec speciem mutare suam liquentia cessant;
Et quojusque modi formarum vertere in ora.
Et nubeis facilè interdum concreescere in alto
Cernimus—————* Ver. 130.

(z) *Omne genus quoniam passim simulacra feruntur
Partim sponte suâ quæ sunt ære in ipso;
Partim quæ variis ab rebus cunque recedunt:
Et quæ consistunt ex horum facta figuris.
Nam certè ex vivo Centauri non fit imago,
Nulla fuit quoniam talis natura animalis.
Verùm ubi equi atque hominis convenit imago
Hærescit facile extemplo—————* Ver. 740.
frightful

frightful appearances, fit for any purpose in which he pleases to employ them. Then he proceeds to account for vision, and the appearances of *specula*, ingeniously enough from these principles (*a*). But his subject goes not on so smoothly with him, when he comes to sounds. He is aware that in dreams we hear sounds, voice and speech, as well as see images, and moving figures; and since voice and sound have a corporeal nature to impel the sense, which truth he proves, because some words hurt the throat while they are pronounced (*b*), he depends upon his *Reader's* kindness, to suppose that sounds may have their *cortices* and *membranæ* also, leaving him to fancy as well as he can (having thus set his imagination at work) how the *images* and *speētres* of words and sentences may hover up and down in the air, till he fall asleep, and then discharge themselves upon him in dreams.

(*a*) *Nunc age cur ultra speculum videatur imago, &c.*
Ver. 270.

(*b*) *Scilicet expletis quoque janua raditur oris*
Rauca viis; & iter lædit, qua vox it in auras.
Ver. 535.
LII. These

LII. These foundations being laid, he comes to the solution of dreaming, which is now an easy affair: for these *speâtres* and *simulacra* of corporeal things, constantly emitted from them, and floating up and down in the air, come and assault the soul in sleep (c). And as for *chimeras*, and other *monstrous representations*, these he had prepared beforehand, (*ver. 130. & seq.*) All this is well enough, if he had but taken care to tell us, how these *simulacra*, such *slender pellicles*, get in whole and entire to the breast, or heart, which he makes the seat of the soul, as hath before been observed; for he allows they are shattered, when they fall upon any rugged, uneven surface: and in giving the difference between sounds and images, he says, though a sound may get whole and entire through any chink, or cranny, yet an *image* or *simulacrum* cannot; but must be ruined and broken, if it hath not room to enter all at

(c) *Nunc age; quæ movent animum res, accipe & unde
Quæ veniunt, veniant in mentem, percipe paucis.
Principio hoc dico, rerum simulacra vagari
Multa modis multis*——

Ver. 726.

once.

once (*d*). But leaving many inconsistencies untouched; let us take notice of the shifts *Lucretius* is put to, in accounting first, how these *cortices* of bodies should have *motion* and *life*; and then how they should *act with design, reason, and intelligence*. Here he cannot so much as alledge his efficient cause, *chance*; for all this must be done in an instant: there is not an eternity of time, wherein these pellicles may dance about, and

*Omne genus motûs, & cætûs experiundo;
Tandem deveniant in taleis disposituras.*

Lib. 1. ver. 1025.

till at length they casually form the vision to be presented to the soul. As to the first; how these fluctuating *films* of bodies should have *life* and *action*, so as to represent a regular dance to the soul in sleep——

*Brachiâque in numerum jactare, & cætera
membra :*

*Nam fit, ut in somnis facere hoc videatur
imago.*

Ver. 773.

(*d*) *Nimirum quia vox per flexa foramina rerum
Incolumis transire potest; simulacra renutant :
Perfcinduntur enim, nisi recta foramina tranant.*

Ver. 603.

He says this is not wonderful; for it is not the same image that performs this: but that there are as many different images, as we fancy there are different postures of the same image: that when one of these *exuvia* of bodies hath appeared, and represented one posture, it is destroyed, and another different one comes, and represents the second posture, which we still fancy to be the first; and just so, a third *case*, or *thin sheet of matter* appears in a third posture, &c.

Non mirum est simulacra moveri; —

*Quippe ubi prima perit, alióque est altera
nata*

*Endo statu; prior hæc gestum mutâsse vi-
detur.* Ibid.

Grave men will perhaps be angry with me for transcribing these absurdities: and it would not, I own, be excusable, if it were not to shew what kind of philosophy hath been embraced, rather than the existence of separate spirits should be acknowledged,

—Ne

—*Ne forte animas Acherunte reamur
Effugere; aut umbras inter vivos volitare :
Neve aliquid nostri post mortem posse relin-
qui, &c.* Ver. 41.

For, as appears from what was lately said, all this is the doctrine of *Democritus* (e). And certainly, no words could so well demonstrate to us the folly of attempting to account for *this various, wonderful, living appearance* (so to speak) as remarking upon these absurd fictions. And to save the trouble of repeating it often, let me observe, that the *Authors* of all the other *hypotheses* would be as ridiculous, if they were as minute. They say some general thing or other; but dare not offer to apply their solutions to any one instance. As to the second difficulty, Why these *empty sheets of matter* should act

(e) *Aristotle* says, cap. 3. Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς. Τοῖον δ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον, ἢ ὥσπερ λέγει Δημόκριτος, εἶδωλα ἢ ἀπερρώας αἰτιώμεθα. What *Aristotle* substitutes instead of this, is his own solution; where, if we consult the place, we shall see no less egregious trifling. “Because the air is not ruffled with wind in the “night-time, the κινήσεις have more effect, and the “dreams are fitter to be divined from!”

with *reason* and *intelligence*, instead of pretending to solve it, he turns another way, to ask questions concerning it, such as, whether we may not suppose that they wait the nod of the will?

*Anne voluntatem nostram simulacra tuentur?
Et simul ac volumus nobis occurrit imago?*

Ver. 782.

Or, when they represent some theatrical performance, Whether we are not to think, that these *cortices* are *learned*, and *full of art*?

Scilicet arte madent simulacra, & docta vagantur,

Nocturno facere ut possint in tempore ludos?

Let any one in this place reflect on the necessity that forced *Lucretius* to make these extraordinary suppositions. And then let me ask a *Sceptick*, who has ever so little ingenuity left, if it be not a strange attempt to account for life and reason mechanically. To mention only one thing more; he crowns all, in his accounting for spontaneous motion, and volition, by these surfaces. He
says,

says, the *surface of walking* (I know no better *English* word for it) beats upon the soul, excites the will of walking in it; and so protrudes the whole corporeal bulk.

*Nunc qui fiat, uti passus proferre queamus,
Cum volumus,——*

*Et quæ res tantum hoc oneris protrudere nostri
Corporis insuêrit dicam: tu percipe dicta.*

*Dico animo nostro primum simulacra meandi
Accedere, atque animum pulsare, ut diximus
ante.*

Inde voluntas fit.

Ver. 875.

LIII. Others to avoid these absurdities, have sought the solution of this appearance, from the *mechanism* of the body only. Mr. *Hobbes* endeavours to account for it thus, chap. 2. of his *Leviathan, concerning the imagination*.

“ When a body is once in motion, it moveth
“ (unless something else hinder it) eternally;
“ and whatsoever hindereth it, cannot in an
“ instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite
“ extinguish it: and as we see in the water
“ though the wind cease, the waves give not
“ over rolling for a long time after; so also it
“ happeneth in that motion, which is made

“ in the internal parts of a man, then when
 “ he sees, dreams, &c. For after the object
 “ is removed, or the eyes shut, we still re-
 “ tain an image of the thing seen, though
 “ more obscure than when we see it.”—So
 again in chap. 45. he says, “ And the mo-
 “ tion made by this pressure, continuing af-
 “ ter the object which caused it is removed,
 “ is what we call *imagination*, and *memory*,
 “ and (in sleep, and sometimes in *great di-*
 “ *stempers of the organs*, by sickness or vio-
 “ lence) a *dream*.” Thus he makes *dream-*
ing to be the *pressure made in the organ*, con-
 tinuing or repeated in sleep. But this is so
 shamefully poor and unsatisfying a cause of
 this appearance, that it accounts for nothing;
 and it is almost loss of time to stay to shew
 the lameness of it. Every thing said, is as
 easily denied as affirmed, and with a hun-
 dred times more probability. How comes
 this motion to be *begun again*, after it hath
 been *stopped*, by so many intervening, various,
 contrary motions? Though a moving body
 without external impediment, will always
 move on; this does not prove that it will
 move on through all the impediments it can
 meet with: or that it will take up a motion
 once

once extinguished, and that after so long an interruption. There is no circumstance common to a body moving in *vacuo*, (of which this axiom is true) and the internal parts of a man's body. A pendulum moving freely, will not move half a night; why should the internal parts of a man's body, crowded, obstructed, move the whole night? nay, why should they move most freely in the morning? It had been altogether as satisfactory to have said, that a *tennis ball*, when a motion is *impressed* upon it by a *racket*, and then *destroyed* by the contrary force of another racket, will, when that contrary force is spent, begin and continue the first impressed motion: or that a *harpsicord*, when a tune is first played upon it, and then a dozen of other tunes, will, when the motion of them all is stopped, begin the first tune of itself again. Besides, according to this account, either the *last impressed motion* shall be first renewed, after we fall asleep, and we should dream over the day-objects retrograde; or *all the waking motions* should be renewed in order, and we should do every thing twice over; or the *strongest only* should be renewed. But this is ridiculous, and contrary to fact. We see

things in sleep that have not been in our waking thoughts for many days, or years before, perhaps never. And what can be said of these from this solution? Or perhaps we see something in a dream, that is familiar to us; and immediately after a thing, that we never thought on before: why are these joined together? or how can a motion be continued, that is begun only for the first time? This is so unperforming an hypothesis, that it answers for nothing. He brings in cold, as has been observed above, to breed dreams of fear; and heat, those of anger. Why doth he not apply this hypothesis of his, to account for *Brutus's* vision? Or if that was too hard, for *Calpurnia's* the night before *Cæsar* was killed? Or at least for some common instance? Every *Hypothesis-Maker* makes a trial of his hypothesis, to shew how well it does. Lastly, If we hear some kind of sounds long, they will continue in the ears it is true, for some time after, while we are awake; but are broken off immediately in sleep, which is directly against Mr. *Hobbes's* observation.

LIV. It is to be remarked, that this Author hath given some dreams *a higher original*.

nal. In the fortieth chapter of this Book he writes thus. “ The father of the faithful,
“ and first in the kingdom of God by cove-
“ nant, was *Abraham*. For with him was
“ the covenant first made; wherein he ob-
“ liged himself, and his seed after him, to
“ acknowledge and obey the commands
“ of God; not only such as he could take
“ notice of, (as moral laws) by the light of
“ nature; but also such as God should *in a*
“ *special manner* deliver to him by *dreams* and
“ *visions.*”——And, having in a few words
insisted, that there was no need of a parti-
cular contract, to add force to the obligation
of moral laws, he continues——“ And
“ therefore the covenant which *Abraham*
“ made with God, was to take for the com-
“ mandment of God, that which in the
“ name of God, was commanded him *in a*
“ *dream* or *vision*; and to deliver it to his
“ family, and cause them to observe the
“ same.” All that can be said to this, I think,
is, that he who wrote thus, should not have
advanced such an hypothesis, for solving the
appearance of dreaming in a mechanical way.
Were these dreams *the motions only of external*
objects impressed on the senses, and continued
after

after the objects themselves were gone? A monitory dream or vision, as to the natural manner of its production, is so like another dream which is not monitory, that it is strange anyone should assign such opposite causes, for effects every way alike, except in relation to certain events which are to follow. Nor is it less surprizing, that, after what he has written in many places, he should still conclude with *so much assurance*, and *so little argument*, that the soul of man, all spirits, and God infinite in all perfections, are but material things (as hath been observed above.) This is but a poor remedy for the *jargon of the schools* which he complains of.

LV. This last solution of dreaming is taken from *Aristotle's*; and so little different from it, that the same considerations shew them both to be quite foreign to the purpose. *Aristotle* says, that the objects of sense produce sensation in every one of the organs; and that this sensation, or perception [πάθος] remains in the organs, not only while the objects act, but after they are gone (*f*);

illustrat-

(*f*) Τι δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ἢ πῶς γίνετ', ἐκ τῶ ὡς
 ὅπνον συμβαινόντων μάλισ' ἂν γνωρίσωμεν· τὰ γὰρ
 αἰσθητὰ

illustrating his account, with the examples of those, who by long looking on the sun, see nothing when they turn away their eyes, διὰ τῇν ἔτι ὑποῦσαν κίνησιν ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασιν, ὑπὸ τῷ φωλός, and of those, who by looking long on any colour, see all objects of that colour; and of those who think every thing moves, after having long looked on running water (g). It were to be wished, by this solution

αἰσθητὰ καθ' ἑκάστων αἰσθητήριον, ἡμῖν ἐμποιᾶσιν αἰσθῆσιν· ἢ τὸ γινόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν πάθος, ἢ μόνου ἐν-
υπάρχει ἐν πῶς αἰσθητήριόις, ἐνεργῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων,
ἀλλὰ ἢ ἀπελθῶν. κ. τ. λ. cap. 2.

(g) After which he observes that violent sounds render men thick of hearing; and that strong scents, acting long on the organ, blunt the quickness of that sense afterward; γίνονται δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μετὰ τῶν ψόφων δύσχωροι· γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὀσμῶν δύσοδοι· ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. But all this is only going about with little distant similitudes, and begging men not to be over difficult to be persuaded: a common shift when men would account for some great thing, from unsatisfying principles. *Lucretius* is remarkable for this art through his whole book; a small resemblance, which rather doth not contradict, than confirm, serves for a proof with him. Yet, I know not how, he came to venture to be so particular in this case; charmed, I suppose, with the poeti-
cal

tion of his, that he had tried to explain any common instance of dreaming, such as that *of the man with the sword, pursuing, and threatening us*; or that he had taken notice of that *diversity of consciousness*, that is in the rational part of the *φωλιάσμα*; or of that *spontaneity*, which is in the animate part of it (see N° 25.) so different from what the soul itself thinks and does, as he himself observes; or that he had explained how such *force and violence* is used upon the soul, by *this remainder of external impressions*, which should seem familiar to it. Surely we may say that these motions, excited in the visory nerves, by the *sun, or colours, or the running water*, are now quite stopped, when we see all other objects again, as we saw them before; and therefore that it must be so *à fortiori*, with respect to other objects, which do not make such strong impressions. Besides, such a *confusion* as remains even during

cal imagination; and therefore he appears so ridiculously absurd: but, as has been said, if *other Authors* had offered to apply their solutions minutely to particular cases, we should have seen abundance of as silly and ridiculous suppositions. Let any one make the trial upon his examples.

the

the time they last, could never be the cause of that *distinct vision* we have in sleep; nor therefore any *remainder of motion* the cause of *distinct perception* then. Nor could we deduce the *infinite variety* of dreams from this *uniform mechanical cause*. Nothing new could then ever be offered to the soul in sleep; all being the remains of familiar waking impressions. Could ordinary common objects, occasion the appearance of objects we never saw before? With the leave of so great a man, would it be at all more absurd to say, that the *shadow* of *Coriscus's* body (*b*), which only moves as his body moves, may become a *living intelligent agent*; than to say, that the impressions made by *Coriscus's* actions on the sensory while awake, may perform other *spontaneous, rational actions*, of which *Coriscus* himself never gave a copy? *Lucretius's simulacra* are more entertaining; nor really are they less satisfactory than this dry notion. when a *school-boy* asks his *Master* something, that happens to be too hard for them both; the *Master* pretends to give him a reason, and the *boy* is put off, thinking he is not yet ad-

(*b*) De insomniis, cap. 2.

vanced enough to understand such deep things: but the *Master* hath not that satisfaction in his own mind, which arises from knowing the case, and his having made another understand it. So, I think, it is with *Democritus, Epicurus, Aristotle*, and their several followers: whatever these men said to amuse others, they had not the pleasure to believe themselves.

LVI. Before we leave this subject of our dreams, there is one circumstance more to be observed in them, wonderful enough; which might be of use to us, if we could enter more into the nature of it. I shall only endeavour to express the appearance itself, and take notice of a truth, which seems naturally to follow from it: perhaps some other hand may not disdain to pursue it. It is this: In our sleep *persons* and *objects* are frequently presented to us, with the *newness* of which we are no way surpris'd, because we seem to know them. They are represented as known and familiar objects, and we allow them to be such, being acquainted with them at first sight; though we know not how, nor where, such familiarity was contracted: for
on

on awaking, we wonder how we thought we knew them, or entered so easily into their designs and business. We frequently think we come into a *company*, where we seem to know what we came for, and what is every one's part of the business in hand: or we are all on a sudden engaged in circumstances, and a course of action, which appears to us to be the consequence of former action, which we readily own we have been concerned in. A man imagines he is in danger or trouble, because he did such things formerly, of which he seems to know himself guilty: he is stung with grief and remorse for crimes he allows he hath perpetrated years before; or he is praised for great and virtuous actions, of the merit of which he seems secretly conscious. In a word, there is this *notable difference* between what we see while awake, and what we see in sleep; that if we see any thing new while awake, we know that it is new to us, and find that difficulty and uneasiness in us, which attends ignorance and unacquaintance: but oftentimes it happens, though we see a thing for the first time only in sleep, yet we do not think it *new* to us, but familiar, and *not new*. This, I believe, will
be

be found to be every one's experience, and an ordinary qualification of our sleeping thoughts. Any one will be surpris'd when he observes that *this knowledge*, which the soul is prompted with in dreams, of the persons and objects then offer'd to it, vanishes as soon as the senses are opened, and external objects begin to act through them; as if the recovering our former experience of the things in real life, darkened and chased away the *other*; or as if these two were inconsistent together.

LVII. I shall venture to give an instance or two of this kind of dreams, to help the better to explain what I mean; the exactness in the relation of which may be depended on: or, it is the same thing if we suppose them imaginary examples, made to be reasoned from; provided there be nothing improbable or prodigious in them: if it were possible for any instance in this subject to be such (*i*). A person dreams, for instance,

(*i*) *Lucian* says, — Εἴ γ' ἀγέδοξα ἔπαθε, μὴ ἀπίστησῃς· θαυμαστοίτοι γὰρ ὄνειροι. *Cicero* says, *Nihil est magnum somnianti*, as above.

that

that he hath lived for a considerable time in a state of marriage with a certain woman, who had been dead many years before; and though he knows not the beginning of this affair, or how it came about, yet he allows it to be so, remembers *some circumstances* of their past life together, and seems to know the situation of their circumstances at present, as if he had been led into it *from the experience of some years*. Again, another hath this scene presented to him in his sleep. He fancies *a person reads to him certain sentences out of a book*, and that neither the *person reading*, nor the *subject read*, are unknown to him, but that he is familiarly acquainted with both; insomuch that he knows beforehand, what the other is to read to him, and the design of the writer: and hath his remarks ready to offer upon it, as if he had perused this *visionary Author* long since. And upon awaking, he remembers some of the words read to him, and something of what he had to observe concerning it: but the scene gradually disappears; and the more he seeks to recover his own sleeping arguments, and the other's reasons, by the help of his wak-

ing memory, the more they are darkened by that very endeavour. One under this disappointment will be vexed that he did not dream on, or that any thing should disturb him, while he is endeavouring to catch the shy remains of his vision, or if possible, to replace himself in the same state of consciousness. Here is a whole scene (or small consistent system) of instantaneous knowledge, which might be concerning any one assignable subject, as well as another, (for the prompting us with a ready familiarity with any knowable subject, without our own pains in acquiring it by the ordinary methods, is the only difficulty in the appearance) and which might have been continued, I think, to any length, by the same *Power* that began it (*k*).

LVIII. This

(*k*) I beg leave here to endeavour to take off a particular objection against the preceding part of this Essay, but urged chiefly against the subject of these two last paragraphs. It is said, “ The solution I have given, and
 “ especially what I mention in this place, makes dreams
 “ mere *enchantment* and *Rosicrucian-work*, which it is
 “ absurd to admit into philosophy and among natural ap-
 “ pearances; and that upon this account, we see Men
 “ have always chosen to explain the phenomenon ano-
 “ ther

LVIII. This is the appearance. And it seems inexplicable to our present philosophy.
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“ther way.” But with much submission, I desire those who make this objection, to review the *appearance itself* once again; and then let them say, Whether I have misrepresented it; whether it is not really what may be called *enthantment* and *Rosicrucian-work* in itself, and abstracting from any solution; and whether this *enthantment* be not a *true* and *real phænomenon*, actually exhibited in nature. Let it be considered, that this sort of objection must of necessity be levelled, not against any solution, but the appearance itself, as it stands in nature; since it is certain that if there be any thing which can be called *enthantment* or *Rosicrucian-work*, if that be not contradictory and absolutely impossible, this *appearance* is such in the literal meaning of the word. And if it be a common and constant appearance in nature, how can it be absurd to admit it into philosophy, or allow it a place among *natural phænomena*? Hence *my solution* cannot make it *enthantment*, it being such in itself antecedent to *any solution* that can be given. If it be meant that although it be such as is here represented, we should nevertheless, endeavour to account for it in some other way, or else let it quite alone. I answer; As to the accounting for it any other way, I am not able; let any one try it who pleases. With what success it hath been accounted for in all the mechanical ways hitherto attempted, I leave the world to judge. And as to letting

The objects of sense, to speak only of these, leave an impression upon the organ by acting:
this

it quite alone, I did not certainly go out of my road to find it, but had it placed directly in my way, by *those Authors* who had treated of it before. It is objected as a *reproach* on the rational nature of the soul, insisted on by *Materialists*, and pompously accounted for as an *effect* of matter and mechanism. All this being inconsistent with the inertia of matter, and the account of mechanism which I have given, forced me to engage in this difficult, abstruse subject. And if what I have advanced concerning it be just, there can be no harm done; only men will be obliged to alter their opinions a little, and that to the right side; but if it should be wrong, I am not quite so foolish as to imagine it can pass. Nor is it to be supposed that a subject of this kind will be *let quite alone*; whoever thinks he can make any advantage of it, will bring it into his side of the controversy. It was this way probably that *Democritus* brought it first into the controversy, observing *Homer's* authority so prevalent on the other side; though *Homer* spoke of it as nature pointed out, without being of any party. But ever since, *these Men* have always brought it into their side of the controversy.

But after all, do not *those* who are least willing to admit of *enchantment* and *Rosicrucian-work* among the *appearances* of nature, find themselves so *enchanted, deluded, imposed upon* every night? Have they not experience of the *force and efficacy* of this *art*? If they have not experience

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this the soul applies to, and consults, when it would consider the objects themselves, now absent.

ence of it, they are proof, it seems, against the cause of this phænomenon, whatever it be, whether *matter* and *motion*, or *immaterial* Agents; and if they are not proof against *that cause*, to what purpose is it to dispute about the *name*, while they own the *thing* itself? Besides, has not every *Author* who treats on this subject, assigned more wonderful instances than I have ventured to give? And is not this, first to *own* the power of the cause exerted in the effect, and then to *disown* it again, by giving it a false name? It must be propostitious to endeavour to *sink* the cause, and *exalt* the effect at the same time. Is it not inconsistent in *Cicero*, when he would treat of every thing that is noble and sublime; when he would explain the constitution of the *Universe*, the order and motion of the *heavenly bodies*; when he would speak of the nature of the *soul*, and of the infinite *Fountain of all Being*; in a word, when he would express the noblest sentiments that can enter into the mind of man; to deliver all under the form of a dream, and yet elsewhere to say—*Omnium somniorum eadem est ratio, &c?* Either some dreams have a higher original, or he *degrades* his *subject*, by dressing it up as a dream. On his supposition, it must have been as *probable*, and even *decent*, to have said, all this was the *ravings of a man in a fever*, as the *Dream of a Scipio*. This is confessing one way, and denying another.

As to what I observe concerning dreams in these two last paragraphs; *That in them we are often prompted*

absent. When they *act again*, if the first impression be not quite worn out, they retouch
and

*with an instantaneous knowledge of things we never thought of while awake, and a ready familiarity with objects altogether new; I must refer to men's own experience for the truth of it. I cannot indeed bring an authority from any Writer on this subject whom I have seen, to vouch the justness of this observation; but if it may be determined by experience, authority will not appear absolutely necessary. We seem to know a person in a Dream, and the character he bears, at first sight; or the circumstances he is in, and his inclinations to us; though on awaking, we can find nothing in our former knowledge that can agree to him. We rarely admire any thing then for its novelty, and seem never to be uneasy for want of information, let the circumstances be ever so new; though we should certainly be uneasy in a waking state, till we had informed ourselves about every thing we saw. In short, we enter so readily and easily into every thing heard and seen while we sleep, that nothing surprises us, merely because it is strange and new. And this itself seems surprising and wonderful, if we compare it with the way how the mind is differently affected, while we are awake. It is true, they who ridicule or despise this whole appearance, and every circumstance observable in it, as below a philosophical consideration, may perhaps be dissatisfied; but that is not to be prevented. It is notwithstanding a real phenomenon, and this is a real circumstance of it; and since some of the
most*

and strengthen it; and the soul becomes percipient, not of a new impression, but of an
impression

most celebrated Authors, as *Aristotle*, *Lucretius*, &c. have treated it in a philosophical way, the *ridicule* or *contempt* should fall upon them first; unless it be *meritorious* to exalt the powers of matter and mechanism, as they have done, and ridiculous to dissent from them.

But let me seriously ask, If all that I contend for were true, would men be in a worse condition, than if *matter*, and *unguided motion* performed all that is done in the Universe? This is a *plain question*, and the *answer* to it will decide a great deal in a few words. *If the motion of matter be guided*, all that I contend for (or else more than I contend for in the present case) is allowed. There is then no shifting, nor declining of consequences. *If the motion of matter be not guided*; we are at the mercy of the most *inexorable* of all things, *brute-matter tossed about by chance*. And is it not strange for men to pretend to foresee *such dreadful consequences* in the one case, and to be in *such security* in the other? *Direction* and *superintendence* terrifies them, and the *absence of these* makes them easy! But to proceed; I have shewn that the motion of matter is *guided* in every the *most contemptible appearance* in the universe; after which, let us suppose that the present appearance is merely mechanical, as *mechanical* as any man would have it to be: And this only engages a *Higher Power* in it, according to the argument in N° 29. since the *First Cause* is the *sole Mover* in all mechanical motions. And thus, out of an unwill-

impression renewed: for the last impression is perceived congruous to, or coincident with the

ingness to allow a just and adequate cause of this phænomenon, we necessarily interest the very *First* and *Highest Being* in the production of it; and, as I said above, N^o 45. Note (e), load the *Deity* with all that is mean and unworthy, lest we should *degrade inferior Agents*. It happens here, as before, with respect to the *inertia* of matter; (see the Note (p) N^o 22. Sect. i.) As long as matter was supposed a *resisting substance*, an *immaterial Mover* was necessary; and when we supposed it *quite unresisting*, the difficulty we would have avoided became greater. So in this point, if dreams are allowed to be *immechanical*, all that is contended for follows; and if they are denied to be *immechanical*, more than is contended for becomes unavoidable. A greater evidence than this cannot well be desired.

To conclude therefore; as this appearance is really what may be called enchantment and Rosicrucian-work, as it stands in nature; for not only *Homer*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, &c. but even *Lucretius*, *Democritus*, *Aristotle*, and others of that side, have represented it as such. They never pretend to disguise, or dissemble the enchantment which we are often under, and feel with uneasiness and pain. Common experience would have given them the lie. *Macrobius* has gone so far, as to name five different kinds of this enchantment, ὄνειρος, ὄραμα, χερματισμός, ἐνύπνιον, and φαντάσμα, [*omnium quæ videre sibi dormientes videntur, quinque principales*

the first, if I may so speak. Hence the soul perceives that object with memory: for memory (as we are passive in it) is only a thing's being brought into the perception, with a *secondary* and *concomitant* perception, which distinguishes it from a new perception, and makes it appear only a *perception renewed*: or that it was there once at least before. Accordingly, the oftener a thing hath been in the perception, still accompanied with this *secondary perception*, the stronger the memory of it is; for the first impression is still made more lively and lasting: and on the other hand, when the first impression is almost worn out, this secondary perception is dark, and memory weak; and when an object hath been long out of the perceptivity, so that the impression is quite cancelled, it is as new to us, as if it had never been there

les sunt diversitates & nomina, &c. In som. Scip.] Hence if there be any *imputation* or *reproach* in the present objection, no man who ever wrote on this subject is free from it. The only difference between *these Writers* is, That *some* of them have ascribed this enchantment to *dead matter*, and *others* thought *some other Agent* was necessary. And indeed if ever a dream was what might be called *ὄραμα*, or *χρηματισμὸς*, it would be strange to make *dead matter* the *Agent*.

before; because it is entirely a new impression, not an impression renewed. Hence it is that many casualties which affect the sensory, weaken the impressions made on it, and consequently affect the memory equally. (See N^o 12. of Sect. V. Vol. I. concerning the soft and yielding substance of the sensory.) Drunkenness, old age, a stroke or wound on the head, and many diseases do this: and, as has been observed above, this is the constant and first effect of sleep. Memory, as we are active in it, is the power itself belonging to the soul, whereby it applies the perceptive capacity to read, as it were, these former impressions; or it is in general that power of the soul, whereby it directs the perceptivity to the consideration of any former object. And this power *no way* depends on the matter of the body. It hath been shewn to be a contradiction to say, The soul cannot exert its active power without the help or instrumentality of dead matter. The soul must act upon matter first, to make it instrumental: and matter could not be the instrument of this *previous action*. See Sect. IV. N^o 9. Vol. I. Note (*k*). Thus much of these two kinds of memory here: and we should not forget

forget the difference between them, because, in a state of separation, the last sort will be without impediment.

LIX. Now from this account of memory it should follow, that every new impression made on the sensory, ought to appear *new* to the soul: and yet we see it is otherwise with respect to the impressions made by these invisible agents. It is one thing to see in sleep persons, *quorum tellus amplectitur ossa* (as *Lucretius* expresses it) alive and before us, with whom we are once acquainted;

Quod ne miremur sopor atque oblivia curant :

and quite another to see persons, who on their being presented for the *very first time*, are familiar to us, and seem to have had former concerns with us; to jump all at once into a train of *former action*, which we were never concerned in; and to become instantly possessed of a *tract of experience*, which we never acquired! This is the most wonderful appearance, I think, in nature. Nothing but the actions of the *Deity* (which we admire, but do not pretend to account for) can exceed it. But whatever this may

3 proceed

proceed from, whether from a different way of acting on the sensory; or some particular *power* and *efficacy*, which so affects the soul as to prompt it with an instantaneous knowledge of all objects thus offered to it; or whatever else may be the cause of it: we undeniably gather this material point from it, That the soul is capable of a more perfect and ready knowledge of things, than that which it attains to know, by the methods of *sense* and *reflection*; where the labour in the acquisition, and the trouble in retaining, is superseded: and that, as there is such a *capacity* on the part of the soul, so spirits, not the most perfect and powerful that we can conceive, may prompt it after this manner. This phænomenon is an *instance* and *experiment* of the thing itself. *Investigation*, (whether it be concerning the nature of material objects, or in abstract reasoning) and *remembrance*, are the two most difficult things to the soul in its present state: it requires time before we can make a sufficient stock of observations, and then we must proceed laboriously in comparing, and drawing conclusions from them; but this undeniable circumstance of our sleeping visions shews us, that
all

all this trouble may be shortened, or rather become quite unnecessary. It is true, we know that in a state of separation the soul must be freed from all restraint and impediment, because *union to matter* limits and confines it; but still we must conceive it using its own power and industry: whereas this qualification of our knowledge in sleep discovers to us a surprisngly new way, which we could have had no notion of without a *trial*. Without such a trial and experience in sleep, all the perfection of our waking state could not have satisfied us that such a method of affecting the soul was possible. The knowledge we are prompted with is not *bare information*, as when one tells us something we knew not before; that would still have appeared *new*: but this, upon first being suggested, is our *former knowledge*, if I may so express it, a *familiar reminiscence*. It is in this respect that our present method of *remembering* is lost and swallowed up in a superior species of memory. Let men consider what conclusions this phænomenon will justify, either as to the assistance the soul may receive in an after-state, or the enlargement of its own faculties: I shall mention
only

only one particular, *viz.* That the several parts of our past consciousness (which we are perpetually losing) may be recovered instantly, united together, and become one, by a firmer union, than the having recourse to perishable impressions on a corporeal organ, or our present method of reminiscence in general; however differently that they may be effected from the formal manner supposed in the last paragraph. And this must at least appear possible, when a thing more difficult and incredible, cannot be denied to be real: for it is not by far so wonderful that we should be prompted with the knowledge of what *hath been*, and been known too by ourselves; as that the knowledge of things that never were, should appear as belonging to our former consciousness (*l.*)

LX. It

(*l.*) Men pretend to doubt whether the soul can have any memory, when it hath no *impressions* on a material sensory to have recourse to; but the present phænomenon shews, that *memory, by no means, depends on material impressions*, absolutely speaking. And if *this appearance* hath raised a doubt concerning the identity of our consciousness, it should, in fairness of reasoning, have satisfied that doubt again; considering that a *God of truth* presides over

LX. It will perhaps be objected, that this knowledge here argued from is *false* and *unreal*, an illusion and cheat on the mind; and therefore that no inference ought to be drawn from it. To which it is answered *first*, that this, though in some cases an illusion, is yet *a true matter of fact*, and a *real phænomenon* in nature; which therefore, by the rules of philosophy, may and ought to be argued from. *Aristotle*, *Lucretius*, and the other *Authors* mentioned above, have advanced hypotheses to account for the whole appearance in a philosophical way; (though they reckoned all but illusion) which therefore they designed should account for all the circumstances of it. And here, by the way, let any one weigh, and add to the former arguments, the impossibility of accounting for this cir-

over all. A certain great *Author* says, “He takes his “Being upon trust.” So he might indeed, provided it was not from *chance*; that is no sure foundation to trust to. *Matter* is now altogether out of the question, I presume; and we are speaking of the power of *immaterial Beings*: and it would be quite absurd to think there is no *higher power* in nature, than such as can deceive and impose upon us; that *Truth* hath not a *supreme Patron* in the Universe.

cumstance

cumstance mechanically. When a thing is reckoned an illusion, it is the province of philosophy to find out how the illusion could be effected: in *Opticks*, when the place of the object is changed, and the dimensions of it enlarged; this is apparent only not real, and may be reckoned an illusion: yet it is real and useful knowledge to understand the way how this is produced. And *secondly*, since the *manner of communicating a thing*, is independent on the thing communicated; this can be no objection against the manner of communicating this knowledge, let it be as false and delusive as it will. If I am so affected in sleep, as to know a man and his designs, though he hath no existence but in vision; might not I be so affected as to know this man and his designs, if he had a real existence? There is *all the parity* here that needs be desired, to make an inference. Besides, other real and true knowledge, against which no exception could be made, might be communicated to us the same way. The *subject* imagined to be read out of the book, in the instance above, may be of the same kind with any of those arguments that are enquired after by men at other times. If we
should

should suppose a man to dream that another made out a speculative truth to him; (which, this instance, and perhaps the experience of some shews not to be absolutely impossible to be done) this knowledge would be real. *That real matters of fact have been discovered in dreams*, I think even a philosopher may allow to be morally certain. I have never heard of any so incredulous as to refuse it. *Aristotle* frequently mentions *προορατικοὶ*, such as foresee in sleep what is to come; and *εὐθυόεροι*, such as have true dreams: notwithstanding the poor solution he offers of such an extraordinary appearance. *Lucretius* affirms, rather than allows, that many reveal their own secret villanies in sleep (m). This

(m) *Multi de magnis per somnum rebu' loquuntur;*
Indiciòque sui facti persæpe fuere. Lib. 4. ver. 1012.
 And again more expressly,

Nec facile 'st placidam ac pacatam degere vitam,
Qui violat factis communia fœdera pacis.
Et si fallit enim Divum genus, humanúmque,
Perpetuò tamen id fore clàm diffidere debet,
Quippe ubi se multi per somnia sæpe loquentes
Aut morbo delirantes, procraxe feruntur;
Et celata diu in medium peccata dedisse.

Lib. 5. ver. 1153.

This is too little to keep the world in awe; and yet it is too much, for chance, or mechanism to perform.

is truth of one kind at least discovered, every way inconsistent with his principle. What Mr. *Hobbes* thought on this head, I have given a pregnant instance of above. The contradictory notions these men had of this appearance did not hinder them from confessing, and allowing, the circumstances of it. History is full of this, which our own experience shews, is no way impossible. *Sylla* wrote two and twenty books of commentaries of his own actions; these he inscribed to *Lucullus*, whom he left tutor to his only son, passing by *Pompey*, and all the other Men of power in the commonwealth: and in these commentaries he advises *Lucullus* to look upon nothing so firm and certain [*ἐταῦς ἀξιοπίστον καὶ βέβαιον*] as what he was forewarned of in dreams (*n*). Now if we consider all the circumstances, this will appear very remarkable. *Sylla's* character, whatever it might be in other respects, was far from lightness and vanity. And *Lucullus* calls this advice to mind, on a very signal instance of a dream, which I have already mentioned, whereby the city of *Sinope*, and all its inha-

(*n*) See *Lucullus's* life in *Plutarch*; as also *Sylla's*; for it is written in both.

bitants were saved from ruin. *Cyrus* in his dying speech to his sons, says the soul in sleep becomes more divine, and sees as it were into futurity (o). *Peticius*, a *Roman* pilot, the night after the defeat of *Pharsalia*, dreamt he saw *Pompey*, not as he had often seen him in *Rome*; but sad and dejected, coming forward and speaking to him. In the morning, as he was telling this melancholy sight to those who were aboard with him, they came and told him that a small vessel drew nigh, and that those who were in it waved their garments, desiring to be received. When it was come close, and *Peticius* had come up, he saw the same sight he had seen in his sleep, *Pompey the Great in a sad reverse of fortune*, [—ἐπιστὰς οὖν Περίκιον, εὐθὺς ἔγνω τὸν Πομπήϊον, οἷον ὄναρ εἶδε· καὶ πλεξάμενον τὴν κεφαλὴν, &c.] Now, though I do not argue from particular matters of fact in such relations; but only alledge them as things no way improbable or absurd, being agreeable to the common sense of mankind in such cases: yet here, though I would, I know not

(o) Let it be remembered that *Xenophon* writes this, the finest Writer, and one of the greatest men of antiquity.

what to deny; *Plutarch's* veracity, or *Peticius's* sincerity in contriving off-hand a story, which was immediately followed with the event. I might instance *Pelopidas's* dream before the famous battle of *Leuctra*, or *Timoleon's* before his expedition into *Sicily*; with a thousand others. The first of these was such as could not have been contrived after the event, nor concealed before: the *chief Men* in the army were called together to consult about it; there was a warm contest between the *Generals* and the *Priests*; whether it should be obeyed literally; and when they came to a resolution, the affair was communicated to the *whole army*. And a publick act of the whole city of *Corinth* followed upon the last. If such things are allowed, more will follow than I contend for here; *viz.* That things to come, have been actually foretold in dreams: let others determine concerning the power of such a Being as can foreknow future events.

LXI. Moreover, as to the present subject, let us reflect that representations of persons and actions in sleep, are *pictures* made by impressions on the sensory; and the ideas of real persons and actions, which we have while
I
awake,

awake, *are only such pictures* with respect to the soul itself; there is nothing more real in the one sort of representation than the other: therefore the soul is made to do as much, when it enters into the designs and plots of the one, from such representations, as if it entered into the designs of the other, from the same, or an equal representation. And it is made to do a great deal more, when it becomes conscious of former transactions (which never were) between the *first sort*, and it; than if it became conscious of transactions, which have been between the *last sort* and it, though now long forgot. Let us make a supposition that a man walking in a solitary place, in a country where he had never been before, saw before him, by the power of enchantment, a great house, and that his curiosity led him thither, where he finds a numerous family of servants, and other people, variously occupied about their domestick affairs, or diversions: this man might easily be excused, if he took this crowd of people for real men and women, busied in real action, not being on his guard against illusion, nor perhaps having power to be so: but then he might also be excused, if he took them all

for strangers to him, and behaved himself as in a place, and among company unknown; since this is the natural way to behave on such occasions. But if farther, he should be *so affected* by the force of this enchantment, as to know them all familiarly at first sight, to understand their business, and designs, and characters, as if he had had a long acquaintance and familiarity with them; if he should all in an instant begin to act his part, as if he were one of them, and do what it was expected he should do; if he should converse with them, as in consequence of a long familiarity; if he should have a contest with one, upon the account of an old grudge, and lye under obligations to others for former favours, &c. the wonder might justly seem doubled. Such an extravagant relation as this could not meet with belief among the most ignorant and credulous: and yet it is no more than what happens literally to some of us every night in our dreams. Surely it is because there is a *God of truth*, who sets boundaries to the power of these Beings, that we are not deluded into the extremest Scepticism by them; that our waking senses are not so bewildered with inconsistencies of *facts* and *persons*,

sons, as to confound human reason; and that we are not led by them every minute to pursue that which would be our ruin! This is that which, as hath been observed before, (N^o 6.) *no mechanism, no solution or hypothesis* can account for; it is *touching the soul* in another manner than by the bare exhibiting of vision to it: one who considers it right, will be surprised that *matter, mechanism, traces*, should be offered as the cause. Now in this case, it is the same thing with respect to the man's being prompted with a knowledge of these imaginary persons, as if they were real. And by whatever way it is that he is endued with this extemporary experience of a whole past life, or by whatever way it is that we are endued, in like instances, with the knowledge of a train of past *unreal* actions; the same power, the same way applied, not to speak of a greater, could make us enter *in a twinkling*, into all the real knowledge and consciousness, which the perfections of *God*, and the consistency of the moral world demands. To grant the one, and doubt of the other, is to allow that there may be an *evil principle* in the nature of things; superior to the *good One*, a principle who hath power to per-

vert truth, and represent things as *they are not*: while the other cannot preserve it, nor represent things as *they are*.

LXII. To end this tedious essay: we may observe *two things* which chiefly tend to make us sceptical with regard to the existence of separate spirits, and their power. First, when by the help of a little philosophy we come to have immoderate notions of the *natural powers of matter*, as they are called: we then do not think the agency of any spirit necessary, and that matter hath all the powers and vertues that a Philosopher ought to admit of. Yet a close survey of matter, its origin and conditions, best of all things shews this to be quite otherwise. The other is a preposterous, if not pretended care, not to weaken the minds of children and young people (*p*). There will be idle stories of ghosts and

(*p*) It is long since this was a Sceptical pretence. In the *Philopseudes* of *Lucian*, mentioned before, *Tychiades the Sceptic* affectedly cautions the vain old men, that they should not talk so idly, if it were but for the sake of the two young lads who were present, because this might fill their heads with Goblins and Spectres, that would haunt them as long as they lived. Thus far he was right; we should not talk idly before young or old: we need talk
nothing

and apparitions, as long as the world stands, as there are false reports concerning every thing that is true. We should not surprize and fright young persons with silly, idle relations, which may have an ill effect on their tender minds; but to avoid this, which is not the greatest inconvenience they may fall into, much discretion is to be used. We ought not to tell them that all these things are groundless and absurd; but own that there is a possibility of them; and that God only can protect us from their power and malice, if we firmly trust in him. *Reason* is strongest, holds best with any age, and is that which will endure: and one who is capable of observing what occurs to his mind in sleep, and curious to know how it may be, is capable of having a rational account of it given him. It is not impossible that one who believed the existence

nothing of this, but give consistent accounts to *young persons*, as soon as they are capable of them, or want them to solve some doubt; but there is a great difference betwixt proceeding thus with them, and endeavouring to make them sturdy against the belief of Spirits, by telling them there are no such things, nor reason to believe any accounts of this kind. Out of an over great zeal to have them *strong*, we bend them to the side of *Scepticism*, as if that were a less weakness.

of

of separate spirits, and that they are constantly in company with him, (for I am apt to think this is true, whatever we believe) might be able to be alone in the dark, or in a room by himself, without fear. There is no true courage, but what is built upon a rational foundation. And to be convinced that a *Being of infinite perfection* rules over all; and to have nothing, or nothing beyond the consequences of human infirmities, to fear from him, is this foundation. Men were formerly credulous and easy perhaps: now they are affectedly nice, with the air of more philosophy and knowledge: but our Moderns forget that he, who believes that dead matter can produce the effects of life and reason, is a hundred times more credulous than the most thorough-paced Believer that ever existed.

S E C T. II.

Dean Berkeley's scheme against the existence of matter, and a material world examined, and shewn inconclusive.

SOME men deny all *immaterial*, and others all *material* substance; so that between them they leave *nothing at all* existing in nature. These two opposite *parties* help to expose each other; and it is hard to say, every thing considered, whose share is greatest in the absurdity of *expunging all Being out of existence*. Yet thus much we may observe, that the existence of *both substances* must be very plain, since each side maintains that the existence of the substance which they themselves assert must be self-evident: for it would be absurd in either of the parties to suppose arguments *necessary* to prove that any thing at all exists. Our dreams having no real external objects, and some of the *ancient Writers* having suggested that *this* might be made a ground for doubting whether there were really any such objects; a late ingenious and learned *Author* hath taken
the

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the hint, not only to doubt of the reality of
matter and a material world, but to pretend
to demonstrate *the existence of any such thing*
impossible and contradictory (a). The attempt
certainly

(a) Whatever way our dreams may be accounted for, whether by thin membranes rising from the surfaces of bodies, as *Democritus* thought; or motions continued in the sensory after the objects cease to act, as *Aristotle* and *Hobbes* maintained; or by *new impressions* made upon it in the time of sleep, as I have endeavoured to shew in the last Section: all these ways still suppose the real existence of matter, in supposing both a *sensory* and *objects* acting upon it. Hence it seems inconsistent in *Plato*, to think the existence of matter might be called in question from this appearance of our dreams; since on any *hypothesis* for solving it, the *existence* of matter must be allowed: or *if it be not allowed*, all indeed is but a dream, even while we are awake, and the *very distinction* between dreaming and not dreaming is taken quite away. For what reason can we have to argue that objects are imaginary and *unreal*, while we are awake, because they are imaginary and *unreal* while we sleep; if we allow no previous difference? Waking itself is made but the most deceitful dream, and we then determine the question, without referring to dreams, and take away all difference between the two states, as to the reality of external objects. And if we previously allow a difference, how can we infer from allowing a difference, that there is no difference? We thus cut off the conclusion a contrary way.

certainly is surprising. If his books had been written with a design to excite men to try what

way. Therefore we can never draw the designed inference, let us make which of the suppositions we please. This is generally the fate of scepticizing; *the design frustrates itself.*

To make this a little plainer. If matter be supposed *necessary in the representation of this phænomenon* of dreaming, it must be contradictory to infer from the phænomenon *itself* that matter does not exist. And if matter be supposed not to exist in the representation of the phænomenon; it must be equally absurd from supposing it *not to exist*, to infer that therefore *it does not actually exist*. There is no difference made on that supposition between the appearances of objects in sleep, and their appearance at other times; *i. e.* the difference on which the argument proceeds, *is taken away* by the very supposition of the argument; and it is made to contradict itself, as before.

If it should be said, that it is not necessary to make *any supposition at all* concerning the existence of matter in this appearance, but to take the appearance itself as we find it: I answer, *first*, That is impossible; the *question* is concerning the existence of matter, and it is to be proved dubious from a certain appearance; therefore it must be supposed either *dubious*, or not *dubious*, before-hand. And, *secondly*, not to consider with exactness and care every circumstance of an appearance, from which we would infer such a weighty inference,

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what they could say, in case *such a kind of* Scepticism should begin to prevail; or as an *exercise* in an university, to shew how far wit and invention might go to maintain a paradox, there had been little in it: but when a

as the existence of a material world, shews a *willingness* to mistake, or misrepresent things in this momentous affair. And, *thirdly*, to say it is not necessary at all to make any supposition concerning the existence of matter in this case, is to suppose that the *appearance* may be produced indifferently, whether matter exist, or not; and that again is to contradict all the evidence we have for the existence of matter in a waking state, before we come to the doubt of it from the appearance of dreaming; or it is to confound the distinction of the two states, from which nevertheless we pretend to raise our doubt and suspicion. Wherefore at any rate it is inconsistent to think this appearance can afford us a ground of doubting.

Whether our Author could have any other ground to call the existence of matter in question, shall be considered afterward; though it seems evident in itself, that the reality of external objects could never have been questioned, unless we had some time or other been deceived in this point, either while asleep, or while awake. Had not this happened, all suspicion would have been prevented, and doubting thought a piece of extravagance.

person

person of great capacity and learning seems serious, and writes pieces, one after another, to support this kind of Scepticism, and continues in these sentiments for such a number of years; if it be not carrying an ungenteel sort of a *banter* a great deal too far, one cannot tell what to think of it. For it seems impossible that a man should be seriously persuaded that he has neither *country* nor *parents*, nor any *material body*, nor *eats*, nor *drinks*, nor lyes in a *house*; but that all these things are mere *illusions*, and have no existence but in the fancy.

That which makes it necessary here to examine this scheme, which denies the possibility of matter, is because all the arguments I have offered for the *Being* of a *God* in Sect. I. and II. Vol. I. are drawn from the consideration of this *impossible thing*; viz. from the *inertia* of matter, the *motion* of matter, the *cohesion* of matter, &c. and every one sees what impropriety, or rather what repugnance there must be, to speak of the *vis inertiae* of ideas, the *motion* or *gravity* of ideas, the *elasticity* or *cohesion* of ideas. Whence these arguments must amount to nothing, if there be nothing but ideas instead of the objects

jects of our ideas, as being drawn from *properties* which can belong to no subject, and which therefore must be *impossible*. Thus there must either be no truth in what I have said, or in what this *Author* advances; for *two such opposite accounts of nature* cannot both be true: and if the conclusions in these two Sections be solid, this itself will be a weighty argument against his scheme. However, I shall here endeavour to shew the inconclusiveness of it from reasons particularly applied; and try at least to remove so weighty an objection, if I cannot add more light to what hath already been said.

II. In considering this new scheme, the following particulars are to be remarked. The *nature* or *essence* of things is altogether different from their *existence*; the former being the ideas of the Divine Intellect, eternally consistent so as to be made to subsist together in the same subject, by his power, whenever it should so seem good to his wisdom: the latter, *viz.* their existence, then commences, when his power is exerted to this effect; or when this *co-subsistence* of properties is first actually effected, with respect to a deter-

determined time and place (*b*). And from thence it follows, that there are eternal properties in the natures of all things, as being

(*b*) In the *Universal dictionary*, or *Cyclopædia*, under the word *Existence*, it is observed, that the existence of created beings hath relation to *time*, *place*, and a *cause*: That *essence* is explained by the chief and radical property of a thing, or all the properties and *existence* by specifying the time, place or cause; and then it is added——
 “ The foundation and occasion of this distinction, is this;
 “ that *essence* belongs to the question, *What is it? Quid est?* But *existence* to the question, *Is it? An est? 3tio*,
 “ *Existence* necessarily presupposes *essence*, and cannot be
 “ conceived without it; but *essence* may be conceived
 “ without *existence*; in that *essence* belongs equally to
 “ things that are *in potentia*, and *in actu*; but existence
 “ only to those *in actu*. Note however, that this does
 “ not obtain in *God*, about whose *nature* and *essence*, the
 “ mind cannot think, without conceiving his *existence*.”
 By being *in potentia* here, must be understood, being producible by the power of God, according to his ideas. Farther, *nature* and *essence* are here synonymous, and, I think, rightly. *Lastly*, It is well observed here that as *essence*, *nature*, eternal properties, or eternal truth, have no relation to a *particular time*; so neither have they to *place*, or *cause*; or, they are as little circumscribed in *place* as *time*; and to have a *cause* is incompetent to them, being eternal. This is one way of coming at a view of the eternity and immensity of the *necessary mind*, where these were eternally known.

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originally, eternally consistent ideas; for the
eternal consistency and agreement of these
ideas, makes these eternal properties. And
from hence again it follows, that we can de-
monstrate several eternal truths concerning
the *natures* or *essences* of things: for to shew
the necessity, or necessary consistence, of
these eternal properties, is to demonstrate e-
ternal truths concerning their natures. To ex-
emplify this. *Solidity* and *extension* were eter-
nally consistent in the divine ideas, so as to
be made to subsist in the same subject, (of
which subject indeed we have no idea; but
God hath, and had it before the subject itself
was:) this eternal consistency makes the na-
ture of this *thing* eternal. There was farther,
a necessary connexion between the ideas of
solidity and *resistance*; if it did not resist it
would be unsolid: or the idea of *not-resisting*
is inconsistent with the idea of *solidity*. More-
over there was an inconsistency between the
idea of *resisting* and the idea of *effecting* what
it resisted, [*viz.* a change of its present state.]
And therefore from this respect, or habitude,
of these ideas to each other, this property,
That it is impossible this *thing* should ever
effect a change of its present state, *eternally*
and

and *necessarily* belongs to the nature of it. And therefore, when we shew the necessity of this property, we demonstrate an eternal truth concerning the nature of this *thing*. Therefore, as before, I infer that we can demonstrate several eternal truths concerning the *natures* or *essences* of things (*c.*)

III. On the other hand, the *existence of things* hath no eternal properties; that is, eternally consistent, or necessarily related ideas, belonging to it. These were all in the Divine Mind, long before any thing but himself actually existed; and belong to their *natures*, not their *actual existence*, which was arbitrary and depended upon his good pleasure to affect. The property just now mentioned, *v. g.* is no way predicable concerning the existence of matter, nor true only when it exists; but concerning its nature, and true whether it exists, or not. Therefore there is no eternal truth demonstrable concerning the existence of Beings, (the *ne-*

(*c.*) The natures of things with respect to us, are the consistent ideas in our minds, which are copies (though but imperfect, and in part) of the eternally consistent ideas in the Divine Mind.

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cessarily existing Being excepted, who is out
of the present controversy) unless it be this,
That their existence was eternally possible,
as depending upon his pleasure, and being
performable by his power : for such truth
would have supposed such eternal necessary
properties predicable concerning their ex-
istence; or that it had been necessary (*d.*)
Therefore, since the existence of *matter*, the
soul of man, or other finite immaterial *Beings*,
is only possible, or contingent, the only ques-
tion concerning their existence is, *Whether it*
be actually effected, or not? It is not demon-
strable as the existence of God is; for his ex-
istence is a part of his nature, and insepara-
ble from it: but there is no necessary con-
nexion between *their nature*, which was eter-
nal in the Divine Mind, and *their existence*
which is only possible. Nor can there be a
connexion between any thing that is neces-
sary, and a thing that is but barely possible.

(*d.*) The existence of a thing, which is but barely pos-
sible, implies no contradiction (absolutely speaking) never
to be; otherwise its existence would become some time
or other necessary; and that eternal properties should be-
long to a thing that may never be, is absurd.

IV. Thus

IV. Thus it appears that to require an *absolute demonstration* of the existence of matter, of the soul of man, (of man in general I mean, for no man wants a demonstration of the existence of his own soul) or of other finite immaterial Beings, is to mistake the nature of such a demonstration, and of the subject it is conversant about. It is to require a demonstration of the necessary existence of those Beings, whose existence, *ex concessis*, is contingent: for such an *absolute demonstration* must have been always true; just as any demonstration of the property of a *geometrical figure* was always true. That is, it must have been always true that matter existed. Supposing a possible being really existed, there is no other way to shew the existence of it to another, but by the *effects* it produces, or the *perceptions* it raises in some percipient Being; or by shewing it would be an absurdity for such *effects*, or *perceptions*, to have any other cause.

V. Yet because this contradiction, *viz.* *That a contingent Being exists necessarily*, cannot be demonstrated; some men have un-

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skilfully resolved to make a doubt of it, Whether matter actually existed. This is a wilful determined kind of Scepticism: because a contradiction cannot be shewn true, therefore they *resolve* (nay I may say *force* themselves) to doubt; and if it could be shewn true, there would be no need of forcing themselves to become Scepticks; for it would be unavoidable. All truth, as has often been said, stands or falls together. The existence of *necessary* and *contingent* Being would be upon the same level: either all Being would be but barely possible, and once nothing at all might have existed; or all Being should be equally necessary, and nothing that exists could ever have not existed.

VI. *Matter* therefore, the *human soul*, and other *finite spirits*, are contingent Beings: the idea of matter, *v. g.* was eternally consistent in the Divine Mind, and is consistent in our minds: but the idea of any thing impossible to exist, or of an impossible effect, can never be consistent. The reason is, an inconsistency in the idea and conception. And this shews the possibility of matter's existing, whenever it should please Infinite Wisdom.

dom. Since therefore the existence of it is possible, nor implies any contradiction; it is impossible for any man to demonstrate the non-existence of it. For that would be to undertake to demonstrate a possibility *impossible*. This, in few words, might be an answer to, and shews us the absurdity of, Dean *Berkeley's* undertaking, who (as I said) pretends to prove, that the existence of matter, or bodies, out of a mind, is a contradiction in terms^(e). He all along allows the consistency of the idea of it; and yet contends, by a new kind of reasoning, that the object of this consistent idea implies a contradiction in terms to be made exist: for by the same argument, whatever it be, he might prove that any thing, besides the Deity, implies a contradiction in Terms to be made exist; or deny entirely a creating power to him: since the consistency of the ideas in the Divine Intellect is that which constitutes the possibility

(e) Under the word Body, in the *Cyclopædia*, a part of the long citation from Dean *Berkeley* is——“ On the whole it appears, that the existence of bodies out of a mind perceiving them, is not only *impossible* and a *contradiction in terms*; but were it possible, nay real, it were impossible we should ever know it.”——

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of the existence of all other things. If we add to this, that the existence of body without the mind; or of a *real, solid, figured, divisible, resisting substance*; for the idea of it in the mind is no more such a substance, than the idea of a Centaur is a *real Centaur*; if, I say, we add to this, that the existence of matter hath all the evidence for it, as will soon appear, that the nature of the thing can admit of, without requiring the contradiction above to be proved; it is not easy to guess what justifiable design a man could propose to himself in such an extraordinary attempt, as to demonstrate that the beautiful system of material nature; heaven and earth; the sun, moon, and stars; the bodies of men and beasts; all the wonders in the vegetable and animal œconomy; their usefulness to mankind; and the kindness of God in bestowing them, *are nothing but a dream within the mind.*

VII. But to be more particular as to the nature of this undertaking: A man who believes there is no such thing as a *solid, resisting, figured substance*; no material world; no *such Beings as men*, compounded of *body and spirit*;

spirit; in fine, *no books, writing, printing, speaking, &c.* but that all these are ideas in the mind only, having no existence without it; can never propose consistently with his own belief, to dispute *with men*, or propagate his doubting among them. He knows not *what things* they are which he would convince, or if there be *any Beings* differing from him in opinion: for all these ideas that are excited in him, as of beings maintaining the contrary of what he maintains, may be only ideas raised in him, by some spirit that hath a design to make a fool of, and impose upon him; as he thinks all the world besides are cheated with other delusory ideas: What greater evidence hath he for the existence of other men's *souls*, than of their *bodies*; though he may have more for that of his own? We only collect concerning the souls of other men from the *spontaneous motions*, and *actions* of their *bodies*: *these*, according to him, *belong* to nothing. Besides, he hath nothing but ideas, or dreams, when he speaks, writes, publishes books. How doth he pretend that these dreams of his should be communicated to other Beings, granting that they existed? In short, his whole enterprise proceeds

proceeds upon the supposition of the reality of what he is going to confute. And thus, I think, he puts it in his adversary's power, to prove from the very nature of his attempt, that he doth not believe himself, and so to confute him without using any other arguments. This is the fate of the generality of Sceptics: their very design opposes and defeats itself, as may be observed in other cases (*f*).

A man

(*f*) This is observable in the *ancient Sceptics*, the followers of *Pyrrho*, those who first affected to be distinguished by that name, and to be reckoned a *separate Sect*: They pretended to *give a demonstration*, to prove that no demonstration could be given, which was very extraordinary; for if their demonstration *were true*, the design of it was defeated, and if it were *not true*, the design of it would still be defeated: and at any rate they could not believe themselves. *Diogenes Laertius* says, (in the life of *Pyrrho*) “ They took away *all demonstration, judgment, sign, cause, motion, learning, generation*, and that any thing was *good or evil* by nature;” and then gives their general Demonstration for all this——*Ἀνέχουν δ' οὗτοι ἡ πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν, ἡ χρηλῆριον, ἡ σεμῆαν, ἡ αἴτιον, ἡ κίνησιν, ἡ μάθησιν, ἡ γένεσιν, ἡ τὸ Φύσει, τί εἶναι αἰαθὸν ἢ κακὸν.* [Their demonstration of this follows.] *Πᾶσα γὰρ ἀπόδειξις (Φασιν) ἢ ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένων σύγκειται χρημάτων, ἢ ἐξ ἀναποδείκτων. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένων,*

A man of this belief, not to contradict himself, should never open his mouth, (the *idea* of

δεδειγμένων, καὶ κεῖνα δεῦσεται, τινὸς ἀποδείξεως, καὶ ὡς εἰ-
πεν εἰς ἄπειρον· εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀναποδείκτων, ἢ τοι πάντων, ἢ
τινῶν, ἢ καὶ ἐνὸς μόνου διαζομένης, καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶναι ἀνα-
πόδεικτον. Here is a *Demonstration in rigorous form.*

And, as if one general demonstration was not enough, they proceed to give particular demonstrations concern-
ing *all the points* mentioned. Here, by the by, we may observe, that even *denying* supposes some certain prin-
ciple; otherwise there could be no reason for denying any thing (as was observed before) more than for affirm-
ing; and that the *Sceptic* or *Pyrrhonist*, while he blames other men for the presumption of affirming and main-
taining, *affirms* and *maintains* out of opposition, and that with great vehemence; in which case he acts quite out of character; for to be consistent with himself, he should observe a profound silence. [See Sect. V. N^o 2, Vol. I. and the Note (b) N^o 3.]

But how do they support the character of *doubting* in all this fury and heat of *maintaining* and *affirming*?—
Why, nothing is more easy. They *affirm* and *maintain* that their arguments, after they have overthrown all other arguments, at length overthrow themselves, like a dose of physick, which last of all purges itself off.—
Καὶ αὖτις γὰρ τῷ τῷ λόγῳ λόγῳ ἀνίκεται· ὅς καὶ εἰς
μετὰ τὸ ἀνελεῖν τῆς ἄλλης, αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἐαυτοῦ περιτραπείς
ἀπόλλυται· κατ' ἴσον τοῖς καθαρίκοις, ἃ τὴν ὕλην προ-
εκκρίναντα,

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of his mouth, perhaps I should say) but la-
ment in silence the misery of his condition, his
lonely

εγκρίναντα, ἢ αὐτὰ ὑπεκκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἐξαπόλλυσθαι. Ibid.
 Thus they are satisfied, provided their reason had the ho-
 nour of being overthrown by nothing *but its own force*.
 They affirmed, That we must not affirm *that there are*
four elements, because there are four elements.—Οὐδὲ γὰρ
 τὸ τέτταρα εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τῶ τέτταρα εἶναι τοῖ στοι-
 χεῖα, βεβαιώσεν. That we must either say; *everything is*
true, or everything is false.—Ἦτοι γὰρ πάντα ἀληθῆ ῥη-
 τέον, ἢ πάντα ψευδῆ. They said things were *hot or cold,*
not from any natural quality, but by law and custom—
 Δημόκριτος ὃ τὰς ποιότητας ἐκβαλὼν · ἵνα φησί. Νό-
 μῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ θερμόν. Accordingly, *Democriton was*
cold in the sun, and warm in the shade.—· Ἐν σκιᾷ
 ἐθάλλετο, ἐν ἡλίῳ ὃ ἐρρίσκετο. They did not all agree whe-
 ther they should be called *Pyrrhonists*, or not; because
 allowing that they knew *Pyrrho's* sentiments, was al-
 lowing that they *knew something*, contrary to their great
principle—· Εἰ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἑκάτερον κίνημα τῆς δια-
 νόιας ἀληπτόν ἐστιν, ἔκ εἰσόμεθα τὴν Πύρρωνος δια-
 θέσιν · μὴ εἰδότες ὅτι, ὃ Πύρρωνεοι καλοῖμεθα αὖν. This was the
accuracy of doubting !

But none of *Pyrrho's* followers came up to his own
 pitch; for having taken away the distinction between *ho-*
nest and dishonest, just and unjust; having found out that
nothing was according to truth; that men acted by *custom*
 or *law*, not according to *nature*, because any thing was
 not

lonely state, and the mist and darkness he is inextricably bewildered in.

And

not *that very thing* more than *another thing*: he set about making his life agreeable to his *principles*; (if we could say that a Sceptick had principles against *their own principle*;) he avoided no danger, would not stir out of the way, though a *chariot* or *waggon* was to go over him; would not go about, if a *precipice* was before him, nor beat off a *dog*, if he came upon him; and in this rigid observation of his principles, his friends were obliged to follow him to prevent accidents. I shall still give my authority.—Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν ἔτε καλόν, ἔτε αἰσχρὸν (says his Historian) ἔτε δίκαιον, ἔτε ἄδικον· ἢ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων, μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ ᾧ ἢ ἔθει πάντα τὰς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν· ἔ γὰρ μᾶλλον τότε ἢ τότε εἶναι ἕκαστον· ἀκόλuthος δ' ἦν τῷ βίῳ, μηδὲν ἐκτρεπόμενον, μηδὲ φυλαττόμενον, ἀπαντὰ ὑφιστάμενον, ἀμάξας, εἰ τύχοι, ἢ κρημνούς, ἢ κυνὰς, ἢ ὅσα τριαῶτα, μηδὲν ἧ αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπιγρέπων· σώζεσθαι μέντοι (καθάφασιν αἱ περὶ τὸν Καρύσιον Ἀντίστον) ὑπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων παρακολυθούτων. If he would yield nothing to his senses (as here 'tis said) he should not (agreeably to his *own principles* it seems) have at all made use of them, nor walked upon his legs, nor done as other men do; but lain in one place, without motion or action. He was once greatly ashamed for having driven away a dog that would have torn him, and made a scrupulous apology for acting against his principles. But of this enough.

Now

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And this argument from the *inconsistency of the method* is applicable to him who but
barely

Now where can we expect to get free from *bigotry*, if it runs to such heights in *Scepticism itself*? It is impossible those men could understand or believe themselves; and yet we see to what absurdity their zeal for *maintaining* [one cannot tell what] carried them. How little reason therefore have men of this way of thinking to object *credulity* and *bigotry*? The man who refuses his assent to plain truths is every way worse, and commits a greater violence on his faculties, than he who believes things without sufficient proof, and certainly more *sophistry*, *cunning* and *disingenuous shifting* is required to maintain that *Truth cannot be found out*, than there would honest application and industry to find it out: and farther, since this is the great principle of *Academism* and *Scepticism*, *That Truth cannot be perceived*, on maintaining of which their honour is staked; the men under these denominations cannot be said so much to have a *disposition* to find out the truth, as a *fixt resolution* to oppose it. *Cicero* does all he can to make good *Pyrrho's* ἰσοθένεια τῶν λόγων, or equality of arguments on both sides; he *labours* to keep a due balance between *truth* and *falsehood*. It is mean and unworthy to see him, upon this account, endeavouring to undermine the truths in geometry, by little impotent cavils. *Mr. Bayle*, in his Controversy concerning the preferableness of *Atheism* to *Superstition*, doth not so much as endeavour to keep the balance; but leans with all his force to the
wrong

barely doubts, if he offers to dispute with the *Beings themselves*, in order to be satisfied *himself* whether *they are*; or to convince *them* that *they are not*: for this disputing supposes the *reality* of the thing he pretends to doubt of (g). But when one undertakes to demon-
strate

wrong side. And a certain great Author is sometimes a *Dogmatist*, and gives us a scheme of virtue independent of any Deity; and sometimes a regular and precise *Academist*. “There is nothing so foolish and deluding (says he) as a partial Scepticism. For while the doubt is cast only on one side, the certainty grows so much stronger on the other.” Can any thing be more absurd than to cast the doubt upon two *opposite* and *contrary propositions*, as if both might be false, or both true! I do not mean that objections should not be put with all their force: but there are some truths so glaring that a man cannot *cast doubt upon them*, without committing much violence on his reason. The art of writing is made to consist in keeping an æquilibrium between the arguments on opposite sides. This may catch a little vain applause; but it is against the interests of truth, and against the rational nature.

(g) Mr. *Wollaston* says, [Sect. 3. Prop. 4. pag. 43. in the Note (a).] “The question in *Plato*, τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιο, νῦν ὥτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομαι, ἢ πάντως ἀδιανέμεθα ἀνειρότομαι, κ. τ. λ. may have place among the *ver-*
litations

strate to us, *that we have nothing whereby another could know that we exist*; since he cannot do this, but by supposing the *truth* of what he pretends to demonstrate *false*, one is at a loss what notion to form of such a procedure. He may be justified, I think, in saying, "The strangeness of the attempt is not to be parallel'd." And how our Au-

"*litations of Philosophers*; but a man can scarcely propose it to himself seriously. If he doth, the answer will attend it." But, with submission, I think it can have no place even *disputandi gratiâ*, without this *contradiction* in the method. For the supposing *every thing which we think to be but a dream* (though we are certain that we ourselves, who thus dream exist) is supposing *all other things* unreal, or only phantastical illusions: and then we must suppose ourselves left alone, surrounded only with our own *visions* and *fancies*; and how a man can *velitate* with others in this solitary condition is hard to imagine, unless he make a contrary supposition, *destructive of the first*, viz. That other Beings *are not* unreal. And if men cannot find a handle to scepticize from, without making contradictory suppositions, they should be satisfied of the absurdity of the attempt. We cannot conceive how *truth* and *certainity* could have been more guarded than it is. Men must previously suppose a contradiction, before they can attack it. And if this be considered, we may justly wonder why the reputation of Scepticism should be so great.

thor

thor can be vindicated from this contradictory procedure, I do not see: for he pretends to demonstrate the impossibility of the existence of mens *bodies*, and thereby denies all evidence that other men can have for the existence of their *souls*; which indeed amounts to denying their existence altogether, and demonstrating the impossibility of it to *those* very beings at the same time.

VIII. The great reason why this Author pretends to doubt of the existence of material substance, or to demonstrate it impossible, is because *we are percipient of nothing but our own perceptions* and ideas; and because *figure, colour, resistance, &c.* is not this substance (*b*).

(*b*) In the *Cyclopædia*, the citation above begins thus ;
 ——(Against the existence of *Bodies*, or any external world, Mr. Berkeley argues very strenuously.)——That neither our *thoughts, passions*, nor *ideas* formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, he observes is allowed; and that the various sensations impressed on the mind, *whatever objects they may compose*, cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them, is not less evident. This appears from the meaning of the term exist, &c.——Here, that sensations *compose* their objects, wants a little proof, and is at best a very equivocal expression.

Now (to observe here the extent of this kind of doubting) this argument will equally shew spiritual substance to be a *contradiction in terms*, as well as matter: for we are percipient of nothing but our own perceptions and ideas, with respect to the *soul* of another man, as well as with respect to his *body*; or if this be true in either, it is true in both. *Activity* and *perceptivity*, the only properties whereby we infer the existence of spiritual substance, are not that substance, but qualities belonging to it, any more than *figure, motion, &c.* are corporeal substance. If then this argument is good for any thing in the first case, it is as good in the second; and if it demonstrate matter out of existence, it equally demonstrates all substance out of existence, save the mind thus percipient, without excepting the Deity himself. So that, brought to its genuine and undissembled issue, it ends in that kind of knowledge mentioned once or twice above, called *Egomism* (i). *Dean Berkeley,*

(i) *Quelques Spinosistes sentant que l'evidence leur échappe a tout moment, dans les pretendues démonstrations de leur Maître, sont tombés dans une espece de Pyrrhonisme insensé, nomme l'Egomisme, où chacun se croit le seul etre existant.* Mr. *Ramsay's Discourse upon Mythology, Part. I.* near the end.

I think,

I think, is not far from owning this. In Sect. 138. of what he calls his *Principles*, he hath these words:——“ If therefore 'tis
 “ impossible that any degree of these powers
 “ [willing, thinking, and perception of ideas,
 “ to wit] should be represented in an idea or
 “ notion, 'tis evident *there can be no idea or*
 “ *notion of a spirit.*”——Here we may observe that, if we neither have any idea or notion of spiritual substance itself, nor of these properties whereby we could only come to the knowledge of such a substance, (*activity and perceptivity*, the examples of which he assigns) it seems impossible that such a thing could ever have entered into the thoughts of men. These particulars ought to be well considered by those who run so greedily into this scheme. It is true, *thinking, willing, &c.* cannot be painted in the imagination, as objects having figure and magnitude may: but might not this *Author* thus prove, that we can have no idea or notion of *virtue, justice, truth?* And if this consequence be fair, as it seems to be; this scheme is a complication of *all the species of Scepticism* that have ever yet been broached. *Notion* extends not only to the images of corporeal objects

in the fancy, but to whatever is the object of the understanding (*k*). It is not enough that an *Author* is not explicit in owning all the absurdities which arise from his scheme; or that he denies them: others will assign

(*k*) *Des Cartes* and *Mr. Locke*, take the word *idea* itself in the same sense. *Mr. Locke* says, (*Introduction, sect. 8.*) “ It being that Term, which, I think, serves
 “ best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the under-
 “ standing, when a man thinks, I have used it to ex-
 “ press whatever is meant by *Phantasm*, *Notion*, *Species*,
 “ or whatever it is, which the mind can be employed
 “ about in thinking.” *Des Cartes* says in his geometrical method of proving the existence of God, and the Soul, *Defin. 2. Ideæ nomine intelligo cujuslibet cogitationis formam illam, per cujus immediatam perceptionem ipsius ejusdem cogitationis conscius sum; adeò ut nihil possim verbis exprimere intelligendo id quod dico, quin ex hoc ipso certum sit in me esse ideam ejus quod verbis illis significatur. Atque ita non solas imagines in phantasia depictas ideas voco: imò ipsas hîc nullo modo voco ideas, quatenus sunt in phantasia corporea, hoc est in parte aliqua cerebri depictæ, sed tantum quatenus mentem ipsam in illam cerebri partem conversam informant.* This is very distinct and full. *Dean Berkeley*, who will not allow us to have any notion or idea of thinking, willing, &c. should give us his acceptation of the word; or shew us what is amiss in *Mr. Locke* or *Des Cartes's* acceptation. Whatever he may say about *abstract ideas*, it is certain all true demonstration is in abstract ideas.

his

his authority to justify their maintaining them. *Epicurus* said many things well——
*Cum bene præsertim multa, ac divinitus ipsis
 Immortalibus de Divis dare dicta suerit——*
 and hath left many fine things in writing :
 and yet when this was observed to *Cicero*, who
 condemned his *philosophy*, he answers, *Non
 quæro quid dicat, sed quid convenienter ra-
 tioni possit, & sententiæ suæ dicere.*

IX. But to return. If Dean *Berkeley*, to
 evade the inconsistency mentioned in N^o 7.
 of disputing with, and endeavouring to con-
 vince no body at all for ought he knows,
 should say that God excites the ideas of mens
 souls in him, (provided he will allow that
 there can be any idea, or notion, of souls)
 then all his certainty for the existence of
 mens souls, is because God would not ex-
 cite the ideas of these Beings in us, to make
 us believe they were, unless they really were.
 And this would be founding his belief of
 immaterial substance, precisely upon *the rea-
 son* which Dr. *Clarke* hath brought, to shew
 that we cannot possibly be deceived, in con-
 cluding that material substance really exists
 without the mind. That is, he cannot avoid

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proceeding in contradiction to himself, and
his own tenets, without having recourse to
the force of the Doctor's demonstration (1):
and that demonstration overthrows his tenets.
This I take to be a hard *Dilemma* upon the
scheme.

X. Here we may farther observe, since
Dean *Berkeley's* argument demonstrates all
substance out of existence, equally with ma-
terial substance; what small reason he had
to proclaim (Sect. 93. of his Book) his vic-
tory over the *Atheists* and *Sceptics*. His words
are——“ Without which [unthinking mat-
“ ter, to wit] your *Epicureans*, *Hobbiſts*,
“ and the like, have not even the shadow
“ of a pretence, but become the most cheap
“ and easy triumph in the world.”—And
again, Sect 96. “ Matter being once *ex-*
“ *pelled out of nature*, drags with it ſo many
“ ſceptical and impious notions, &c.” This
is, I think, as if one ſhould advance, that
the beſt way for a woman to ſilence thoſe,
who may attack her reputation, is to turn a

(1) See this Demonſtration in the *Cyclopædia*, under
the word *Body*, immediately after Dean *Berkeley's* argu-
ments againſt the exiſtence of matter.

common

common prostitute. He puts us into a way of denying all things, that we may get rid of the absurdity of those who deny some things.

XI. If we will talk soberly, though the evidence of sense is not the greatest we are capable of; yet since it is the most universal and constant, fitted to all the concerns of life, and the capacities of all men; since (except in a few cases, the causes of which we know, and can rectify the judgment) there is a satisfactory agreement between the informations of it, through all different ages, and in all countries; and since it is in effect, the first foundation of all our knowledge, in our present state of union with matter; the man who endeavours to overturn *the evidence of sense universally*, endeavours to introduce the *wildest and most unbounded Scepticism*, let his pretences be what they will. And Dean *Berkeley*, by teaching men to distrust their senses, teaches them to distrust his *Book* in the first place; it is but an idea like other things, every word and line in it: all his actions and great undertakings are but *mere dream and chimæra*; and his designs disap-

S 4

point

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point themselves in every respect. If once we refuse that reason which Dr. *Clarke* has assigned for believing the existence of *external objects*, and a *material world*; there is in truth no stopping till a man has denied every thing that exists without his own mind, except it be perhaps the existence of some *delusory Being* who constantly cheats and imposes upon him. How this can be such an *antidote* against *Scepticism* and *Atheism* is not easy to be imagined. We might with equal reason affirm, I think, that putting out the eyes is *the best cure* for dimness of sight (*m*).

XII. It may not perhaps be foreign to the purpose, to take notice here of the contradiction in terms, which is pretended to be in asserting the existence of matter. It is (if any where) in Sect. 4. of Dean *Berkeley's Principles*; for in Sect. 7. he speaks of having *demonstrated his conclusion*; and in Sect. 21. he says, *Arguments, à posteriori, are unnecessary for confirming what, if he mistakes not, has*

(*m*) It is true, *Des Cartes* doubts of the evidence of sense; but it was only to shew it more certain afterwards; it was rather calling his knowledge to an examen; yet I humbly conceive his method was wrong; of which more immediately.

been

been sufficiently demonstrated, à priori; therefore in Sect. 22. he apologizes for dilating on that, which may with the utmost evidence, be *demonstrated in a line or two*, to any one that is capable of the least reflection. In short, all that I could find for it is in that fourth Section, and contained in the following questions.—“ For what are the foremen-
“ tioned objects [*houses, mountains, rivers,*]
“ but the things we perceive by sense? And
“ what, I pray you, do we perceive, besides
“ our own ideas or sensations? And is it not
“ plainly repugnant, that any of these, or
“ any combination of them, should exist un-
“ perceived?”—This is but a sorry affair to be the subject of three new pieces. We shall consider it query by query, as it is proposed. And first, *What are the forementioned objects, but the things we perceive by sense?* This query seems not to agree well with the next. Here it is allowed that *we perceive things* by sense, or by the mediation of sense (for these things seem at a distance from the sense) which are supposed, and called *objects* (of sense it would seem); and in the next it is taken for granted, that *we perceive nothing* but our own sensations; that is, nothing by
means

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means of the senses. This is what one may
call sleight-of-hand reasoning. Let us join
both questions in one. *What are the objects of*
our sensations, but those very sensations them-
selves? This question proposed thus somewhat
less jugglingly, implies or supposes the truth of
this proposition. *Our sensations have no ob-*
jects existing without the mind: which is really
the whole point in controversy. And to take
this for granted, is to beg the thing to be
proved; or to suppose the debate at an end.
Those *mountains, rivers, houses,* we all sup-
pose to exist without the mind; and although
we should be wrong, it remains to prove that
we are wrong, that being the whole of the
dispute. To *affirm* this, or *ask* if it be not
so, will never do any thing. We may far-
ther add, since he allows objects perceived by
sense in this query, that *sensations* cannot be
objects to themselves: a sensation may be-
come the *object* of a reflex act of the mind
upon it; and it can become an object to
the mind in no other manner. But when
a sensation thus becomes the object of a po-
sterior perception, it is not the object to it-
self(*n*). When a man beholds the *circulation*
of

(*n*) At this rate we must say, that brutes have no ob-
jects

of the blood, by the help of a microscope, he doth not admire his own simple *perception*, more than when he beholds a pebble; but something which he thinks at least, the *cause* and *object* of it. We might as well say, when a man laughs at some ridiculous thing, he laughs at his own laughter only. However, we may answer the question categorically: That these *forementioned objects*, [rivers, houses, mountains,] are *the very things* we perceive by sense. This is a proper answer enough to such a question; and we may add, that these *objects* excite sensations in the mind, by motion, or acting on the organs; whether by reflecting the rays of light, by raising an undulation in the air, by immediate contact, &c. and this motion is propagated by the nerves to the brain, where the soul (there present) is apprized of them thus acting. Now, it is no matter whether what we say be true or not; though it be only a *conjecture formed at random*, if it assigns to sensations their

jects of their sensations, since sensations cannot be objects to themselves; for they make no reflex acts of the mind, and there are no material objects from without, according to this scheme.

distinct

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distinct objects, without a *contradiction in terms*: this puts D. B. to the trouble of another demonstration, as much as if it were the real case that obtains.

XIII. His second question is, *And what I pray you do we perceive, besides our own ideas and sensations?* A consistent answer to this follows from what was said just now. We perceive, besides our sensations themselves, the *objects* of them; or we perceive objects existing from without, by the mediation of sensation, or motion produced; since we are conscious not only of sensation excited, but that it is excited by some cause besides ourselves; for we suffer it, often against our will. This cause we call matter: and D. B. says it is *God Almighty*. Hitherto there is no contradiction. He says it is *one thing*, and we say it is *another*: and so far he hath no reason to say we contradict ourselves, more than we have to say the same of him: nay nor so much. It is pleasant to observe D. B.'s address: he would have us to allow that *matter is a sensation*; or that our *sensations* are the same thing with their *objects*, which being the thing in debate, is still begging the argument,

gument, by an equivocal question. So he might prove that, if a man in a dark night were groping out his way, with a long pole in his hand, and felt something resist it, which made him turn another way, lest he should run his head against the wall; so he might prove, I say, that it were a *contradiction* for the man to say, there was any thing there, besides the pole itself, by *this same query*——For what, I pray you, says he, do you perceive, besides the pole in your own hand?

XIV. We may here again observe, as in N° 8. that this query of D. B.'s easily turns against himself. We say, that which excites sensations in us is generally the objects of those sensations, existing from without: unless in the instances of dreams and phrenses, in which there is still a manifest difference from ordinary sensation. He says, God, who is not the object of our sensations, is the immediate cause of them. How doth he disprove what we assert? Thus. You perceive *nothing* but your perceptions. The *cause* of your perceptions, which you assign, is not your perceptions themselves. There-

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Therefore you do not perceive this cause of your perceptions. Therefore *this cause of your perceptions is not at all*; or is but the same thing with those very perceptions. Here the fundamental reason of this inference is, because we perceive nothing but our own perceptions. But D. B. doth not perceive any thing but his own perceptions, more than other men: and if his not perceiving the *cause* of his perception, is a sufficient ground of *denying* such cause, or of making it the same thing with the very perceptions themselves; then God, not being perceived, either is not; or is but a very perception in the mind of man: *Absit blasphemia!* And thus his own argument will exterminate out of nature, any other cause of perception he pleases to pitch upon. He says, matter being once expelled out of nature, drags with it, &c. It is true, matter is but a contingent substance in nature; but being once expelled out of nature, it drags more along with it, in his method of reasoning, than he is aware of: and it drags least of all our sceptical and impious notions with it, as he pretends. To suppose it absent multiplies these notions without end.

XV. The

XV. The last question in this demonstration, and which he designed should carry home the conviction of the whole, is, *And is it not plainly repugnant, that any of these [ideas] or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?* Here you see, he presumes you have allowed him, according to his last query, that *sensations* and their *objects* are the same thing; and on this presumption, his argument indeed is conclusive: but if you are not thus far complaisant, he is at a loss. And I answer, Our *ideas* surely cannot exist without the mind: but their *objects* may; and do. And they are still sensible objects, though they fall not under the senses, at all times and in all places: *i. e.* though they are not *objected to the sense*, in places where they are not; and at times when our senses are not directed to the places where they are. With respect to this it is observable, that he hath another very short way of demonstrating his main point. He *supposes* that the term [*to exist*] hath the same import, when applied to corporeal things, as to be *perceived (o)*: asserting (strongly indeed) that

it

(o) In the *Cyclopædia*, *loc. citat.*——This appears from

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it is otherwise unintelligible. Whence it
clearly follows; Matter which is *not perceiv-*
ed,

from the meaning of the term *exist*, when applied to sensible things. Thus, the table I write on exists: *i. e.* I see and feel it.—— But the existence of unthinking Beings, without any relation to their being perceived, is unintelligible: their *esse* is *percipi*.

One cannot well pass by the argument here, without enquiring a little into the reasonableness of it. This proposition [their *esse* is *percipi*] is delivered with the air of an *axiom*; but if it be, it is incumbent on the *Author*, I think (who seems to be the first that discovered it) to shew the necessary connexion between the terms *esse* and *percipi*, in it. It cannot be said to be *self-evident*, on which account certain propositions were first called axioms; since others cannot find out the *self-evidence*, or even the *truth* of it. We say indeed with respect to the *Deity*, his *esse* is *existere*, because *necessary existence* belongs to his *nature*; but no body allows that *to be perceived* belongs to the *esse* or *nature* of matter; so that this axiom appears to me, after the exactest enquiry I am able to make, to be such an *axiom* as begs the question.

He argues from the meaning of the word [*exist*] that, when spoken of material things, it is the same as *to be perceived*; but who besides the *Author* himself, hath affixed this meaning to that *term*? Is it the common acceptance of the word, when applied to material things? Hath he the *Philosophers*, or even the *vulgar* on his side in this, as he seems to insinuate elsewhere? *Pythagoras* asserted

ed, doth not exist! But the *Artificer* seems to understand that his *tools* exist all the intermediate

asserted that the earth was *spherical*, and *habitable* quite round [— γῆν, ἢ αὐτὴν σφαιροειδῆ, ἢ περιειρημένην· εἶναι ὃ ἢ ἀντίποδας· ἢ τὰ ἡμῶν κάτω, ἐκείνοισι ἄνω. Diog. Laert.] But he did not mean that the *Antipodes* did not *exist* because he did not *perceive*, i. e. *hear* and *see* them; as he must have done according to our Author's acceptation of the word. Again, *Virgil* says,

Est in secessu longo locus: insula portum—

He doth not mean that the place he describes did not *exist*, because he was not there at the time to *look upon*, or *perceive* it. If it should be said, that *Pythagoras*, or *Virgil*, did not speak *philosophically*; we may be sure at least that they spoke *common sense*; and as all men have spoke both since, and before. Which shews his sense of the *term* to be quite new.

Moreover, what reason can be assigned why the existence of matter should be confined to *the being perceived*, more than the existence of other substance? If the reason of the *Author's* assertion be, That what is not perceived, neither *by itself*, nor *any other thing*, doth not exist, then any other substance (*the human soul*, v. g.) if it doth not always perceive itself, must have *intervals* of non-existence, as it ceases to perceive itself, or otherwise: at least the Author should have proved that it *always thinks*, to shew it has no *pauses* or *blanks* of existence. It is true, it must always think upon his scheme, having no restraint or interruption from matter; but

intermediate time, after he lays them by at night, till he takes them up again next morning. And after this, it is unaccountable how this Author could pretend (Sect. 82.) that he doth not deny even corporeal substance, in the *vulgar sense*; but only inert senseless matter: as if the Artificer thought his tools were *artful, sensible* matter; or disappeared when he had them not in his hands; or even then, were nothing but the *ideas* of instruments in the *ideas* of his hands.

then he will have a difficulty to explain, how it could be so affected without matter, as to make this appear doubtful. I might take notice of the *variation* and *proportion* of existence, (so to speak) the *rising* and *falling* of it, upon his scheme: for instance, The *Table* I write on, when I do not perceive it, *doth not* exist; but when I sit down to write on it, *it comes again into* existence. If another person perceives it along with me, must it have a *double existence*? And if three of us sit at it, must its existence be three times greater, than if I looked at it alone? And, lastly, if it were true that *being perceived* constituted the existence of *matter*, and *all created substance*, the *Infinite Mind* perceives them without intermission; and this will constitute the continued existence of matter upon his own principles, I think; unless he would say that matter *exists continually*, as the Deity perceives it, and *doth not exist continually*, as other Beings do not perceive it.

All this then ends in the following *childish sophism*: *sensible things* are but the *objects of sense*. Whenever they are not the objects of sense, *they are no longer sensible things*. Therefore, when they are not the objects of sense, or not perceived, *they are not*. But would not D. B. allow his house to be a *combustible thing*, unless it were actually on fire? He might, with equal force of reason prove, that unless it were in flame, it were *no house* at all.

XVI. This is his demonstration. We may farther observe that it doth no great honour to this new scheme, nor those who pretend to admire it, that it forces the Author to suspect, that even Mathematicks may not be very sound knowledge at the bottom. In Sect. 118. he says, "To be plain, we suspect the Mathematicians are no less deeply concerned, than other men in the errors arising from abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind." And in Sect. 119. he says, the theorems in Arithmetick are *difficiles nugæ*. A man ought to have a vast deal of merit, and to have obliged the world with surprising discoveries, to

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justify his attacking these sciences at this rate; or rather no merit possible can warrant it. And it must give us but a bad opinion of the notions that necessitate a man to declare himself thus. What necessity they lay him under, we shall see instantly. In Sect. 22. he expresses himself after the following manner.—“ It is but looking into your
“ own thoughts, and so trying whether you
“ can conceive it possible for a *sound*, or a
“ figure, or a motion, or a *colour* (*p*), to
“ exist without the mind, or unperceived.
“ This easy trial may perhaps make you see
“ that what you contend for is a *downright*

(*p*) D. B. hath perplexed himself about the *sensible qualities* of bodies; and insists much upon it as a demonstration of the non-existence of matter, because these qualities cannot exist without the mind. But he might have observed *that heat*, for instance, is an *equivocal word*; and may either stand for the *sensation* excited in the mind, or the quality in external bodies, raising that sensation. It is very trifling, because the *first* cannot exist without the mind, to infer that the *last* cannot; to conclude, that because *sensation* is not in the fire, there is no *quality* in it to raise sensation in a sensitive Being. Here *figure* and *motion* are nicely shuffled in with *colour* and *sound*; though they are qualities of a different kind.

“ *contra-*

“ *contradiction*. Infomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue; if you can but conceive it possible for any one extended, moveable substance, or in general for any one *idea*, [here *extended moveable substance*, and *idea*, are supposed *species* and *genus*; in which case he is very safe] or any thing like an *idea*, to exist any other ways, than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. And as for all the *compages* of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence; though you can neither give me any reason why you believe it exists, nor assign any use for it, when it is supposed to exist. I say the *bare possibility* of your opinion’s being true, shall pass for an argument that it is so.”——This is very solemn! A man that is so generous had need be wonderfully secure of his conclusion.

XVII. But we take him at his word. Having shewn that his demonstration doth not conclude; and conceiving it very possible that the whole *compages* of external bodies may exist without the mind, and no ways in it;

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the argument is at end with him (q). No man can ever be seriously persuaded, that this Author's scheme is true in fact, let him use the utmost violence possible to his reason. The thing itself is of such a nature, that it will not admit of belief: so far is the contrary from being a *downright contradiction*, as he says. And it is wonderful that he should be so peremptory in direct opposition to the sense of mankind. However we shall go on to shew, in consequence of what was said in N° 6. how possible matter is; and that there is all the evidence for the real existence of it, that the nature of things can admit of, unless we will require the contradiction there named to be proved. And first, if matter had not been possible at least, no man would ever have had any idea of it at all. To omit the reason of this before given, (N° 6.) let us consider that whatever part of an idea is not perceived, is *no part* of it; its *esse* is really

(q) It is to no purpose to insist longer on any thing contained in his Book. It will all be found to be a repetition of this supposed demonstration. He carps very much in his Introduction at abstract ideas; but the usefulness and necessity of them is never a whit the less; a remarkable enough instance of which will appear immediately.

percipi.

percipi. (See D. B.'s *Principles*, Sect. 132. as also his *Opticks*.) A part of a perception not perceived, is a contradiction indeed, being a part of it that is *no part* of it. Consequently a part less than the *minimum sensibile* (see again Sect. 127.) is no part of it, or nothing. Therefore *in the idea* of a solid inch of matter, *v. g.* there is no part that might be expressed by this number 1,000,000,000,000 in the denominator, having unit for its numerator, (or we may make the number greater, for those who have very good eyes) such a part being less than the *minimum sensibile*: or such a part is nothing at all. But if there be no such part; or if the million-millionth part is precisely nothing; the *whole idea* is made up of a million of million of *no ideas*: or the whole idea is no idea. For undoubtedly, a million or any number of nothings, will never make something: nor will any number of *negations* of an idea, ever make a *real idea*. Two, ten, a hundred, &c. *negations* of a thing, will never amount to the *thing itself*. Thus unless a *real, solid, figured substance*, were at least possible to exist without the mind, such a part of which would be a *real part*, of the same nature

with the whole; our idea of the whole would be *impossible*, and *no idea*. This follows from asserting such a scheme, as makes it necessary to maintain, that *whatever we perceive not of matter is not*, which this Author doth very explicitly (r). A little *abstraction of ideas*, to which he is such an enemy, would have been of use to him here. The same may be shewn concerning the ideas of *motion*, resistance, weight, &c. We do not perceive the resistance of an atom; therefore we could not perceive that of a cannon-ball: for the last is but so many times the first. And if the first be nothing, so many times *no perception* will never make perception. Again, we have no sense of a motion extremely slow, or extremely swift: therefore such motions are not. We have no perception of the motion of the index or hour-hand of a clock: and yet this *no perception*, so many times repeated, becomes real per-

(r) Here we might ask a reason from the Abettors of this scheme, why our ideas do not reach the very intimate essence of other things, as well as body! Our ideas come not up to those in the Divine Mind, with respect to body, more than other things.

ception, with respect to the minute-hand (s).

XVIII. Again,

(s) We may draw it as a corollary from the argument in this paragraph, That our perceptions in general *have no parts*, or are indivisible; and *particularly* that our ideas or perceptions of divisible, extended substance, are themselves *indivisible*, without *parts* or *extension*. If they were not, then the million-millionth part of the perception of an inch long, would be *some part* of it, or *perceived* by the terms. And from this again it will follow, that the percipient Being in us *is not matter*; because if our perceptions of length, breadth, figure, were in a material substance, they *should* necessarily have dimensions. For such ideas of figures would be then affections, or modifications of matter; but all affections or modifications of matter, must be inherent in the matter whose modifications they are. And if the perception or idea of a figure, be an *inherent modification*, or *affection of matter*; it is clear it *must inhere in all the matter percipient of it*, and therefore have equal superficial dimensions at least. And, secondly, our perceptions of extension being without parts illustrates and confirms what was said in Sect. 3. *viz.* That the soul hath no parts, or is a *simple, indivisible substance*. We must say, I think, that *all the soul is percipient*: if any part of it were impercipient that would not have the nature of *soul* (or of percipient Being.) And if all the soul be percipient, and yet its perceptions *be without parts*, we must say that *it both no parts*. If the soul were extended as matter is, certainly our perceptions would be
extended,

XVIII. Again, *solidity, figure, divisibility, &c.* are either properties inhering in some extended, or have parts; *infinite divisibility of extension* would not only be conceived by abstract reason, but the actual infinite little parts would be *pictured down*, if I may so express it; or they would be *as much perceived*, as any parts, and that by the terms being *parts of the perception*. And lastly, from this corollary I ask the following question; If the faculty of imagination requires a *picture extended in length and breadth*, but no idea or perception, *as it is in the mind*, is extended, Does not the power of imagination as much infer a material sensory or organ, as a pure or simple perception requires an unextended or immaterial percipient? In imagination, or in sensation of visible objects, the perception *is not itself a picture*; but undoubtedly *it is the perception* of a picture somewhere lodged. And if this be so; imagination, as it is the perception of a picture, shews not only that the soul is immaterial, *but that it is united to a material sensory*, where the picture is impressed, and to which it applies for the perception of it; or that matter exists. How far this argument is applicable to overturn D. B.'s scheme the Intelligent will determine; but *Cartes* himself, who, it may be presumed, shewed D. B. the way of calling material substance in question, says—*Nam attentius consideranti quidnam sit imaginatio, nihil aliud esse apparet quàm quædam applicatio facultatis cognoscitivæ ad corpus ipsi intimè præsens* [the sensory] *ac proinde existens*. Meditat. 6.

substance ;

substance; or substance itself (*that thing*, to wit, in which properties inhere, which we call, and must call substance:) if they are substance, *solidity* and *figure* will prove a *solid, figured* substance upon us. If they are only properties, they are either properties of our ideas, or not; if they are, then our ideas are *substance*, with respect to these *properties* or the thing in which they inhere; and therefore *solid, figured* substances. A thing that hath *solidity, figure, &c.* as properties belonging to it, or predicable concerning it, must be a *solid, figured thing*. But that our ideas should be such, as upon this scheme they must be, is monstrous. At least therefore, a substance must be possible, of which these are properties: for they are certainly properties of something. And if it be allowed that such properties exist now; or that the thing exists to which they belong; they will infer not only the *possibility*, but the *actual existence* of matter.

XIX. Again, all geometry is conversant about *quantity*. If there be nothing that can be called *quantum* in nature, or without the mind; nothing to which *quantity is applicable*;

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cable; then we have a large body of fine demonstration, and men have discovered vast numbers of *eternal and undeniable properties* (as of a *triangle, circle, cylinder, sphere*) precisely of nothing; *immutable truths* conversant about an *impossible object*: which is strangely contradictory. It hath been always allowed that *nothing* can have no properties predicable of it, nor truths demonstrable concerning it. Our ideas are not *quantity*: to say that would be to deny again the principal hypothesis maintained in this scheme of *an utter want of extension* in *rerum natura*. And if we allow *extension*, why not *an extended substance*? They are only ideas of quantity; and those truths are purely demonstrable of the *objects* of our ideas. No man ever spake of a *circular thought*; a *spherical*, or *triangular perception*: the *sine* or *tangent* of a *sensation* would be a new monster in science. Where will these absurdities end? Nothing ever exposed men so much as this late species of Scepticism. It is a wonder it should find admirers; and among Mathematicians! For upon this scheme the object of their whole science is unphilosophically universal and abstract.

XX. Moreover, What a fine branch of knowledge have we concerning *extended* and *resisting quantity*, or body? The *shock* of bodies against each other, particularly of *elastic bodies*; their perpendicular and inclined *descents*; their *motion*, circular, or in other curves; their *centrifugal forces*; their *centers* of gravity, oscillation or percussion? What fine and surprising theorems, concerning bodies moving in, or supported by *fluids*? These truths have still nothing for their object. Our ideas are not *heavy*, *resisting*, *projectile*, *fluid*; capable of being *compressed*, or *dilated*; have no properties of *inflexion*, *refraction*, &c. To allow that our ideas had any of these properties, would be to allow them to be solid, resisting, figured, divisible *things*. And to say it is impossible there can be any *substance* of which these are properties; or to doubt only of this; is to doubt if several useful truths may not be found out, and demonstrations given, about *nothing*. Let me ask, what kind of philosophy would such propositions as these make; the *centrifugal forces* of two *equal ideas*, revolving in the same time,

in

in unequal ideas, are as their distances from the *centers* of these *ideas*? Or, the *volumes* of *compressed* ideas, are reciprocally as the *weights* of the *superincumbent* ideas? Or, the spaces run over by an *idea*, falling by its own *gravity*, are as the squares of the times? This would still run more oddly if dressed entirely in the language of this hypothesis, thus: The *ideas* of the spaces *run over* by an *idea*, falling by the *idea* of its own gravity, are as the *ideas* of the squares of the *ideas* of the times: for here all must be expressed by *idea*, their objects being impossible. These are shocking to the last degree. It is no wonder that the men who broach this scheme, should bear a grudge to Mathematicks. They are diametrically opposite to each other: and if there be any truth in that science, this must fall. Or rather we may ask universally, the particulars in N^o 8. and 14. being also taken into consideration, what philosophy these men would retain; or what kind of knowledge would they leave to be pursued? Indeed what throws us into general and unbounded Scepticism, must strike at the roots of all science.

XXI. But it will be said could not *God Almighty* have excited all these ideas in separate spirits, and made them capable to investigate these properties of a solid, extended substance, which never actually existed? To this it is answered, that indeed *these truths* concerning a *solid extended substance*, were eternally in the *Divine Intellect*, before such substance existed: but then surely they were truths only, with regard to that *substance* itself, and not with respect to *immaterial substance*; unless we should say that the real properties of matter, were applicable to, and true concerning a substance *not matter*. Thus, even Infinite Power could not prompt us with these ideas in respect of any thing but what we believe to be the *objects* of them, not of our ideas themselves. *Which, by the way, realizes our knowledge and philosophy about material things more than it is of late fashionable to follow (t.)*

XXII. This

(t) I beg that the following axiom of *Des Cartes* may be considered in this view, and it seems to me nothing needs be more evident. Axiom. 5. *Unde etiam sequitur realitatem objectivam idearum nostrarum requirere causam, in quâ eadem ipsa realitas non tantum objectivè, sed formaliter*

XXII. This being so; the next question is, Whether God Almighty (*a Being of infinite veracity*) would have made it necessary for all those separate spirits (whom we call *men*) to pursue and attain a knowledge, less or more, or at least an experience, of the nature of a *substance* which no way existed, as fancying that a great part of their ease and comfort depended upon *this*; and have so constituted them, that all of this species of Beings in the world, not excepting one, are verily persuaded, that they are continually conversant with this substance, and that it enters into the composition: the *question* is, I say, Whether this Being could have performed such a constant and universal *piece of juggling* (u)? If it could answer a good and wise

realiter vel eminenter contineatur. Notandumque hoc axioma tam necessario esse admittendum, ut ab ipso uno omnium rerum tam sensibilem, quàm insensibilem cognitio dependeat.

(u) It is extremely absurd to suppose that God Almighty should have given us so costly an *apparatus* of senses, as *Anatomy* discovers ours to be, especially of *seeing* and *hearing*; made us capable of investigating the nature and method of sensation; of seeing the contrivance

wise end, that this substance should exist ; *why doth it not exist?* If otherwise ; *why make us believe a thing exists*, whose real existence could have answered no good and wise end? Can any supposition lay God under a necessity of constantly deceiving his creatures? and his rational creatures too? Will not such a supposition contradict his reason and his truth? This will have all the force of a just

vance and wisdom, and the relation between the *object* and the *faculty*; and all designed only to misguide and deceive us, as if these were to be the organs for communicating the action of external objects, when in truth there is no such thing. This in the language of the present scepticism is, That God *excites* in us (or rather leaves us to *investigate*) certain wonderful ideas [of *eyes* and *ears*] for the reception of other ideas, [*men, houses, animals, &c.*] which we are incapable of receiving by the ordinary manner, if these first ideas are any way disordered. And all the art and experience men have acquired, to procure themselves ease and relief from such disorders, is only at the bottom helping an *idea* that is *distempered*; a mere juggle (as I said) played upon us by the Author of our nature. Let me suppose that the Deity himself possessed us with a notion, that our bodies were made of *China-ware* or *Glass*, (*vel caput habere fictile, vel totos esse cucurbitas, vel ex vitro conflatos*, as *Cartes* says) and then ask, If that would be a greater imposture, than the present, on our Author's scheme?

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demonstration to sober men. Besides, since no man can be certain of the existence of other men, upon this scheme; and since it is said that God excites in us all the ideas, which we fancy are excited by bodies; we must say that, when we think we are tempted by other men, to commit an *unjust* or *immoral* action, God immediately tempts us: and this, not only by exciting the ideas of the persuasives in the temptation (of the words and actions, to wit, which are nothing external;) but in formally *contriving*, and *suggesting* the *obliquity* of the sin we are tempted to; for, as hath been said, taking away the existence of their bodies, there is no kind of evidence left for the existence of the souls of men, who by the *abuse* of their *freedom* might tempt us. They who allow God to be a *Deceiver* as to the first, can make no scruple of supposing him to impose on us in the last. I might mention the influence of this *new refinement* on the lives and practices of men. Though the obliquity of actions rises from the will; he who thinks *theft*, *murder*, or *adultery*, nothing real beyond bare idea, and that for ought he knows, he injures *no body*, will be surely under less restraint to satisfy

tisfy his inclinations of any kind. I might also mention the direct tendency of this improvement to *Atheism*. Men will hardly allow the exciting illusory ideas in our minds, of *beauty* and *order*, which no where really exist, such a proof of the power and wisdom of God, as an actually existing frame of material nature, where the *grandeur*, *harmony*, and *proportion* is permanent and real, existing from without, as well when we turn our thoughts *from*, as *to it*. And indeed it is not; for take away the existence of the material Universe, and all the surprising scene of Providence discovered above, Sect. II. Vol. I. where the God of nature by *real power exerted*, constantly preserves the world, and influences every *particle* and *atom* of this substance, by incessant various, wonderful *impulse*, ends in a dream and chimera. In that case no power could be exerted but to delude us. How could we believe the abilities of a Being, who was forced to have recourse to a deceit, to raise in us a notion of them? Or what opinion must we have of his wisdom and address, when we ourselves can detect the imposture? How much better is it as otherwise ordered! We cannot *convince*

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God of a lie; nor shall we be able *in an after-*
state to say, he deceived us *in this*. What
a noble school is the frame of nature, where
we see the Creator's mighty power put forth,
in constantly moving and regularly directing,
the vast, unweildy bulks of dead matter;
where all the works are real, nothing phan-
taetical! How would it grieve a rational mind
to think that all this was performed in shew
only; and our ignorance laid hold on to raise
our amazement! Doth it not appear that the
good and wise end designed, and in some
measure attained by the real existence of the
material world, is to train us *rational Beings*
up to the knowledge of the perfections of
the Deity, in a way adapted to our nature
and capacities?

XXIII. Now to return to where we be-
gan. Matter is *possible*, as hath been shewn
just before; but not *necessary*, as hath been
also shewn: What kind of evidence, or de-
monstration then, would we have for the
existence of such a substance, which we have
not? In reason and philosophy, its existence
should be known from the *effects* it produces,
or the *perceptions* it excites in us, and the
perfections

perfections of that Being, who constituted it and our nature such, that it should act, and we perceive it acting. To expect we should know it *without sensation*, is to demand a proof of its existence, inconsistent with the very idea we have of it. To insist that its existence should be investigable by abstract notions, though we get our ideas originally from sense, by which matter must first enter, is to shew a great *unskilfulness* (v), or a *fixed resolution* to doubt; it is to suppose it a *necessary*, and not a *contingent* Being. Its existence hath no eternal necessary properties belonging to it; nor the existence of any thing save the Deity. Therefore I conclude, that the knowledge of the existence of external material objects, by sense, is *certain knowledge*, and the evidence as great, as possibility, and the nature of things can admit

(v) Mr. Ramsay observes well, *La source du Pyrrhonisme vient de ce que l'on ne distingue pas entre une demonstration, une preuve, & une probabilité. Une demonstration suppose l'idée contradictoire impossible; une preuve de fait est, ou toutes les raisons portent à croire, sans qu'il y ait aucun pretexte de douter; une probabilité est, ou les raisons de croire, sont plus fortes, que celles de douter, Travels of Cyrus, Book 6. in the Dispute between Pythagoras and Anaximander.*

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of; and therefore, as great as the reasonable
soul (as such) can desire (x.)

XXIV. Before

(x) Mr. *Locke* says, (Book 4. chap. 2. sect. 14) “ So
“ that, I think, we may add to the two former sorts of
“ knowledge, this also, of the existence of particular ex-
“ ternal objects, by that *perception* and *consciousness* we
“ have of the actual entrance of ideas from them; and
“ allow these three degrees of knowledge, *viz. Intui-*
“ *tive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive*; in each of which
“ there are different degrees and ways of evidence and
“ certainty.” See also chap. xi. of the same Book. Mr.
Ramsay in the place just now cited, says,——*Je crois*
qu'il y a des corps, non sur le temoignage d'un seul, ni de
plusieurs sens, mais sur le consentement unanime de tous
les sens, dans tous les hommes, dans tous les temps, &
dans tous les lieux. Or comme les idees universelles & im-
muables nous tiennent lieu de demonstrations dans les sci-
ences, de meme l'uniformite continuelle, la liaison constante
de nos sentiments, nous tiennent lieu de preuves, lorsqu'il
s'agit de faits.——After this let me observe, since this
scheme denies the existence of matter, *contrary to the*
testimony of sense; and since the Epicurean scheme al-
lows of nothing but matter, *from the testimony of sense*,
setting the certainty of sense above that of reason, (see
Lucr. lib. 1. ver. 420 & *seq.*) let me observe, I say, that
it is not easy to conceive, how these two should agree
in this particular of the testimony of sense; though it is
observed in the *Cyclopædia*, under the word [*fallacy*] they
do.——Lastly, (says the Author) “ *Reason* cannot shew
“ our

XXIV. Before we put an end to this Section, it will not be amiss, in consequence of what has been said N^o I. to take some farther notice of the ridiculous cause that hath raised all this doubting concerning the *existence of the material world*, and carried some to deny directly the possibility of any such thing; *viz. That we have no certain mark to know whether we are awake or asleep.* This is what a man of plain, common sense would laugh at: only *Philosophers* think it enough to prove the world may be *nothing* rather than *something*. In an objection made to *Des Cartes* concerning his doubting, the *Objector* readily grants, There is no mark to know which of
 “ our *senses* mistaken, since all reasoning depends on pre-
 “ vious sensations; and the senses must first be true,
 “ before any reasoning founded thereon, be so. Thus
 “ the Epicureans, whose system is strongly confirmed by
 “ what we have already laid down from D. B. concern-
 “ ing the external world.” These two seem to me to agree in nothing unless in perverting all true philosophy
 —— Yet (says the same Author, under the word Abstraction) has a *late eminent and ingenious Author D. B.* contested the reality of any such ideas [*viz. abstract*] and gone a good way towards overturning the whole system, and consequently towards setting our philosophy on a new footing.

the states we are in, and only finds fault with *Cartes* for publishing, as a new method of doubting, that which *Plato* and *others* had broached long before him (y): which, by the way, is a strange sort of an objection. The inconsistency of this *doubt*, or this question, is plain, I think, in that no man has a right to make it, but he who hath experience of both the different states. If he has only been in one of them, he can know *no difference*, and therefore be in *no doubt*: and if he has been in both, and remembers a difference, he must know it; and therefore is obliged to answer himself, as having a conscious experience of the thing he desires to be informed in. Since sleep is a state in which the faculties of the soul are obstructed, or impeded, by the indisposition of the matter of the body, especially memory; since this is so, I say, for a waking man to desire a *mark* or *sign*, whereby to know if he be awake, is as if he should desire another man to tell

(y) *Satis constat ex iis quæ dicta sunt in hac Meditatione [prima scil.] nullum esse æquívocum, quo somnia nostra a vigilia, & sensatione verâ dignoscantur; ——— veritatem hujus meditationis agnoscimus. Sed quoniam de eâdem incertitudine sensibilibus disputavit Plato, &c.*

him,

him, *Whether he hath the powers of his soul at liberty or not?* which he himself can know best. The soul hath not some powers to be impeded, and *other powers* of the same kind to remain still free; it should then have *two consciousnesses*; therefore it is improper to ask, if a sleeping man can have a mark to know whether he sleeps? nor is it less improper for a waking man to ask a mark to know if he be awake. In the *first case*, there is a want of consciousness of the state we are in; and in the *second*, a consciousness that we are not in the *first state*: what doubt can there then remain here? If the powers of the soul were not impeded in sleep, that state would not differ from being awake, except in the indisposition of the body: but since it differs so widely otherwise, who can be excusable in pretending not to know the difference? At this rate, men might ask a sign to know, whether they are blind, or not, or how they can be certain that they are in their sober senses rather than mad (x); and whether,

when

(x) *Pyrrho* indeed, and the *Sceptics*, seem to deny a difference between *these two*——ἐδὲ γὰρ οἱ μαινόμενοι παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκείνοι ἢ ἡμεῖς;
but

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when they are conscious of a thing, they
can be sure that they are conscious of it (a.)
XXV. Thus

but to defend this, was, I think, *to own themselves mad* in effect.

(a) The argument in this paragraph, which is said not to be intelligible enough, would perhaps become plainer, if we should ask the question. Whether it is a *waking man*, or a *sleeping man*, who proposes the doubt? And to this we may reasonably expect an answer, since the *doubt* supposes a *Difference* of the two states, and that this difference *hath been observed*; for otherwise the *ground* of doubting vanishes. It may, I think, be probably supposed that *Plato*, and *Cartes* were awake, when they proposed this *nice* and *philosophical* manner of doubting; and that they started it from some experience of the two different states, otherwise they would still have doubted without reason; and yet that *very experience* answers the doubt. The *doubt* could never be greater than the *experience* on which it was founded: If this experience is supposed *nothing*, the doubt becomes *nothing* at the same time; and the *greater* the experience is supposed to be, the doubt becomes the *less*; since much experience of the *difference* could best teach them that *difference*. This, I presume, makes the argument intelligible; and shews the *inconsistency* of such doubting, if a man allows himself to be awake. And if he says *he dreams when he doubts thus*, what he owns here also answers itself; when he awakes, he will find it but a dream. Besides, he owns the *difference* between dreaming

ing

XXV. Thus much of the different *state* of the mind itself in these two conditions, of sleep-

ing and not dreaming, and the former argument will still be applicable.

But allowing the *Scepticism* to be pushed as far as may be. If one should say, "I never dreamed in my life." (Since some of *these men* affirm this of themselves) what reason would he have for asking a *κρίσιμον*, whereby to distinguish *dreaming* from *not dreaming*, when he owns he never dreamt in all his life? And if he should say, "I had such a dream last night, and was verily persuaded of the *real existence* of the things seen; and why may not the things I see and hear now be as phantastical as these were?" I answer, first, he is incapable of being satisfied; because on his own principles, he will still have equal reason to think any answer as phantastical as the *person* [or rather *φάντασμα*, according to him] who gives him the answer: and therefore, as I said in the beginning of the Section, he should for ever hold his tongue, and doubt on in silence. When he desires satisfaction, he supposes the *reality* of the thing he pretends to *doubt of*. This is always the fate of *Scepticism*. And, secondly, when he says, "He dreamed last night, &c." He owns he is awakened out of *that dream* now, otherwise he could not perceive that it was but a dream: Or else he must allow he is still dreaming on; and, as I said, whatever answer is made to him must still appear a dream. If he should say, "I am not certain whether I ever dream-

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sleeping and waking, which brings the τεκ-
μήριον fought to *self-consciousness*. But the
great

“ed in my life, or not.” It is as if he should say, “I am
“not certain, that ever I was in a different state of con-
“sciousness from what I am in at present.” And then
why should he demand a τεμήριον or mark to know which
of the two states he is in, who never observed any dif-
ference? He can have no doubt of the *reality* of exter-
nal objects, who was never imposed on, by being made
to think *phantastical* objects real. And how could any
answer give satisfaction to such a man? If he thinks all
things real, he will need no satisfaction; and if he thinks
them *phantastical*, the answer must appear to be *such*, as
much as all other things. In a word, he hath either per-
ceived a difference, of the state of consciousness he hath
been in; or he hath not: if he hath not, he can have no
doubt; and if he hath observed a *difference*, he should
consider that difference, and is obliged to answer himself,
as having a *conscious experience* of the thing he desires to
be informed of. For it is *mere humour*, and in effect *ab-*
surdity, for a man to say, “Inform me of a particular,
“of which I have experience in my own consciousness
“from your experience of it in *yours* ;” since *self-con-*
sciousness of what passes in one’s own mind, is the *last*
appeal in all controversy.

From all this, it appears still more plain, I think, that
Scepticism, in any shape that may be given it, is incon-
sistent with itself, in supposing the thing concerning which
it pretends to doubt; and therefore it defeats its own de-
sign

great difficulty pretended, is, *How can we be sure that any thing exists?* All from N^o 1 to 24. is an answer to this; to which let me add, that if we never dreamed in sleep, we should not at all doubt of the *existence* of the frame of nature. But have we less evidence now, than if all were a *blank* then? Or can the existence of the world depend upon the indisposition of our bodies, or the different state of consciousness of our minds? Suppose a *whole nation* of men should never dream, (see N^o 33. Note (c) of the last) and *another nation* never sleep, while *we* both sleep and have visions in our sleep; can the *standing* or *falling* of the fabrick of the universe depend upon *this diversity*? We see the heavens represented in a *pool* of standing water, and images reflected from a *mirroir*: is that *bea-*

sign every way. Whence it must appear a very *extraordinary attempt* to endeavour to raise doubts, in spite of the *absurdities* that attend doubting, and to render *truth* suspected without any ground. Though I were able to perplex *plain* and *well-meaning* men, by this subtle kind of doubting; I must be conscious to myself of a *disingenuity* and *perverseness* in the *undertaking*; unless I also shewed them a way how to get free of such *puzzling sophistry*.

ven,

ven, or the objects of these images less real, because the stars are made appear *below* the ground; or men, trees, houses, represented as hanging *above us*? What if some idle Philosopher had made this a handle to become a learned Doubter? Though perhaps we might have had another Denomination of Sceptics from this man; that would not however have made the existence of heaven and earth less certain. This may be thought a strange supposition; and yet the *Sceptics* pretended to doubt of the *existence of material objects* on this very account; *viz.* from the *different appearances* they made by mirrors.——κὴ ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ μορφὴ

παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν καὶ ὁπῶν ἄλλοῖα θεωρεῖται· ἀπολθεῖ οὖν μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον τὸ φαινόμενον, ἢ ἄλλοιον. Diog. Laert. Pyrrho.

And as this very phænomenon of exhibiting the appearances of things by the *pool*, or the *glass*, supposes and proceeds from the *reality* of external objects existing: so even our dreams, though they have no external real objects, yet *suppose such*, and are exhibited in imitation of them; and upon this account deceive us. Therefore rightly considered, they bring no argument
against

against the real existence of material things, but rather one for it. Thus *Cartes* himself says (though against his own purpose) in the same place where he proposes his *universal doubting*,——*Tamen profectò fatendum est visa per quietem esse veluti pictas quasdam imagines, quæ non nisi ad similitudinem rerum verarum fingi potuerunt*——This is remarkable in itself; but still more so as said by him and on such an occasion too. He continues —*Ideoque saltem generalia hæc, oculos, caput, manus, totumque corpus res quasdam non imaginarias, sed veras existere: nam sane pictores ipsi, ne tum quidem cùm sirenas & satiriscos maxime inusitatis formis fingere student, naturas omni ex parte novas iis possunt assignare sed tantummodo diversorum animalium membra permiscet; vel forte*——In our dreams we have representations of some things that cannot be imaginary, as *figure, magnitude, number*; and of some that are necessary, as *time, place*: every vision must have *duration*, and a *scene* of existence. So *Cartes* in the same place——*cujus generis esse videntur natura corporea in communi, ejusque extensio; item figura rerum extensarum, item quantitas, sive earundem magni-*

I

tudo,

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tudo, & numerus : item locus in quo exi-
stant, tempusque per quod durent——(Me-
ditatio 1.). From this the *Intelligent* will
 see that dreams are but superficially confi-
 dered, when they are made a *pretence for*
doubting; and that *Cartes* himself cuts off
 the chief pretence he had for calling in
 question his former knowledge; though with
 the design of becoming more certain, and
 placing it on a surer foundation than it for-
 merly was.

XXVI. Let me here observe to young peo-
 ple who have not perhaps considered it be-
 fore, that this *great Man* was not able with
 his utmost effort seriously to *doubt of every*
thing. Having alledged all the reasons for
 doubting in his *first Meditation*, that he could
 think of; he is forced at length to come to
 this, *That if he could not doubt on other terms,*
he would designedly deceive himself by doubting.
 His words are, *Quapropter, ut opinor, non*
male agam, si voluntate plane in contrarium
versâ, meipsum fallam illasque omnino falsas
imaginariasque fingam, donec tandem velut
æquatis utrimque præjudiciorum ponderibus,
nulla amplius prava consuetudo iudicium me-

um a recta rerum perceptione detorqueat. As if he had said, “ If I cannot doubt with
 “ my eyes open, let me shut them: if I
 “ cannot believe things false, let me sup-
 “ pose them false against my belief.” Is it
 not plain here, he only said he doubted, with-
 out being able to do so? Those things could
 not be called prejudices, with which he was
 forced to take this method. A man should
 not doubt where he is forced to feign causes
 of doubting (*b*). And in the *Synopsis* of his
Meditations, he says, (speaking of the ex-
 ternal world the bodies of men, and other
 things of that nature) *De quibus nemo un-*
quam sanæ mentis serio dubitavit. The other
 great reason he assigns for *universal doubting*,
 is the very worst, I think, that could be giv-
 en; the supposition, to wit, *that God may*
be malicious and a deceiver. Quid autem nunc
ubi suppono deceptorem aliquem potentissimum,
& si fas est ita dicere, malignum, datâ operâ.

(*b*) If any one doubts that he may become more certain,
 and is forced to feign causes (nay to deceive himself) that
 he may doubt; I ask if he can become more certain, by
 this method than he was before? Or if being reduced to
 the necessity of such a method before he can doubt, be
 not itself the greatest mark of certainty.

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in omnibus quantum potuit, me delusisse——
May we not here say, that this is a costly
way of doubting, which forces *Des Cartes*
to make an *almighty devil* of the Deity be-
fore he can make his doubting feasible? They
who have the lamest notions of the Deity,
conceive him as something perfect: he says
elsewhere, *Ex quibus satis patet illum [De-*
um] fallacem esse non posse: omnem enim frau-
dem, & deceptionem, à defectu aliquo pende-
re, lumine naturali manifestum est. If this
is plain from the light of nature, especially
to such men as *Cartes*, and I believe no bo-
dy will deny it; was it philosophical in him
to suppose God a deceiver, merely that he
might doubt of truths, which otherwise
forced his assent? Pray observe whether I
do him injustice. He says, *Nam sive vigi-*
lem, sive dormiam, duo & tria simul juncta
sunt quinque, quadratumque non plura ha-
bet latera quàm quatuor; nec fieri posse vi-
detur ut tam perspicuæ veritatis in suspicio-
nem falsitatis incurrant: and yet in the ve-
ry next sentence the reason why he doubts
of these self-evident truths, is no better than
because God may be a deceiver. Is it not
mighty inconsistent to suppose an *evidently*
false

false thing true, that he may be at liberty to suppose *evidently true things* false? But leaving this, I shall only observe, that the manner in which he ends his meditations is very remarkable——*Sed hyperbolicæ superiorum dierum dubitationes, ut risu dignæ sunt explodendæ, præsertim summa illa de somno, quem à vigiliâ non distinguebam; nunc enim adverto permagnum inter utrumque esse discrimen*——By speaking thus [*nunc enim adverto*] *Des Cartes* would have it thought, that he had got *a new light* from this manner of universal doubting: though one must be at a loss to conceive whence the light could come. Could he not perceive the difference between *dreaming* and *not dreaming*, till he had first called in question the truth of self-evident propositions? Must every individual man follow this method, before he can tell whether he be awake, or asleep? Or can the forcing ourselves to suppose God an *Almighty Deceiver*, be the only way to discover that he is a Being of infinite veracity! Whatever *vertue* such a method of doubting may have, to open a *Philosopher's* eyes; I am sure it will never open anybody's else. The only thing I can find worth

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our imitation through the whole method,
is *the exploding this hyperbolical doubting,*
as deserving our laughter ; though it was
inconsistent in him to speak thus of it, if it
had served him for such great purposes (c.)

(c) I shall here take notice of some exceptions made
to the reasoning in some of the preceding paragraphs,
and endeavour to remove them. It is observed, that
D. B.'s scheme takes away the existence of *other minds*,
and perhaps of *our own*, and of all sorts of *substrata*, as
they are called ; and therefore that most of what I have
said seems right. But then it is added, “ It is true, one
“ *Sovereign Mind* may be sufficient to produce all these
“ ideas ; and many Philosophers affirm, that *He* actual-
“ ly produces them in us, though they allow the *objects*
“ to exist. The question is, Whether he produces them
“ according to a certain order, and certain laws esta-
“ blished by himself ; or whether he produces them a-
“ greeably to the real state of a *certain third object*,
“ which we call the *sensory*. D. B. will say, that the
“ *order* and *laws* which rule their connexions and ap-
“ pearances in our minds, are in every respect the same
“ to us, as the real existence of the material Universe.
“ From *this order*, he will answer your query, How
“ he can *communicate* his thoughts to others, on which
“ you seem to lay much stress ? And this order will
“ serve him to answer your queries about the beauty of
“ nature, and of natural philosophy.—If he had con-
“ tented himself with denying the actual existence of
“ matter, he would have avoided many absurdities.”

In

In answer to this, I own, first, I do not see that D. B.'s reasoning takes away the existence of *our own minds*, or invalidates *Des Cartes's* principle, *Cogito ergo sum*. Those *Philosophers*, who allow the *objects* of our ideas to exist, affirm, I think, without necessity, That the Sovereign Mind *produces* the ideas of them in us; in so far I mean, as the objects themselves may do this; or otherwise than by *co-operation*. Matter, I know, cannot act of itself; or it acts only by resistance; but if the resistance between the matter of our bodies and other matter, be enough to excite the idea of that resistance in our minds, it would be unnecessary to suppose *God* to excite the idea, and the resistance itself to have no effect. And if we do not allow that the matter of our bodies affects our minds directly, and by itself; the union between them will seem in a great measure to no purpose. The reason, I believe, why those *Philosophers* affirmed that God excited the ideas of matter, and material action in our minds, was, because we cannot formally conceive the manner how *matter* affects *spirit*, or how *spirit* acts on *matter*; but we are certain this is matter of fact in many instances, whether we conceive it or not. The Deity himself moves matter, in almost all the phænomena of nature; and the soul of man perhaps moves some matter of the body, though in an infinitely less degree.

And as to the manner in which our ideas are produced; though they are produced agreeably to the real state of a certain third object, which we call the sensory, they are nevertheless produced according to a certain order and laws established by this *Sovereign Mind*; the one of these doth not exclude the other. To allow this third

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object, the *Sensory* namely, is all that is desired. To allow this, and contest the existence of *material objects* would be inconsistent.

D. B. cannot answer my *first Query* concerning *communicating his thoughts to others*. For if *any Being* excites the ideas of *other men's bodies* in us; if, as he maintains, it is *impossible* and *contradictory* there should be any such bodies; and if it be from these delusory ideas which *this Being* excites in us, that we infer the existence of other men's minds: how can he be certain of the existence of their minds, which he collects from false appearances? 'Tis he himself who has made the foundation of all a *cheat* and *imposture*. But supposing the *same Being* excited in us directly the ideas of other men's minds; how could we have a greater certainty in the one case than in the other? The veracity of *this Being* becomes now suspected. And why should we trust him again after a *former illusion*? *Cartes* only supposed, but this *Author* endeavours to prove him a *Deceiver*. He should by all means have given a *Demonstration* of the existence of men's minds, when he asserts the existence of their bodies impossible, by which only we inferred the existence of their minds. And if the argument which I have taken notice of in N^o 9. be good; he can offer no proof for the existence of their minds, which will not equally prove the existence of their bodies. So difficult is it, I conceive, to answer this *Query*. Besides, how can it be said that D. B. may answer this *Query*; and yet at the same time be owned, that his reasoning takes away the existence of *other minds*, nay and perhaps of our own too?

Nor

Nor do I think he can answer the *other Queries* concerning the *beauty* and *order* of the Universe. Can a thing impossible and contradictory have any beauty, or order, or, in general, *any property*? I have shewn in N^o 21. that even *Infinite Power* could not prompt us with the ideas of this beauty, order, or properties, any farther than as they relate to these very objects, which are controverted. And if these objects be impossible to exist, it is farther evident, *that the Infinite Mind itself could have no ideas of them*; for an impossible thing there can be no conception. We must *necessarily* therefore, in explaining the *phænomena of nature*, suppose the existence of the objects of our ideas; since *these phænomena* are true only of the objects of our ideas, not of our ideas themselves. What I mean is, though we conceive the beauty, order and proportion in the Universe *by our ideas*, we do not conceive these to be beauty, order, or proportion exhibited *in our ideas*, but in the things we suppose the *objects of them*. I have shewn in a place or two above, what *ridiculous* philosophy it would make, to substitute our *ideas* instead of the *objects* of them. Therefore, I think, D. B. could have no reason to say, *That the order and laws which rule the connexions of our ideas, and appearances in our minds, are in every respect the same to us as the real existence of the material Universe*. This, I conceive, is a great mistake; and the generality of men allow too hastily, that it is consistent enough with philosophy to suppose nothing but ideas, instead of the objects of ideas; and that demonstrations may be given, and the *phænomena* explained, as well upon the one supposition as the other. This is that which hath

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made D. B.'s scheme appear *so impregnable*, and in effect not altogether absurd; whereas in truth, *no one appearance in nature* can be explained, nor *any one proposition* in abstract geometry demonstrated without supposing the objects of our ideas, instead of our ideas themselves.

As this is the main difficulty, I shall endeavour to make it plain by an instance or two. It hath been shewn in N^o 17. that our ideas, as they are in the mind, have no parts nor magnitude; and our Author's scheme supposes, or rather asserts this. A want of extension *in rerum naturâ* is the great principle. Let us then take this proposition, *In a right angled triangle, the square of the hypotenuse is bigger than either of the squares of the other sides* (as being really equal to them both.) Now this proposition is directly false, if you substitute the *idea* of this square instead of the *square itself*, which is the object of the idea; for this idea hath no parts nor magnitude whereby to exceed the other ideas; and it is absurd to say it is either *greater* or *less* than another idea, or equal to two or more, or to institute any *proportion* between them; for all such proportion is in respect of *dimensions* or *magnitude*, which can never be applicable to ideas, either in reality, or on the Author's Scheme. And the argument is the same in respect of all *lines, surfaces, solids, angles*; every thing about which geometry is conversant. And as to *philosophy*, I need not give an instance in it, after what hath been said in N^o 20. If we apply this proposition [*The spaces run over by a body, falling by its own gravity; are as the squares of the times*] to our ideas, instead of their objects, it is downright *nonsense* and *contradiction*. In short, it is as trifling and sophistical, because all demon-

stration

stration is in ideas, to say it is conversant about no *object* but ideas; as it would be to say, because all demonstration must be pronounced in words, or written on paper, it can relate to nothing but the words it is pronounced in, or the paper it is written upon. Omitting therefore other instances, I shall give one, which seems to prove directly the existence of objects without the mind, and that from the *perceptions* of the mind itself.

If our ideas have no parts, and yet if we *perceive parts*; it is plain we perceive something more than our own perceptions. But both these are certain; we are conscious that we perceive parts, when we look upon a house, a tree, a river, the dial-plate of a clock or watch. This is a short and easy way of being certain that something exists without the mind. We are certain of this from *consciousness itself*; since we are as conscious that we perceive parts, as that we have perceptions at all. And this argument proves at once, and from the same perceptions, the existence of both the parts of our composition; (see the Note (s) N^o 27. above) and therefore makes the existence of both equally certain. Our ideas as they are in the mind, are without parts; and as they make us conscious of perceiving parts, we are conscious that an extended object exists without the mind, where the extended image is exhibited, viz. an extended sensory. Our very sensations, and the faculty of imagination, as much prove the existence of this sensory, as they prove the existence of the sensitive Being; and this whether it be in a dream, fever, or any way a Sceptic pleases to suppose, provided only parts be perceived. The wildest chimeras in sleep prove the certainty of the thing they were brought

to render suspected. If these sensories were not, there would be no such illusions: and if *some other cause* than matter, did not make these impressions, there would be still no such illusions. Our sleeping sensations infer the existence of *one cause more*, than our waking sensations shew us.

I am persuaded, if *Des Cartes* had observed this property of our ideas as they are in the mind, *viz.* that they are without parts or extension, (and the definition he gives of an idea which I have quoted above, leads him directly to it) he would have owned that *the same perception of parts* proved to us the existence of both substances. He does indeed in some places point full at this truth. *Præterea* (says he) *ex imaginandi facultate, quâ me uti experior, dum circa res materiales versor, sequi videtur illas existere.* He saw here there was no other way of accounting for the faculty of *imagination*, but by the existence of a material sensory. It were to be wished, he had gone a little farther. But he comes still nearer below. — *Ad hæc considero istam vim imaginandi quæ in me est, prout differt a vi intelligendi, ad mei ipsius, hoc est, ad mentis meæ essentiam, non requiri; nam, &c.* *Meditat. 6.* How near is this to proving the existence of *both substances* from the *same perception* of parts or extended images!

One who considers this argument, can make no objection to it from the *images* formed by *specula*. For these are *extended*, and *prove* what I advance, as much as any appearance. In this instance, *magnifying the image*, i. e. *enlarging the extension of it*, is the great end proposed, and every one knows that such images
are

are formed by *rays* of *light*, which are corporeal things. Neither can there be any objection from the power of an *omnipotent Being*, who may exhibit *extended, figured images*, without any extended, figured subject, in which they may inhere. To bring in Omnipotence to help out an objection, by performing a contradiction, such as to make *properties* exist by themselves without a *subject*, is ridiculous to the last degree.

Others will determine how far this realizes our knowledge concerning matter and material objects, Mr. *Locke* speaks of *sensitive knowledge* with much fairness and candor, giving it the third place, or making the degrees of our knowledge to be *intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive*; (see Note (x) N^o. 23.) but with much submission, the existence of matter in general, or at least of material sensories to which the soul is united, seems to me, from what has been said, to be nearer *intuitive* than *demonstrative* knowledge, if the same *perception* of parts proves to us both the *spirit* and a *material sensory*. Be it as it will there is but one step in the Demonstration, *viz.* to shew that perceptions, as in the mind, have no parts. But D. B. confounds *perception* as in the mind itself, with the *image* perceived in the sensory; and thus endeavours to make our own perceptions of no use to us in shewing us the existence of matter. We had the *conviction* in our own *consciousness* and *perception*; but he made us believe we had it not; and then we were at a loss to find it any where else. A certain great *Author* seems to follow the same tract.—“ But thought (says he) we own pre-
“ eminent, and confess the realest of Beings, *the only ex-*
“ *istence* of which we are made sure by being conscious.

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“ *All these may be only dream and shadow.* All which even
 “ *sense* suggests may be deceitful; the sense itself remains
 “ still; reason subsists; and thought maintains its elder-
 “ ship of Being, &c.” This is carrying things too far. From what has been said just above it appears, that we are *sure* of the existence of matter by being conscious, or having perceptions of some kind; that as long as sense or sensations remain, this is certain; and that our very dreams shew that *all else* is not a dream. This Author elsewhere makes matter as necessary as *thought itself*; and here he says, all that sense suggests may be but a dream. It is hard to reconcile this. If matter be as necessary as thought, and yet but a dream, nothing at all will be left real.

From what is here said it will follow, that separate Spirits have a superior power or faculty of conceiving extended substance, and not our formal manner of *imagination*; but this, I think, is as it should be; agreeable to reason and philosophy. We are under a necessity, as hath been said before, of applying to impressions on the sensory; being by our union kept at a distance from the objects of sensation: in such a state the sensory must be a *necessary artifice* to supply that defect. Hence our present *imagination* and *reminiscence*, are but a kind of *vicarious faculties*, in which separate Spirits must exceed us. These inferior *helps* seem in *them* to be swallowed up in *intellect*, or the best way of conceiving. That wonderful appearance taken notice of in the end of the last Section, makes this in some measure conceivable. That there is a superior way in this case is certain. The Deity is not confined to our narrow faculty of imagination; every thing is *intellect* in him. It may be so in a lower degree in

created separate spirits. All this is more intelligible and reasonable than to run into the contradiction of asserting that living Beings can know, or perceive nothing, when not confined to dead matter. But to return.

As to what is said, *that if D. B. had contented himself with denying the actual existence of matter, he had avoided many absurdities*; I must observe that this is a common mistake, and too readily allowed by us. It should be considered, that if he had granted the existence of matter a possibility, he could not have had one argument for denying it to exist actually. Why deny a thing which is allowed possible enough to be, and which hath all the reasons that the nature of things can admit of, to shew that it actually is? To have written Books then *against the actual existence of the Universe*, would have appeared, if possible, a more extraordinary attempt, than the present. Let any one, to satisfy himself, try if he can find out a reason, on this supposition——“ It
“ is very possible the world may exist, yet it is certain
“ that it doth not really exist, because——.” Or thus:
“ There is no impossibility in supposing myself to have
“ hands, feet, and a body; and yet nothing is more true
“ than that I have *neither hands, feet, eyes, nor ears*, for
“ ——.” It is not conceivable what plausible reason a man could assign to fill up these arguments. But let us suppose that one should recur to the *great topick* and *pretence* for doubting, *viz.* our dreams, and say, “ I find
“ that I am often imposed upon and deceived in dreams;
“ therefore, &c.” I reply; “ Those things which you
“ dream of, and see in your sleep, really exist; and it is
“ very possible for the same *individual Being* to become
“ *a man*,

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“ a *man*, a *brute animal*, a *monster*, &c. successively, as
 “ you see it *represented*. How can you disprove this ap-
 “ parent existence; or shew it not to be real, and that
 “ you are imposed upon in sleep?—By the testimony
 “ of your senses perhaps; since you neither hear nor see
 “ these things when you awake?—I answer, This
 “ is ridiculous in you: you are inconsistent with your-
 “ self; you make opposite reasons conclude the same
 “ thing; you have quite thrown aside the testimony of
 “ your senses, when you conclude against that testimo-
 “ ny, *that the material world doth not really exist*. If
 “ sense can prove any thing, your whole scheme is an
 “ absurdity.” Thus these men cannot prove a dream *to*
be a dream on their own principles: The reason is, they
 suppose all a dream antecedent to any proof, and make
 use of *that supposition* as a proof; as was argued in the be-
 ginning of the Section. This comes from casting off the
 testimony of sense. There is no laying aside the methods
 of certainty which God hath appointed, and finding any
 consistent *succedaneum* in the place of them. We stumble
 from one absurdity to another, till at length we are lost
 amidst the inextricable mazes of *error* and *contradiction*.
 And from all this it appears, that to allow the existence
 of the material world possible, and yet deny its actual ex-
 istence, is at least as difficult as the method *D. B.* has
 taken to deny it; he had not another possible method to
 answer his purpose, but to pretend it could not exist.

Some other objections have been made, but not urged
 with that candor, strength and accuracy as the former;
 however, I shall mention them. One is, “ That the
 “ *existence* of material objects may be called in question,
 “ from

“ from the different appearances they make, when
 “ placed at different distances from the eye; for why
 “ should they have one *magnitude*, or *figure*, rather
 “ than another.” This, which our *Author* and his *Fol-*
lowers insist much on, is taken from *Pyrrho*, and his
Disciples ——— Καλὰ τῷτοι τὸ τρόπον τὰ δοκῶντα εἶναι
 μεγάλα, μικρὰ φαίνεσθαι· τὰ τετραγώνια, τερογύλα· τὰ
 ὀμαλὰ, ἐξοχὰς ἔχοντα· τὰ ὀρθὰ, κεκλασμένα. ———

It is against the first *Elements* of *Geometry*, that any ob-
 ject, this *Book* for instance, should subtend the same an-
 gle by rays proceeding from it to the eye, at all the va-
 rious distances at which it may be placed. Thus upon
 the supposition that objects really exist, there is a demon-
 strable necessity that they should appear of different mag-
 nitudes and figures, placed at different distances from
 the beholder. Hence it seems very unskilful to make
 such an *appearance* an objection against the real existence
 of extended objects, which must necessarily obtain, sup-
 posing them to exist. If such an objection prove any
 thing, it proves extended objects impossible, because
 another *impossibility* cannot become *fact*; viz. That
 the *same line* should always subtend the same angle, by
 lines drawn from it to any point.

It is said, “ I have pretended to ridicule this scheme,
 “ by endeavouring to put some propositions, according
 “ to it, in ridiculous language.” This I directly deny.
 The language into which I have put these propositions,
 is very proper according to this scheme. This was de-
 signed as an argument against the scheme, not as ridi-
 cule; and I still think it is one. When it is said in the
 objection, “ That an *object* (this *Book*, v. g.) placed
 “ within

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“ within a foot of the eye, appears of one magnitude ;
 “ and removed to the distance of ten feet from it, appears
 “ to be of another ; and at the distance of a hundred
 “ yards, still of another, &c.” I assert that this is no
 language for this scheme ; or it is captious and sophistical
 language. It should be “ The *idea* of a Book, placed
 “ within the *idea* of a foot of the *idea* of the eye, &c.”
 To express this in common language, and yet suppose the
 expression proper, is first to suppose the Book *placed*, and
really existing ; and then to infer from this supposition *that*
it is only an idea. To apply common language to a quite
 contrary sense, and then to suppose this *arbitrary appli-*
cation an argument to overturn common sense, or to con-
tend for the propriety of such application, is as inconsistent
 as any thing in the scheme. It is plain *figure, distance,*
magnitude, motion, are no language on this hypothesis.
 These are supposed real in the *language*, and it is thence
 concluded there are no such things. This is an open falla-
 cy. It is certain, arguments for a *true hypothesis*, may be
 expressed in words agreeable to that hypothesis ; and not
 in such a language as *contradicts* and *supposes it false*.
 And since it is impossible for any man living, to do this
 on our *Author's* principles ; this itself is an invincible ar-
 gument against them. Common language is adapted to
 the *objects* of our ideas, and *these principles*, to the *ideas*
 of objects : this must occasion a constant opposition be-
 tween any language and these principles, and shews that
 they contradict common language, as much as common
 sense.

S E C T. III.

That matter is not eternal and uncaused, nor the eternal effect of an eternal cause.

I. **I**T hath been shewn in the first and second sections of Vol. I. what kind of a substance matter is: it appears to be a *sluggish, inactive, lump*; not only not endued, but utterly incapable of being endued with any *active power*. The nature of it consists in being *solidly extended*, or so extended as to *resist*. Hence *resistance* is fundamental in its nature: and hence again arises an impossibility of its *effecting* what it resists, *viz.* any change of its present state. If we should conceive it once *placed* in any part of the immensity of space, (though we could not even conceive it placed *at first* in that part rather than another, without some *external cause* to determine this particular *location*;) if, I say, we should conceive it once thus placed, we must after that conceive it to remain *in that place* to all eternity; to continue in *that shape* or *figure*, and with the same *relative situation of its parts*; without any possibility of change or variation; unless we allow of an *immaterial*

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rial Cause, which could effect a change in such a dead substance. And in consequence of this it appeared that an *universal, indefinient, various impulse* from an immaterial Cause, was necessary to be impressed upon it, to effect all those changes it undergoes, and to produce all those regular and beautiful *vicissitudes* which we behold in nature; and that the incessant and universal influence of *this Cause* is that which constantly *supports* the material world. It was moreover shewn that this *inert substance* cannot *resist* but in proportion to its *quantity*. And since the *least parts* make the greatest resistance, that they may not be put out of their relative situation among themselves; *this itself* appeared to be *the power* of this immaterial Cause, indefinitely impressed upon, and exerted in every possible part of matter. And since without this, *these least parts* could not *cohere* at all, or make a solid, resisting substance (*a*); it appears that the power of this Cause thus incessantly put forth through all its possible parts, is that which constitutes the *solidity* and *resistance* of matter. And hence again

(*a*) Let what hath been said concerning *the cohesion of matter*, from N^o 7. to N^o 12. Sect. 2. be here remembered.

it follows that, as the power of this Cause constantly exerted, constitutes the nature and solidity of matter *now*; so it could not have been a solid resisting substance *at first*, or for any the *least time*, without the power of this Cause thus exerted. And thus the great question concerning the *rise* and *origin* of matter, seems to be naturally and easily determined, from what has been already shewn in these two sections. For from this it appears to be a *thing caused*, at whatever time it may have been brought into existence: and nothing can be more against reason than to suppose, that such a *dead, inactive, substance* (a substance, which wants the power of a *foreign* Cause to be indefinitely put forth upon it, that it may be, what it is) should nevertheless be a thing uncaused and independent. Without this *foreign influence* to effect cohesion and solidity in it, we could not conceive it at all to be a substance. Let us go as far as we can in the *sub-division* of parts, as long as we allow these parts to be *solid* and *extended*, we must allow them to be solid and extended by this external power exerted: and if they are not solid and extended parts, they cannot be *parts* of solid and extended substance.

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This carries the point beyond the reach of objection; for to say, There might have been some *incomplete subject*, or *substratum*, eternal and self-existent which the power of *this Cause* (by being exerted in it) constituted into a *solid, resisting* substance, would be to speak not only unintelligibly but absurdly. What could this *incomplete, self-existent* thing be? It could not be matter, or solid and resisting substance; but some unsubstantial *phantom* of matter. And I demand a reason from the *Patrons* of eternal and uncaused matter, why an incomplete unsubstantial *phantom of matter* should be eternal and uncaused; since the substance in its complete nature could only be a dependent effect (*b*)? Can a *half-finished*,
ed,

(*b*) All this would be the *counter-part* to *Aristotle's* figment of *substantial forms*. The *phantom* of substance, (which is the same as *unsubstantial* substance) and *substantial forms*, seem to tally in making up something like real substance between them, if we could conceive either of them to subsist without the other; but they must either be both *substances*, or both *shadows*. And in the terms to which the controversy is here reduced, the Deity contributed the one part in finishing the substance, [the solid and resisting nature of matter] which seems the only substantial part: and the other [the unsubstantial

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ed, imperfect thing have a better claim to *self-existence*, than that whose nature is *full* and *complete*? Here the latter of these hath been manifestly proved to be an effect: after which it would be absurd to the last degree, to pretend the former may be independent and eternal. This would be contending, without knowing what was contended for: and it is so far from being true, that we cannot conceive *the creation of matter out of nothing* possible, as is pretended, that it is even impossible to conceive it *self-existent* and *uncreated* (c). It must have been created

(and

substantial phantom] is as eternal and necessary as he himself! I should think men should be ashamed to stand by this. If we call to mind *Aristotle's* definition of his *materia prima*, we shall find it exactly to agree to that which must be here supposed *necessary* and *self-existent*. It is, *Nec quid; nec quale, nec quantum, nec quidquam eorum quibus determinatur ens*. This is *empty sound*; but it is fit enough to describe an *empty phantom*, of which no man ever had, nor ever will have any notion. And yet this is that which the *Stagirite* makes eternal and necessary; which, if it had not been self-existent, no power of any Being could ever have supplied!

(c) “ You tell us (says Dr. *Clarke*, in his dispute with “ *M. C.* p. 245.) if we have not an idea of the creation “ of matter out of nothing, *we must inevitably conclude*

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(and out of nothing too: not certainly out of a half-finished phantom of a *substratum*) when the power of *this immaterial Cause* was

“ *matter a self-existent Being.* I answer, by the same
 “ argument, it follows on the contrary, that if we have
 “ not an idea of the self-existence of matter, [that is,
 “ *that every distinct particle of matter* in the Universe,
 “ *is a necessary, independent, self-existent Being,*] we must
 “ inevitably conclude matter to be a *created Being.* And
 “ by a better argument, it follows, if we have an idea
 “ of the possibility of the *non-existence* of matter; that
 “ is, if we have an idea that Space can (without a contra-
 “ diction) exist without matter in it; we must inevitably
 “ conclude matter not to be necessarily-existing, but a
 “ *created Being.*” To this I beg leave to add, that the
 unneccessariness both of matter itself, and the idea of it,
 can no way better appear, than if we compare these two,
Space and *Matter*, together. The one hath all the ge-
 nuine marks of necessity; it forces itself upon us; it will
 neither be increased nor lessened in our thoughts; and
 we cannot suppose it out of nature, but by a contradicti-
 on. It is quite otherwise with *matter*; we may suppose
more or less of it to exist, or even that once *none at all*
 existed without any violence offered to our ideas. When
 we dispute Space out of existence, we endeavour to ob-
 scure one of the clearest ideas we have of necessary ex-
 istence; but after the heat of the argument is over, I am
 apt to think every man finds in his own breast that this
 is impossible to be effected,

With

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was first exerted, to make it a solid resisting substance.

II. This

With respect to the *impossibility of creating matter*, a certain great *Author* seems very positive. I shall here give his argument, and endeavour to answer it. He says, speaking to the other *Person* in the Dialogue.—“ In
“ the first place, give me leave to wonder that, instead
“ of the many arguments commonly brought for the
“ proof of a *Deity*, you make use only of one single
“ one to build on. I expected to have heard from you,
“ in customary form, of a *first Cause*; a *first Being*, and
“ a *beginning of motion*: how clear the idea was of im-
“ material substance; and how plainly it appeared, that
“ some time or other matter must have been created.
“ But as to all this you are silent.” [Thus our *Author*, I think, endeavours to get quit of this kind of reasoning, with a pretended *contempt*, instead of argument.] “ As
“ for what is said of a *material unthinking Substance* be-
“ ing never able to have produced an *immaterial think-*
“ *ing one*; I readily grant it: but on the condition that
“ this great maxim of *nothing being ever made from no-*
“ *thing*, may hold as well on my side as my *Adversary's*;
“ and then, I suppose, that *whilst the world endures*, he
“ *will be at a loss how to assign a beginning to matter*, or
“ how to suggest the possibility of annihilating it. The
“ *spiritual men* may, as long as they please, represent to
“ us, in the most eloquent manner, that matter consi-
“ dered in a thousand different shapes, joined and dis-
“ joined, varied and modified to eternity, can never of
“ itself,

II. This might suffice; but this old controversy is still varied into new and different forms;

“ itself, afford one single thought, never occasion or
 “ give rise to any thing like sense and knowledge. Their
 “ argument will hold good against a *Democritus*, an *E-*
 “ *picurus*, or any of the *elder* or *latter Atomists*. But it
 “ will be turned on them by an *examining Academist*;
 “ and when the two substances are fairly set asunder,
 “ and considered apart, as different kinds; ’twill be
 “ *as strong sense*, and *as good argument*, to say as well
 “ of the immaterial kind, That do with it as you please,
 “ modify it a thousand ways, purify it, exalt it, sub-
 “ lime it, torture it ever so much, or rack it, as they
 “ say, with thinking; you will never be able to force
 “ the contrary substance out of it. *The poor dregs of sor-*
 “ *ry matter* can no more be made out of the simple,
 “ pure substance of immaterial thought, than the *high*
 “ *spirits* of thought or reason, can be extracted from
 “ the gross substance of heavy matter. *So let the Dogma-*
 “ *tists make of this argument what they can.*”

This is a bullying defiance, and the argument is treated in a very metaphorical manner. But passing by other things, the *Academist* grants here, both *material* and *immaterial substance* to exist, or a substance which is solid and resisting, and a substance thinking and intelligent, as distinguished, and (it seems) equally eternal. And he will be forced to own that if there be an intelligent Being any way perfect, there must be *an infinitely perfect*

forms; the idea of eternal and uncaused matter is pretended to be the only consistent idea we

perfect intelligent Being: for whatever Being is necessary, cannot be necessarily limited and imperfect. And if there is an infinitely perfect Being, he must be infinitely powerful and knowing, or what we call *God*. Now the argument comes to this, I presume, *That, if matter could not create God, or if this on the one hand is certain, it is no less certain on the other, That God could not create matter*: Or, *if a powerless, dead lump could not create an infinitely powerful, living Being; no more could an infinitely powerful living Being create a powerless dead substance*. The examining Academist may shew the parity of reason here, on which his argument is founded; or examine if there be any disparity; for to others who cannot examine so well, the disparity seems infinite. The condition which he demands, may be allowed, as well on his side, as his adversary's, *That nothing can ever be made out of nothing*, supposes that an infinitely powerful Being is as unable to create a new substance, as dead matter is unable to perform the like effect. This is too large a *postulate* to be granted so easily! but of this more afterwards. Besides, it seems wrong to contend that a *dead substance* must as necessarily have been without origin, as a Being of infinite perfections; merely because such a Being had not perfection enough to produce this sluggish inert substance. This looks like denying a Being of infinite perfections. In his way of *extracting, exalting, subliming*, it would appear the *Author*

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we can have of it; and abundance of other difficulties are endeavoured to be raised. Wherefore we shall proceed to consider the idea which all men naturally have of matter, and to shew from *that*, and from many *circumstances* in its existence, which must be determined by an *external Cause*, before we can

thor imagined that matter was to be made out of *immaterial* or *thinking substance*, as a pre-existing subject; or that *Spirit* was the *materials* from which the *sorry dregs* of matter was to be drawn by a sort of chemical process. A little more *argument* and less *metaphor* would have been more convincing. If any thing *existed necessarily*, it was the very *sorry dregs* of matter; for every thing *solid* and *substantial* in it appears to have been produced in time. Lastly, All this flourish is no more than what *Pyrrho* and the *Sceptics* affirmed long ago. They said, “An *incorporeal substance* could not produce *body*.” The reason they gave was, “because no *incorporeal* thing produces *body*.” And again, “*Body* doth not produce any thing *incorporeal*, because the thing produced must be made out of a passive subject, or pre-existing materials.—” Ἀσώμαλον ᾧ σώματι ἐκ ἔστιν αἰτιον· ἐπεὶ ἔδεν ἀσώμαλον ποιεῖ σῶμα· σῶμα ᾧ ἀσώματὶ ἐκ ἂν εἴη αἴτιον· ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον, τῆς πασχέσης ὕλης ὀφείλει εἶναι· *Diog. Laert.* *Pyrrho*. Hence it would appear, the *examining Academic* goes no farther than the *dubbing Sceptic*.

conceive

conceive it to exist at all, that it must have had a *commencement* some time or other. It is to be observed that the two general hypotheses, on which men have chosen to build the eternity of matter, are, *first*, That it is eternal and uncaused; and *secondly*, That it is the eternal effect of an eternal cause. Of these in order. And here I must take notice that men have added to the natural difficulty of this subject, by starting all manner of *subtile* and *wire-drawn* objections to hinder any conclusion from being established: and then they complain of the *subtilty* and *abstractedness* of the arguments; as if that were not occasioned by themselves. Every objection must be answered according to the nature of the argument it contains; and for men to have recourse to subtilties in raising difficulties, and then complain that they should be taken off by minutely examining these subtilties, is a strange kind of procedure. And to those who would desire to have the point fairly determined, without troubling themselves with abstract arguments on either side, the reasoning in the last paragraph, it is presumed, will give satisfaction; and indeed more is unnecessary to any fair Enquirer.

III. Now

III. Now as to the *idea* of matter, a man, I think, must commit great violence on his mind, who raises it into the idea of a *necessarily existing Being*. Not to mention that this is a false idea of it, as appears from what has been said; our common observations concerning it, seem to suggest to us, that it is only a *thing contingent* and *passive*. We can discover no perfection in it; it seems to be altogether subject to the power of *active Beings*; it is tossed about from place to place; the figure of it is changed all manner of ways; we fashion it as we please; and all the trouble it gives us, is only from its *deadness* and *inactivity*, things the farthest possible from heightening our ideas of any substance. These are the first and most general notions of mankind concerning matter: and if *speculative men* begin to consider it in a more accurate and philosophical way, they will discover nothing that can heighten their conceptions. Allowing we could not have an *idea* of the *creation of matter*; (though something very like the certainty of this *creation* hath been proved in N^o 1.) yet if we offer to form a contrary idea of it, *viz. that it is eternal and uncaused*;

so many absurdities arise, as shew we offer violence to our reason. The consequences of this supposition are, That matter must be *self-sufficient* in its own nature, or such a substance as *owes nothing* to any other *Being*; that it is contradictory to suppose *one atom* of matter *less* or *more* in the Universe; or to suppose it not to have existed in all *time past*, or not to exist in all *time to come*. But every particular of these is false, and proves this to be a *false idea*. It hath been shewn that matter *owes* its very nature and *solid extension* to an *immaterial Cause*; and the quantity of it is entirely arbitrary, which is a plain consequence of the former. Every atom of matter is a *distinct substance*; and nothing can be more *unsupported* than supposing such an *infinite number* of necessary, *self-existent*, *distinct Beings*. And if *any atom* in the whole number is not rigidly necessary, so that it would imply a contradiction for it not to exist; *no one atom* in the whole mass is necessary, and the supposition itself falls to the ground.

That which forces us to own the existence of any thing necessary is, because it would imply a contradiction to suppose the contrary :
and

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and if *every atom of matter* existed eternally, and without a cause, it would be as contradictory for it at any time not to have existed, as for *the same thing to be, and not to be at once*. In this case, the contradiction must be as far extended backward, as that supposition on which it is founded, *viz.* to eternity; for the atom is supposed eternal and uncaused: and *this axiom*, which is otherwise *conditional* becomes here *unlimited*; the condition being removed by supposition. Hence it must have been eternally a contradiction for such an atom not to have existed: but those who have maintained the eternity of matter, have never been able to prove it; so far is *the non-existence of an atom* from implying a contradiction. Whence, as I said, this supposition cannot be true, nor the idea of *uncaused matter* a just idea.

IV. To make this reasoning the more easily understood, I shall take notice of a difficulty which I am told will lie against it. It is said that though from a thing's existing *necessarily* we can infer that it hath existed *eternally*, for there the consequence is plain; yet it is not so clear conversely, that from a
thing's

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thing's having existed *eternally* we can infer that it exists *necessarily*, so as to imply a contradiction in being supposed not to exist; and that the greatest difficulty in this argument is to make out this connexion. But I answer, If matter had no cause of existence, it must be *self-existent*, or existence must belong to its nature; there is no medium: and if it be self-existent, it must *exist necessarily*; a thing whose existence is of itself, and belonging to its nature, cannot be indifferent *to exist* or *not exist*: and if it exists necessarily, it must also be *independent* on any thing else for its existence. So when we suppose matter uncaused, we do as much as if we supposed it *self-existent necessarily existing*, and *independent* on any thing else for its existence: and whatever contradiction there is in supposing a necessarily existing Being not to exist, the very same there will be in supposing an eternal and uncaused Being not to exist, or uncaused matter not to exist: and the contradiction will appear thus. If any one should think there is only one necessary Being, and at the same time with the Atheist should add, that matter is this Being, (since it is a plain contradiction that once nothing at all might

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have existed) if he supposes matter at any time not to have existed, this contradiction comes full home to him. [It would have been absurd in *Lucretius*, who said, *Nothing existed but matter*, to have said, *Once matter itself might not have existed.*] Or if he should say there are *two necessary Beings*, of which matter is *one*, and that some time or other it might not have existed, he not only absurdly makes the half of necessary Being contingent; but since they are equally necessary if one might have not existed, the other also might have not existed; and thus still *nothing at all might have once existed*: and he will always be reduced to this, though he should suppose a hundred such Beings (*d.*) Let it
be

(*d.*) The argument shewing that matter doth not exist necessarily is of great consequence; since it follows from it, that an immaterial Being must have existed necessarily; for it would be absurd to say either that *nothing exists necessarily*, or that what exists necessarily is neither *matter*, nor *not matter*. Therefore I shall here remark another difficulty or two started against the reasoning in these two paragraphs. Because I have said, if matter existed eternally and without a cause, it is contradictory to suppose it not to have existed in all time past, or not to exist in all time to come: It hath been observed “ That
“ some

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be remembered that *uncaused, self-existent, necessarily existing, and independent*, are all equivalent

“ some may look on it in the natures of *the things themselves*, as far as known to us, equally possible for them
“ to have *begun to be*, or *never begun to be* [as having
“ always existed to wit] ; or even after they have *been*
“ *for ever, or for any time*, to be annihilated by *some*
“ *cause* endued with the requisite powers.” But let it be considered how absurd it would be to affirm either of these contraries, *matter began to be*, or had a cause ; *matter never began to be*, or had no cause, equally possible ; of these the one must be unalterably *true*, and the other *false* ; and if we know any thing, we must know that possibility cannot be equally competent to two such propositions more than to a proposition of *Euclid*, and the negation of it. If matter be a *self-existent thing*, it was impossible for that very reason that ever it could have begun to be ; and *vice versâ*, if matter *began to be*, it was impossible it could have been self-existent. Though matter may be *indifferent to existence or non-existence*, (where there is no necessity on either side) ; yet it could never be *indifferent to necessary existence or arbitrary existence* ; that would be to make *necessity itself* consist in *indifference*. Whence it appears, that to entertain such a notion of matter, as is mentioned in the objection, would be extremely absurd ; and if it be a common way of thinking, it ought to be rectified. And farther, which soever of these two propositions, *Matter existed by a cause, Matter existed by no cause*, be the true

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equivalent expressions; as appears from what has been said in this paragraph.

V. We

one; yet by the rules of argument, he who supposes the one to be true, must at the same time suppose the other to be false and impossible; which shews the argument above to proceed rightly. The last part of the difficulty shall be considered hereafter.

The other difficulty is of much greater consequence. I say, That which forces us to own the existence of any thing necessary is, because it implies a contradiction to suppose the contrary. On this it is observed, “ That if
 “ the *Cartesian arguments* from the idea of a God are
 “ inconclusive, as they are generally now allowed to be,
 “ it will be hard to say that *any Being* is to us necessarily
 “ existent in this sense; that when we infer from the
 “ existence of other things *an eternal uncaused Being*, it
 “ doth not come up to the sense here meant, else why
 “ have we recourse to a train of reasoning, and do not
 “ rather see the contradiction immediately? Can the
 “ mere speculation of ideas prove the existence of any
 “ thing? The existence of *such a Being* must be an
 “ axiom, and need no proof, since its non-existence must
 “ imply an absurdity; so that in this sense nothing seems
 “ necessarily existing to us, not even *the supreme Being*,
 “ because it is from *his effects* we discover his existence,
 “ and not from any *sufficient reason* which discovers his
 “ existence *à priori*. That we know that an eternal
 “ uncaused Being exists, a proof of this, *à posteriori*, is
 “ allowed; but the sufficient reason, *à priori*, was never
 “ given;

V. We may next observe concerning matter that *if it existed necessarily*, it either existed

“ given; and till it can be known, how come we to be
“ so bold in speaking of the manner of his existence?”
To all this I answer, first, that *I do think* there is a
strong necessity for the existence of Being in general, nay,
a necessity for *infinite existence*; because otherwise an
infinite and eternal nothing would be necessary. It seems
to me the greatest absurdity to make all existence *barely*
possible, or contingent; for even that supposes some Being
necessary, of which it must be a *possible effect*. And if
any existence be allowed necessary, it must be *infinite*
existence; for where-ever necessary existence *ends*, a ne-
cessary nothing *will take place*, either *finite* nothing, or
infinite. But nothing can have no properties, otherwise
it would be *something*. Infinite and eternal are necessary
properties of *something*, and therefore of *infinite and eter-*
nal Being. And this I would beg leave to call a *demon-*
stration of infinite and eternal existence, or Being, merely
from the speculation of our own ideas, abstracting from
effects; which if we should give up, we cannot, I think,
pretend to be certain about any thing. Or let it be
considered thus, that there is an absolute, unconditional
necessity either of *existence* or *non-existence*; and this will
make *one* of the two universal and absolute. There can-
not be a necessity for both; there would be then *two*
absolute necessities *opposing each other*, whereby the ne-
cessity on both sides would be suspended or destroyed;

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ed necessarily in *one solid mass*, or in *separate and incoherent parts*. It could not exist necessarily both these ways, since the one excludes

nor can both be said to be unnecessary, or indifferent; that would be *a necessity of universal indifference*, or of want of necessity, whereby opposite affections of Being, [necessity and indifference] would be confounded, or made the same: and such notions applied to Being itself would make strange work in Philosophy. Absolute necessity is every where alike and uniform, without difference or variety, which indeed shews *the unity* of the necessary Being, as Dr. *Clarke* observes. Now I cannot help observing, that this seems very different from the *Cartesian method*. They first of all form, if not arbitrarily, at least voluntarily, the idea of an infinitely perfect Being, and argue for the necessity of his existence from that *formed idea*: but beginning in the manner here mentioned, the complex idea of an infinitely perfect Being forces itself upon us, property by property; and the idea itself becomes necessary. Let me farther observe that it seems improper to apply here Mr. *Leibnitz's* principle of *a sufficient reason*. This necessity appears to me more than a sufficient reason, as it is necessity, for necessity is more than *bare sufficiency*. And this will hold also applied to the manner of necessary existence, which will itself, I hope, appear necessary immediately. And thus far here as to the proof of necessary Being, *à priori*, which I shall have occasion to resume in establishing the unity of the Deity.

As

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cludes the other: therefore it existed necessarily in one of them only. But it could not exist

As to what is said, that though a proof *à posteriori* is allowed, yet we can determine nothing about the manner of his existence till the *sufficient reason* is known; I beg leave to observe, that supposing no proof *à priori* could be adduced, yet if it be shewn by arguments *à posteriori*, that this Being hath no *cause of existence* from without, it follows that he must have a *necessity of it* from within, or in his nature, just as effectually as it could have followed from a proof *à priori*: and this determines the manner of his existence as to necessity, that is the necessity of it; and the manner of it in any other respect is not yet enquired into; nor are we guilty of any unwarrantable boldness, I think, in speaking thus much of the manner of his existence upon such grounds. I leave it here to the judicious to consider, whether in this case there be not a needless difference made of late, in point of conclusiveness, between a proof *à priori* and *à posteriori*. What signifies it how we come to the knowledge of any truth, provided we come to the *certain knowledge* of it? Whether by the *synthetic* or *analytic* method; by beginning at the head and coming down to the foot, or by beginning at the foot and mounting to the head? In other parts of knowledge the *analytic* method is much insisted on, which is all by arguments *à posteriori*; and this brings no disadvantage to that particular science, or truth. Mathematicians in Algebra begin at the end, (if I may so speak) and argue backward:

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exist necessarily either of these ways, since the other was equally possible, or implied no contradiction: that is, it existed necessarily

and having found out the truth this way, they make it a standing theorem, to argue *à priori* from, for ever after. Why should it be otherwise here? When by arguing *from effects* we find out that there must be an *eternal uncaused Being*, why may we not make this truth a *standing theorem*, and deduce all the same consequences from it, as if we had seen it directly without investigation. If we discover a necessarily existing Being *à posteriori*, we have then a sufficient reason *à posteriori*, for believing his existence; and if we have a sufficient reason *à posteriori*, why demand another sufficient reason *à priori*?—But in truth, we have a sufficient reason *à priori*, for we discover a necessity of his existence, which is much the stronger. A *sufficient reason* is only applicable in the nature of things, I conceive, when we are enquiring about *effects*; but to require a sufficient reason of uneffected existence (or of the manner of it, which must be also uneffected, and therefore necessary) seems to me very absurd; it is the same as to require a sufficient cause able to effect these *uncaused* or *necessary things*. Lastly, I would observe that the denying a necessary Being may imply a contradiction, and yet that contradiction want to be brought out by a train of reasoning. The denying every true proposition as well as *axioms*, implies a contradiction; and yet these want to be proved. And those propositions may be axioms to the *quick-sighted*, which to others will require a demonstration.

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one of these ways, and yet neither of them, which is a repugnancy. This argument holds with respect to the *location* of matter in some particular part of space, since the quantity of it is not immense; with respect to the *figure* of the mass, or of its separate parts; their *distance*, or *situation*; its *state* of rest or motion, and the *direction* or *velocity* of the motion, if matter be supposed to move. In short, *indifference as to the manner of existence* (that is, where more ways of existence are all equally possible) is *inconsistent with necessity of existence*: for all the ways being, by supposition, equally possible, the necessity of any one of them is prevented; and therefore the necessity of any manner of existence, or the necessity of existence in general. In this case we are forced to suppose an *external cause* determining one particular manner of existence out of more possible ones. And this is applicable to the condition of matter particularly: for being a *dead inactive* substance, as has been made appear, and indifferent to the several ways of its existing, and not being able to determine this indifference itself, an *external cause* to determine the manner of its existence is absolutely necessary: and since it could not exist at all

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but in some manner, an external cause was absolutely necessary to make it exist *at first*, or to give it *any manner of existence*.

VI. Here again it hath been urged, “ That
“ *indifference* as to the manner of existence
“ may not be inconsistent with a *Being’s* ex-
“ *isting necessarily* in some manner; if it be
“ allowed that a Being which owes its exi-
“ stence to no other Being, may be affected
“ by other Beings as to the manner of its ex-
“ istence, which does not appear so absurd as
“ to be easily confuted.” Whether by these
last words it be meant that *God Almighty* may
be affected by his *creatures* as to the manner
of his existence, or that *matter* which owes
its existence *to nothing else* (which by the way
would be a begging the question) is so affect-
ed as to have the manner of its existence
changed, I know not; only it had been pro-
per to have said something in proof of this
supposition, or to have assigned *the instance*,
since it is made the ground of an objection.
However, the absurdity of it may appear in
general thus. If a *necessary Being* might have
the manner of its existence changed by any
other Being, it must depend on that other
Being

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Being for the manner of its existence at least: and if it depended on another Being for the manner of its existence, it must depend on that Being for *existence itself*; since it cannot exist but *in some manner*. Existence taken separately from all manner of existence is an impossibility, the negation of existence. But it hath been shewn (N^o 4.) that a self-existent Being must be also independent for its existence, and therefore for the manner of its existence. Nay, so independent is the manner of necessary existence, that it is even absurd to suppose it to depend on *the necessary Being itself*, or to be determined by it; for it ought to exist before it could determine the manner of its own existence, and therefore to exist without determining the manner of its existence; or to exist in a necessary and independent manner. Or thus. It ought to exist before it could determine the manner of its own existence, and yet to determine the manner of its existence before it could exist, since the manner of its existence is supposed dependent on, and therefore determined by itself; which is repugnant. In a word, if the manner of necessary existence were *dependent*, it would be *effected*: and

as

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as we suppose it dependent on another Being, or the necessary Being itself, it would be effected by one or other of these respectively. And, since existence cannot be without a manner, the supposition ends in this palpable contradiction, That an *uncaused* Being is *caused* by another Being, or by itself.

VII. I am solicitous to remove the prejudices of men in this material point, and therefore observe that the *manner* of necessary existence is otherwise proved to be itself *necessary*, thus. If the manners of necessary existence are more than one, then they are either *all unnecessary*, or contingent only; or they are *all necessary*; or, lastly, *one of them* only is necessary. *First*, if they are all contingent or unnecessary, since the Being could not exist then but in one of these unnecessary manners, it could not exist necessarily at all. For, as I have said, existence, taken separately from all manners of existence, is an impossibility; so that it is contradictory to say existence is of a different nature from all manners of existence. Conceive, if it be possible, a Being stript of all manners of existence; and then enquire about the

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the nature of its existence if you can. It must be then annihilated, having *no manner* of existence, and therefore an existence of *no nature*. Existence without a manner is but an abstract idea: and hence it is that from the manner of it only it receives the denomination of *necessary, contingent; happy, miserable; &c.* Secondly, if the manners are all said to be necessary, (passing by the contradiction in such a supposition) when the Being exists in *any one* of them, *all the rest* must be *unnecessary* for that time at least, nay *impossible*; since a Being cannot exist in two different manners at once. Thus the impossibility would go round through them all, and this supposition would make them all as unnecessary as the former, the necessity is but *nominal*. Now since there could be no *necessary Being* in either of these two suppositions, and yet it is certain that some Being exists necessarily, it follows that the manner of its existence is *one, necessary, and immutable*. And this shews, as I concluded before, (N^o 5.) that matter is not an uncaused or necessarily existent thing, whose manners of existence are so *various* and *different*. This principle therefore, *That indifference as to the manner*

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manner of existence, is inconsistent with necessity of existence, and supposes another Being to determine it, and of consequence to give existence to that thing at first, stands firm; and ought, I think, to be received as an undoubted truth in philosophy. Let it also from hence be remembered, that existence cannot be of a different nature from the manner of it, or from the present manner of it; for it hath no other thing to give it a nature, or denomination, or to constitute a difference in it, being otherwise only a general or abstract idea. But to go on with the farther consideration of matter.

VIII. If it was eternal and uncaused, it received nothing from any other Being, and its nature and properties are self-existent. Now the nature or matter, without which it could not be what it is, and without which it would be nothing to us, is, that it is a substance *solidly extended, figured, moveable, divisible*. But a substance *extended and figured* is a plain effect, and infers a *cause* which thus *extended and figured* it; when we say a thing is *fashioned, made, wrought*, we intimate a cause which wrought and
fashioned

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fashioned it after that manner. *Extended, figured, fashioned, wrought*, are all alike expressions of the passive form (*e*). How oddly
would

(*e*) It hath been observed here, that this is only a *grammatical argument*. But let it be so; it shews us that even the propriety of expression leads us into a just way of thinking. Let a man say, whether it is not literally true of matter, as it is a solidly extended substance, that it is *figured, fashioned, wrought*; and if so, whether it can be other than an effect, either in *grammar* or *philosophy*? It would be hard to suppose these two inconsistent. Since we have not another way of communicating our thoughts but by language, if there were no propriety in the *expression*, there could be no justness in the *thought* when communicated. And since it has been shewn that the *constant action* of an immaterial Being constitutes the very solid extension of matter, this justifies the propriety of the expression; for it could never have been thus solidly extended, or figured at first without the action of *this Being*; *i. e.* it could not have been without a cause.

With respect to this it hath been farther urged, that
“ If my expression [*matter is figured, extended, placed,*]
“ be turned thus, [*matter has figure, extension, place,*]
“ the argument vanishes with the form of expressing it.”
But I ask, Whether the Objector’s manner of expression makes *figure, extension, place*, any powers or activities belonging to matter? If they are only *marks of passivity* in it, we are just where we were before; they must still
I appear

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would it sound to say a *self-existent house*, an *uncaused pyramid* or *statue*? The absurdity is not

appear *effects*, however disguised by the manner of expression. If it be certain that matter could not exist without *figure*, or *extension*, or *place*, and yet could not give these to itself; what are we to conclude? That such *passive affections* are *necessary* and *self-existent*? Matter could not *have* solid extension, unless an immaterial power were exerted upon it, (see N^o 1.) it could not therefore *have* figure or place, as being *eternal* and *uncaused*. If I should say, the table I write upon is a substance *figured*, and another contend that it is only substance having *figure*; would his changing the expression shew that the *figure* of the table was *necessary* and *self-existent*? The cases seem to be much alike. One might indeed chuse to say, matter is a substance having inactivity, instead of matter *is* an inactive substance; but the inactivity of matter would not *vanish* with the form of speech. I say, matter is a *solid, figured, extended* substance; it should be shewn then that this expression is improper, or ambiguous; and that it hath led me to make a wrong conclusion; otherwise to find fault with it, is what may be called *nodum in scirpo quærere*: and to turn it to a form less common, and less just, is endeavouring to perplex a plain case.

It is still farther urged on this Head, “ That the *location* of matter, or its being in *one place* rather than another, cannot prove that it doth not exist necessarily, as I pretend; because necessary existence has relation
“ only

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not less, though it be less attended to, when we suppose an *uncaused* globular particle of matter,

“ only to *time*, but not to *place*; or it implies that the
“ thing must have existed through all points of time, and
“ for ever, but not in all places and every where.” This is the common notion concerning necessary existence; but if we consider what has been said in the two last paragraphs, concerning the manner of necessary existence, which must be itself necessary, this notion will appear to be only a common prejudice. I shall here apply the argument to matter in particular, and endeavour to shew that necessity of existence hath as much a relation to place as to time.

If we say matter exists necessarily *in general*, but not with respect to any *particular place*; since *place* is as necessary an affection of its existence as *extension* itself (for *extension* cannot be without *place*;) it is as if we should say, the extension of matter in general is necessary, but in particular it is only *contingent* or *casual*; or thus, the existence of matter is necessary, but a *necessary affection* of that necessary existence is only *casual*. Thus the general and particular existence of matter should have *contrary natures*: or the *existence* of matter, and a *necessary affection* of that existence, should have contrary natures. This *affirms* and *denies* the necessary existence of matter at once. And there is no avoiding this contradiction, for the objection supposes matter to *have two different kinds* of existence; it supposes the existence of matter in general to be *undetermined* by any thing else, as it exists necessarily;

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matter, a *self-existent* cubical atom. *Figuration* is one of those things which unavoidably

necessarily; but matter must *exist particularly*, and is not what *Logicians* call an *Universale à parte rei*; and therefore its *particular existence* must be determined. Now since matter can only exist particularly, and hath no general existence, it cannot exist without being determined by an external cause as to place. And since its existence hath no *necessary relation* to place, *it is not necessary*. Here the *Objector* supposes matter once *determined* as to place, (or once determined in its particular existence) no matter how: and having supposed this, he contends no determination is necessary, and that the argument from *determining its particular location* hath no force to shew *that it could not be self-existent*.

The argument which writers make use of to shew that matter doth not exist necessarily, is this: If matter exists not necessarily in *this* place, it doth not exist necessarily in *another* place; and therefore it exists necessarily in *no* place. The strength of this argument would be better perceived perhaps, if it were drawn out at greater length, which may be done in the following manner.

If matter exists necessarily at all, it either exists necessarily in *no* place; or in *all* places; or lastly, in *any* place it is supposed to be in. These are all the suppositions that can be made, and yet they are all contradictory. As to the *first*, if matter be said to exist necessarily in *no* place, it is denied to exist necessarily at all. The property which its existence hath in no place, is no property

ably imply *causation*. The conception of matter is not that it is a substance *figuring*,
and

property of its existence. The *second*, that matter exists necessarily *in all places*, is a direct contradiction; for since matter (any *particle* of it, or the *whole mass*) can exist but *in one determined place* at once, in all other places it exists neither necessarily, nor unnecessarily.

Where it exists not, its existence hath still no properties.

And the *third* supposition, *viz.* That matter exists necessarily in whatever place *it is supposed* to be in, is repugnant in *the very terms*. It cannot be said to be in *any* place, rather than *another*, but by *supposition*, and at the same time it is said to be *necessarily* there. What I observed just before is very evident here; the determination is once supposed, or matter is once supposed in a certain determined place; and it is hence inferred that no external determination is necessary, or that matter *exists necessarily* there. If this be not so, let the *Objector* assign another reason, why it should exist in any particular and determined place, besides his own *supposition*. Let the place it is said to be in, be called A; it exists therefore in the place A at the time α ; now it was equally possible that it might have existed in the place B at the time α ; or there is no other necessity for its existing in this place, but an arbitrary supposition; and another man might have supposed with equal reason, that it existed in the place B, C, or D, at the time α . But to suppose it existing in the place A at the time α , and thence to infer that it exists necessarily *there* at that time, is as much as to say, *My supposing it to exist there makes it necessarily*

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and *extending*; but a substance *actually figured*, and *impenetrably extended* (f): and that

a sub-
exist there. Which shews, as has been said, that necessity of existence has as much relation to place as to time. And therefore since matter is indifferent as to existing in any place, it requires an external, or *immaterial* cause to determine its place, or *location*; and since it could not exist at all, but in some place; it requires an *immaterial* cause to determine its existence in some place at first.

And the same kind of argument will be applicable, to shew its *indifference* as to being of this or another *figure*; having the parts of its mass *contiguous*, or *separated*; and if separated, as to having them at this or another *distance*. And the same reasoning will also shew its *indifference* as to being in a state of *rest* or *motion*, as to having this or another *direction*, this or another degree of velocity; in all which an infinite variety is possible. And in spite of all evasions that can be thought on, this argument shews that matter is not a *self-existent* or *uncaused substance*.

(f) Here it hath been asked, “If we may not say ‘that space is extended as well as body?’” I answer, that it cannot be said to be extended in the same sense that body or matter is. The idea we have of space is of extension in the abstract, not of a concrete extended substance. And this takes off the force of the objection from a supposed parity. Upon this account Mr. *Locke* chuses to call it *expansion*, (Book 2. chap. 15. Sect. 1.) and we conceive it as a thing incapable of *contraction*, *dilatation*, *motion*, *divisibility*, or *separation of parts* (See Mr. *Locke*, Book 2. chap. 13. Sect. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and

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a substance should be figured with infinite diversity, and extended arbitrarily, and yet by

and 17.) But chiefly we conceive it as *necessary* and *infinite*, incapable of change, and impossible to be produced or annihilated. It would be contradictory to say, space is extended in *some places only*. The *Cartesians* make matter infinite, to get free of infinite space; so necessary is it even in their conception. They saw wherever *matter ended*, *pure space* would begin; this made them change the *Aristotelian* notion, as to the finiteness of matter; for *Aristotle* both made the world finite, and yet allowed neither *place* nor *emptiness*, nor *time*, beyond the heaven [*Ἄμα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ἑδὲ τόπος, ἑδὲ κενόν, ἑδὲ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἔξω τῷ ἔρρανθ.* De cœlo, lib. 1 cap. 11.] And yet it is to be observed, that he did not constitute a *pure non-entity*, or negation of all Being, without the mundane limits; but places living, unchangeable, happy, eternal *Beings* there. [*Ἄλλ' ἀναλλοίωτα, καὶ ἀπαθῆ, καὶ ἀρίστην ἔχουσα ζωὴν, καὶ αὐτάρκεσάτην, διαίτεται τῷ ἀπείρῳ αἰῶνα.* Ibid.] It had been absurd to place a small quantity of matter amidst an infinite nothing. Thus we see what violence men offered to their ideas when they denied space to be actually infinite. A *Cartesian*, or even an *Aristotelian plenum* is as certainly *false* as it is true that there is such an affection of body as *motion*. In short, we cannot conceive, without repugnancy, that space can be taken away, or that it was *stretched out* at any certain time, or by a *particular action*: or, contrarily, that *body was placed* rather in one part than another of this necessary immensity, without the *particular act* of some Be-

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by nothing, is the same absurdity as that *there may be an effect without a cause*. This argument hath not been hitherto fully considered; but it will appear to a reasonable man, after the exactest weighing of things, that the *location* of body rather in this than that place, implies the *act* of some Being: that the *figuration* of any particle of matter required an *external cause*; and that its *determined quantity* of solidity, rather *more* or *less*, could not have been without a *determining principle*. These are the inseparable characteristicks of an *effect*; and let us pursue matter as far as we please, we can never find it divested of

ing; or that it was extended thus far only, and no farther, without *the determination* of an external agent. The extension of body then implies a particular action exerted, but the extension of space implies no such thing: so we cannot truly say *space was extended*, nor apply the term *extended* to both in the same sense. I may farther take notice here, that they who make matter necessary (all sorts of *Atheists*) should observe the great difference between space and matter in point of necessity. Space hath all the true marks of necessary extension, matter all the contrary. To say *once space was not extended* implies a contradiction; it is *impassive*, without *figure, location, division, situability, motion*. Two things equally necessary, could not have opposite affections in respect of that very necessity.

them.

them. There are not more marks of an effect about a *house*, or a *statue*, than can be shewn about the *rudest* piece of matter; not so many, as about the least assignable part of it, if we consider the constituent particles of an assignable part, and the parts of a *house*, or *statue*, as such. Why should I allow, if I find a piece of wood *shaped*, that this shape was given it by something? and if I consider any other part of matter as having *shape*, that this shape was given it by nothing? Or if I find the piece of wood *lying anywhere*, that it was dropt there, or laid there, by something; and if I consider any part of matter *as placed*, that it was *laid there*, or *placed there* by nothing? Certainly if we consider this point coolly, the *figure*, the *quantity*, the *location* of any part of matter, will as readily lead our thoughts to a cause of them, *not matter*; as the *dimensions*, *figure*, &c. of a house, lead us to a cause of them, *not the house itself*.

IX. Moreover, matter is a thing *moveable*, *divisible*, *situable*, with respect to other matter: these are all passive qualities of matter, no powers in it, but capacities or properties, whereby it is capable of being variously af-

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fected by *some Being* having power thus to *vary* and *modify* it; and all flowing from the nature or primary conception of it. Matter that is not *divisible*, or *moveable*, or *situable*, with respect to other matter, is not matter at all to us: denying this of it, we deny every thing we conceive concerning it, and quite destroy our idea of such a substance. But to be passive implies to be *made* or *effected*. To have *power* and *activity* doth not straight conclude that the Being is not an effect: but to want these, and to be *entirely passive*, is an argument we may rely upon, that the thing is an *effect* of an active cause; otherwise it is passive for no reason, and by no agent, being passive by and from nothing. *Passivity* can only in the order of nature be consequent upon *activity*, as much as *effect* can only be consequent upon *cause*; and there is the same indissoluble connexion between what is *passive* and that *from which it is passive* (something active namely) as there is between effect and cause. Passive and active, truly speaking, are but the just epithets of effected and efficient. It is not possible to assign an instance of a thing's being passive, but what relates either to its being *produced* at first, or having the

manner

manner of its existence *changed* by an active cause. If indeed it were possible that a passive substance should not be the effect of an active cause, but uneffected, uncaused; then there would be no need of any cause at all to produce any effect; for effects, or things of a passive nature, might be self-existent, which would confound reason, and put an end to philosophy.

X. Against this argument from the passivity of matter the following difficulty hath been moved. “ There seems to be this material difference betwixt a thing’s being
“ passive in relation to another Being, and a
“ thing’s being an effect of a cause, that the
“ first as a relation might never exist, tho’
“ the things exist; the other must exist whenever the subjects exist. A thing may be of
“ a passive nature, and yet never acted upon.
“ This relation, if the cause of it is asked,
“ flows from the nature and essence of things.
“ May not one argue from a thing’s existing
“ of an active nature, that the passive Being
“ must necessarily exist in the same manner
“ as you do in this place?” To this I answer first, that it is not to be understood how a re-

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lation should not exist, if the related things themselves exist; nor how a thing of a passive nature should exist without ever having been acted upon. If *father* and *son* exist, the relation between them must exist: nay, if the *son* alone exists, being a related thing, this as much infers that the *father* existed in the generation, as if both the terms were expressed; since a relation cannot consist in one term. In like manner, a thing of a passive nature is a relative term, and infers a thing different from itself to be the other term of the relation. If a relation flows from the nature of things, it flows from the nature of both the related things. It cannot flow from the nature of one thing only. Relations are as eternal between the ideas in the Divine Mind as any thing else; but even there a relation doth not consist in one idea. And these ideas are the origin of the nature and essence of things. This expression, “a thing
 “ may be of a *passive nature* and yet never
 “ *acted upon*,” passes over the *main point*, and shuffles in another instead of it. It supposes a thing of a passive nature *once existing*, no matter how, but without having been acted upon in the production; and then insists upon
 on

on a thing possible enough, that afterward it may never have been acted upon in having the manner of its existence changed. But the question here is, Whether a thing of a passive nature could exist without an active nature to produce it at first, or having been passive from something in the production? This is supposed, and the relation, included in the term (*passive*) alledged never to have existed. But waving this, I say *the reason* why we conclude any thing to be an effect at all, is the observing it to want power and action, and yet seeing power and action exerted upon it. This is the *characteristic* of an effect, by which we know it to be an effect, though we were not present, at the production of it: and it is the case of matter in particular; and if, notwithstanding this, it may be still self-existent, the distinction of *cause* and *effect* is entirely lost in philosophy, and all reasoning is at an end, as I have said. Surely it can never be right to admit of such a principle as will stop our mouths for ever after, and entirely prevent our reasoning about any thing. Now there is not more power manifested when matter hath the manner of its existence changed, by motion to wit, which is confessedly allowed to be

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be an effect, than is manifested in it considered without any change in the manner of its existence; that is, by the terms, than is manifested in the mere production of it. *Any finite particle* of matter in this case may be considered as *a large system*, where numberless things are done: the figure of every part of it is determined, and that to *an indefinite minuteness*; the relative situation of all these *numberless under parts* is determined, and necessarily to be supposed determined in the very first production; the quantity of solid extension is determined: the indifference in all those particulars that were mentioned in N° 5. is determined to one certain circumstance out of millions of others equally possible, by some thing. I add then, There is not by far so much power manifested when matter hath the manner of its existence changed, (by motion) as is manifested in the simple existence of it. And could this thing exist without power exerted: that is, without an *active cause*; that is, without having been *passive* in the very production? Observe, it is contradictory to say matter exerted this power itself: allowing that now it has power, this is a power exerted previous to its having any;
it

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it is a power exerted in order to its *very existence*: it could not exert a power before it existed. And since matter itself is not this *determining*, this *operating*, this *powerful principle*, is not the existence of an *immaterial Being* necessary to give it its first existence? Can a figure be determined both in *magnitude* and *kind*, and yet by nothing? Must not then this *passive thing* have been *acted upon* in the very production of it? From a philosophical survey of the nature of matter we can never draw this inference, “That a
“ thing may be of a *passive nature*, and yet
“ never have been *acted upon*.” Matter is not barely *situable*, but really *situated*, which requires a particular act. Thus situation implies not only the passive capacity, but that it hath actually *been passive*, from another thing, or acted upon: and this relation must have existed as soon as matter existed. The same is to be said in other respects; matter is not only *figurable* and *extendible*, but *de facto figured* and *extended*. It is not possible here (which I beg may be attended to) to conceive the simple passive capacity, without the relative act exerted. So much doth a near inspection of the nature of matter shew it to be

be

be an *effect*, that we could have no notion of it at all without the idea of the act implied, whereby it was produced. No man could have the idea of a substance *situable*, *figurable*, or *extendible*, which had not already *some situation*, *some figure*, and a *determined extension*: he cannot conceive it existing without these; nor produced first, and receiving these determinations afterward. As to the question that is put, “If one may not argue from the existence of an *active nature*, that the *passive Being* must necessarily exist, in the same manner as I do in this place?” I answer, by no means. I argue from the passive nature of matter, that it must have been produced by an active Being, and therefore have begun to be: but an active Being doth not require a *passive nature* to be the cause of it, (that is repugnant) as the dead or passive substance requires an active Being to be its cause. A dead substance doth not only want an active Being to act upon it before the manner of its existence can be changed; but to produce it at first; in which case there is no arguing conversly. Perhaps something farther may be intended in this objection; if any such thing be, what the

reader

reader will meet with towards the end of this Section, will furnish him with a sufficient reply to it.

XI. It is observable that this argument *from the passivity of matter* concludes in few words, from what has been said in N° 6 and 7. If a self-existent Being could not have depended on another Being for the *manner* or *mode* of its self-existence, that manner of self-existence could not have been changed at any time by another Being; for it must be equally self-existent at all times. If it depended for the manner of its existence on any Being, it must have depended for its existence itself on that Being; since existence is not of a different nature from the manner of it (N° 7.) And therefore it could not have been passive from another Being, so as to have the manner of its self-existence changed: it could never have been so much as capable of this. Therefore *conversely*, a Being that is capable of having the manner of its existence changed, or of being thus passive from another Being, cannot be uncaused, or self-existent; and therefore matter cannot be such (g.) From this,

and

(g) From what is said here, the answer to the last part
of

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and what has been said in N^o 7. it follows easily, and is to be marked as a consequence,

That

of the difficulty in the Note at (*d*) is plain. It was said there that it seems possible, “that a thing which hath
“existed from eternity may be annihilated, by a being
“endued with the requisite powers.” But an eternal uncaused thing must be *self-existent*, by N^o 4. and by this N^o 11. the manner of its self-existence *cannot be changed*, nor therefore taken from it; nor therefore can its existence itself be taken from it; that is, it cannot be annihilated. A self-existent being was secured *à parte ante* eternally) from such contingency: no other being (supposing another) could thus effect a self-existent nature. And it is absurd to suppose that a being might *rise up in time*, which should have this power over it. What was a contradiction from eternity, must be a contradiction to eternity; because a contradiction can never become possible. It is a begging the question to suppose any being may be endued with the requisite powers to perform such an effect: It is as if I should say, A *circle* and *square* may be made to co-incide in all their points, by a being endued with the requisite powers. It is a mighty unphilosophical prejudice to clothe a self-existent being with all the *marks of contingency* in our imagination; and yet this taken the contrary way makes us think it so easy, as is insinuated in this objection, for a *contingent thing* to be self-existent. We make the transition from the one to the other a mere trifle; though their difference is so great, that it cannot be illustrated by any comparison the wit of man can invent: necessary existence is infinitely

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That the manner of self-existence must be immutable; and that a self-existent Being can have no accidents, or things not necessary in it. And that there must be such a self-existent Being, immaterial, the cause and author of matter, is now evident, if what has been said in this and the former Sections be duly considered.

XII. It will be to no purpose, in order to elude the reasoning above, to say *Matter was extended and figured eternally and without beginning*, so that we are not to enquire *how*, or *when*, or by *whom*. This is to say it was extended, without being extended *at any time*; or figured, without being figured *by any cause*: it is to allow it to be *an effect*, and at the same time to deny it had *a cause*,

higher above contingent existence, than contingent existence is above utter non-existence. In short, this whole objection taken together amounts to the following plain absurdity. *A Being endued with the requisite powers may make matter either a necessarily existent thing, or a contingent thing*: for either of these two cannot be equally possible in the nature of matter itself, as is supposed, unless it be possible to some Being. I am the more express here that I may awaken men to a due sense of the infinite difference of these two natures.

in

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in denying that ever it was thus *passive* from any thing, or at any time. In short, it is to bid us shut our eyes, and make no farther enquiry, but allow matter to be an *eternal passive lump*. If we say a thing was done, and *at no time*, we deny that it was done : in the same manner, if we say an effect was performed and *by no cause*, we deny it to be an effect. To say matter was eternally figured, or extended, is an *affected, unintelligible* expression, which, attentively considered, grows into a contradiction ; for *anything done*, as matter figured, extended, &c. is a thing done, must partake of the common affections of *time, place*, and a *cause* ; inasmuch that if we deny any of these inseparable affections concerning the thing done, we deny the thing itself to be done. Matter extended, and yet by *no cause*, and at *no time*, or *no where*, is matter not extended, *no matter*.

XIII. And for this reason that a thing done must be done in some time, matter cannot be an *eternal effect* of an eternal cause, which is the second hypothesis I mentioned, by which some philosophers have endeavoured to maintain the eternity of matter. This is

still an affected unintelligible expression. The supposing an *action*, such as the effecting of matter must be, destroys the idea of eternity in *the thing effected* by that action. Every action must have a *beginning* and an *end*, these are included in the conception of action; for if it were without a beginning, the thing is not yet begun, or never was begun; and what was never begun cannot be now ended, as the production of matter is. The denying *these limits* to action, amounts still to an absolute negation of it. And to say matter was produced without action, is as much as to say, it was effected without *agency* or *efficiency*. It will be said, *God* is eternal, and naturally active; therefore an action may be eternal: for the *Philosophers* who say matter is an *eternal effect*, are not *Atheists*. But though it be certain that the *Agent* is eternal, it will never follow that any *particular act* is eternal. It is the nature of any particular act to be *circumscribed* and *temporary*, that is, in other words, to be limited both *before* and *behind*, which is a condition inconsistent with eternity. Upon this account it is to no purpose to endeavour to *entangle* the present question, and then to *lose* it among the *perplexities* concerning a

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successive eternity: for, whatever may be in that, when men contend that the eternity of a Being is made up of finite parts of duration, all succeeding one another, they are far from supposing that any part can be the first part; that would ruin their conclusion. Whereas here we are forced to conceive that an *effect* must receive existence by a *particular act*, and therefore to have a *first part*, or *beginning* of its successive duration; and this hypothesis asserts matter to be an effect. If this be well attended to, it will readily prevent a reply. And indeed if men would speak nothing but what they understand, and have ideas of, it is not conceivable what can be replied. For,

XIV. It is certain, by what is said above, that *some other Being* determined the *manner* of matter's existence at first, and therefore *the existence itself*, or gave it existence, since existence without a manner is impossible. Now let a man answer it to his own understanding, if when matter *got existence*, that doth not plainly imply that it *had it not before it got it*. And if it ever was without existence, whether its existence can be eternal. It appears to me, that to say, an effect may be

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be eternal, is the same as to say, a thing which had a beginning may want a *commencement*. It is of no consequence how far back we carry *this beginning* in our imagination, provided the conception of it adheres necessarily to matter, as it hath been shewn to do. The carrying a limit farther back will never make it *no limit*. Again, let this *antithesis* be taken notice of. It is the nature of a self-existent cause never *not to exist*; and it is the nature of matter, an effect *ex hypothesi*, to begin to exist. What conclusion are we to draw from this? Will it ever follow from it that, Therefore these two are *co-eval*, equal as to eternity? Here is not only a priority *of nature*, but *of existence*, or time; which I desire may be considered (*b.*)

XV. It

(*b.*) It hath been urged here, “That it is not yet
“made sufficiently evident that a being acting from eter-
“nity, may not always have acted in a particular man-
“ner on a subject; and consequently, may not also have
“produced the subject of its action in all time, or from
“eternity.” But to this I reply, that this itself is a very
dark unintelligible notion, and what no body, I think,
can have a clear conception of, that a particular act, such
as the production of *any finite particle* of matter may
be spun out into an eternal duration, as if infinite power
were employed *negatively*, or in *delaying* the effect; for

XV. It was a hankering after the eternal atoms of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, and that they so I presume we must conceive, if infinite power was always acting in producing the least assignable atom of matter: and in this argument, whatever agrees to any the least assignable particle, agrees to the whole mass, which certainly is not infinite. I mean, it must be said that every particle of matter must have been a-producing in all time, or from eternity; for if it was temporary, the production of a finite mass could be but temporary. And even tho' the whole mass were infinite, yet unless every the smallest atom of it was a-creating through eternity, any finite portion of that mass, *our earth*, for instance, would still be but temporary, as consisting of parts that did not take up an infinite time in the making. And the reasoning is the same with respect to the *sun*, *moon*, &c. And the inhabitants of any other *system*, if such there are, might still with reason conclude, that their system also was temporary: and so of others. Nor doth the difficulty end here; for as any assignable part consists of numberless other parts, by the same kind of reasoning, we must at length be forced to say, that *any infinitely little part was the work of Omnipotence through eternity*: for there will be all the same arguing about the least finite part as about the greatest. Besides, it is to be observed, that to suppose a subject *eternally pre-existing*, as is here done, is no reason to infer that a subject may be eternal in the production, or before it be made to exist. Not to mention that to suppose a *passive subject* eternally pre-existing is equal to a
tacit

they might get matter some way or other allowed to be eternal, which made some *Platonists* contrive such evasions, contrary to *Plato's* own sentiments. He himself said, “ God “ made the world *visible* and *invisible*, out “ of no pre-existing subject; and that his *will* “ alone was sufficient for the existence of “ things (i).” Where, by the way, it is very obvious, that *what is made out of nothing* cannot be eternal: for it did not exist, or was not effected, when as yet it was nothing, so to express it, or as long as it was nothing. And there is *no medium* between having been *once nothing*, and *eternally something*: that is, we cannot join these two together, and make *a compounded*, or *third nature* out of them; such a thing, to wit, as should have been *once nothing*, as being effected, and yet *eternal*; and everyone must perceive that the tacit begging the question that matter is eternal without any production; *contra demonstrata*, if the arguments in the first part of the section be right.

(i) Καὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα Θεὸν αὐτῇ προϋφίστησιν ἡ σκέψις, πάσης ἐμφανῆς τε καὶ ἀφανῆς δημιουργὸν διακοσμήσεως, ἣν ἐκ μηδενός φησιν ὑποκειμένην προαγαγεῖν ἢ τεχνίτην· ἀρκεῖν γὰρ αὐτῷ εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὄντων τὸ βέλημα. Hierocl. de Providentia & Fato, ex Photii Bibliotheca.

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present scheme supposes these two inconsistent things joined together. The followers of *Plato* did not agree among themselves. Some of them made matter eternal without being an effect, a *sister-substance* to the *Deity*, ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀδελφὴν εἶσιν (*k*), as if the lowest Being went as high in the highest perfection of *self-existence*, as the *supreme* Being. Their manner of explaining this is worth observing. They said, “ God was not *able* or *sufficient* “ of himself to make a world, but used the “ *co-operation* [συνεργία] of eternal matter; “ and that, all things existing virtually in “ matter before-hand, he only delineated, “ shaped and wrought them off, out of the “ common mass and from their original rude “ form (*l*).” They indeed excluded *Epicu-*
rus's

(*k*) Ibid.

(*l*) Καὶ τί, φησὶ, καταλέγω σοι τέττα, ὅπερ γε καὶ τῷ Πλατωνικῶν τινες ἐκ ὀρθῆν τὴν περὶ δημιουργοῦ Θεοῦ διασώ-
ζουσιν ἔννοιαν; ὃ γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ὥρθησαν αὐτοτε-
λῶς ὑποσῆσαι δύνασθαι κόσμον οἰκίαν δυνάμει καὶ σοφίᾳ
ἐξ αἰδίδος ἐνεργεῖν. ἀλλ' ἀγενήτε ὕλης συνεργία, καὶ τῇ
μὴ παρ' αὐτῷ ὑποστάσει φύσει καταχρῶμενον μόνως δη-
μιουργεῖν δύνασθαι πάντων μὲν δυνάμει προϋποκειμένων
ἐν τῇ λεγομένῃ ὕλῃ. αὐτῷ ὃ οἶονεὶ διαζωογραφεῖν αὐτὰ,
καὶ τέλει μόνον, καὶ διακρίνειν (μόνον) ἐκ τῆς ὕλης
σχήμα. Ibid.

Here,

rus's chance; but they made a dead substance as necessary as a living Being in the nature of things: as if *self-existent deadness* must have contributed *its help* to self-existent Power, before a world could be formed. At this rate the *negation of every perfection* might be made a *self-existing thing*; and there might be an eternal necessity of *imperfection*, as well as of perfection in nature! They imagined infinite power could not produce a certain effect; therefore they kindly assisted it out of their own fancy, by supposing the effect already performed, and all the difficulty over. What can be easier? It is just such an argument as if we should contend, that no Being could *cut* and *form* the parts of a watch, tho' it might set them together, if we suppose them *eternally pre-existing*: and therefore *the*

Here, if we consider what hath been proved before, *viz.* that it is the power of the Deity exerted, which constitutes the very solid nature of matter; it must appear a direct contradiction to say *any thing existed* virtually in it. One would almost think these *Philosophers* had been *Carpenters* by trade, and had confined the *Deity* to their own manner of working; at least their whole description favours of the *lowest Mechanick*. If matter be utterly inactive, how can it *co-operate*? What hath no *ἐνεργεία*. can never afford *ἐνεργεία* or assistance to another Being.

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parts pre-existed eternally! The *self-existence* of a dead inactive substance is as great an absurdity, when we suppose the Deity to co-exist with it, as if we denied him, or rather greater; because then we allow the existence of a *Powerful Cause*, which we deny on the other hypothesis. And, as hath been said above, there is as much power actually exerted, be it by what it will, before the rudest piece of matter could be made simply to exist, as could be exerted in changing the manner of its existence: and that it should be exerted, and by nothing too is strange. We allow that a power must be actually exerted to move the particle A from B to C, or along the line B C: but the *intelligent Reader* will never deny, that it requires power to place it at B first, and to *determine* all those things likewise in its simple existence, which I have shewn are to be determined.

XVI. The other sort of *Platonists* allowed *God* to have made the world, both as to *form* and *substance*; but yet so as that it proceeded from a necessity of his nature, and was a consequence παρακολούθημα, of it

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it (*m*): or so that he had no priority of existence before his own effect, which therefore had no beginning in time (*n*). But if God created matter by a necessity of nature, he could never *not create it*; for, as hath been shewn, there is no mutability in his nature,

(*m*) Καὶ εἰ βῆλει, παραδείγματι· σέ τινα τῶν γνωρίμων ξεναγήσω πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον· Φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι κατὰ πᾶν αἴτιον τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἐκάστω σκιᾶς γίνεσθαι ὁμόχρονον· ἢ τῷ σώματι ἢ σκιᾷ, καὶ ἐκ ὁμοτιμῆς· ἔτω ἢ καὶ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος παρακολυθημαῖ ἐστὶ τῷ Θεῷ, αἰτίῃ ὄντι αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι, καὶ συναϊδιός ἐστι τῷ Θεῷ, ἕκῃ ἢ ὁμοτιμῇ. Zachariæ Scholiast. as cited by Dr. Clarke. Another of these comparisons is to be found in the same place from St. Augustin. *Sicut enim inquiunt [Platonici] si pes ex æternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium, &c.*

(*n*) Qui autem à Deo quidem factum fatentur mundum non tamen eum volunt temporis habere sed suæ creationis initium; ut modo quodam vix intelligibili, semper sit factus. Ibid. ab eod. Here how could the world, if it had a *beginning of creation*, be without a beginning of time? This is *scarce intelligible* indeed, or rather *plainly contradictory*. But though *Philosophers* of all men are obliged to speak nothing except what they understand, and conceive possible; yet they are the only men in the world perhaps, who have spoke the greatest nonsense; inasmuch that there is scarce any thing so absurd, which some or other of them have not maintained.

and

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and this necessity must always remain: or God must create matter *constantly* as well as *necessarily*. Shall we think that he created an infinity of it; and that (no more after that being possible) he is forced to annihilate some part again, that he may answer the necessity of creating? something like this must be supposed on their scheme. And if, on the other hand, *it were possible* he should produce matter *in time only*; then it was possible too that matter might not be eternal: and if it were possible it might not be eternal, by what argument can a man shew that it was *really eternal*? They who would defend the eternity of matter, must at any rate stick to the impossibility of its being otherwise, or that God produced it necessarily. And indeed, these men have endeavoured to explain themselves by comparisons that shew they had this notion of the *Deity*, “As the
 “ *Sun*, (say they) if it had eternally existed,
 “ would have eternally *produced light*, or an
 “ *opaque body* a *shadow*, or a *foot* a *footstep*;
 “ so the material world is an *eternal pro-*
 “ *duction*, or *consequence* of God who is e-
 “ *ternal*.” It is easy to observe here first that the *sun*, the *body*, or the *foot*, are not *effici-*
ent

ent causes producing an action of themselves, but things of a passive and necessary nature, which *Another Agent* uses as *instruments* to produce the effect. A foot, v. gr. is but the instrument or thing, whereby a *free Agent* (man), produces the *print* or *vestige*: And to say, "If a man had eternally produced the
"impression of his *foot* in *sand*, or the fig-
"nature of a *seal* in *wax*, it would have been
"an eternal effect," is no proof or illustration of the thing intended to be cleared up by the comparison, but a bare supposition of it in other words. The production of an impression in wax or sand is an action, and implies the limits of a beginning and an end; for it cannot be conceived that any one should be eternally a-putting on an impression, without having at any time really put it on. The same may be said concerning the *Sun* producing light, or an *opaque body* hindering the progress of it: since these are *necessary things*, and not *free Agents*, it is the same as to say, if some Being had from eternity given that property to the *Sun*, whereby it *emits light*, or that property to *another body*, whereby it *casts a shade*; then light would have been *eternally produced*, and a shade e-ternally

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ternally projected: which supposes the thing in question, but no way shews how it is possible. All these examples preposterously suppose the *uneffected eternity* of matter in some circumstance or other, in order to shew that it might have had an *effected eternity*, so to speak; which is, I conceive, to suppose one absurdity, in order to prove another. Besides, they change the question to this, Whether *God* be a *free Being*, or a *necessary Agent*, as it is called; though any *Being*, so far as it is determined by a *physical necessity*, is rather a *patient* than an *agent*, being passive from that thing which imposes the necessity. To make their comparisons suit the design, it ought to follow, that it is the nature of *God* to create matter, as necessarily as it is of the *Sun* to emit light, which cannot *not do it*.

XVII. But to be a little more particular concerning necessity. To be determined by a physical necessity is a *mark* of a *dependent nature*; as here in the *sun* or *opaque body* (o):
and

(o) Here this question hath been put, “ Do not those
“ necessary effects, which have been ascribed to the sun
“ and opaque body, arise from their nature? And why
“ is it more a mark of dependence in them, than in a
“ triangle

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and the dependence is upon the *Being imposing that necessity*. Now to extend this kind of necessity over the *first* and *supreme Being*, implies just this contradiction, That there is some Being *prior* to the *first*, or *superior* to the *Supreme*. This Being imposes a physical necessity on all inanimate things in nature: that is, as we have seen in Sect. II. Vol. I.

“triangle to have its angles equal to such a sum?” But I answer, there is no parity between the two instances adduced. That the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles is an *eternal truth* which obtains by an *absolute* or *metaphysical* necessity, and doth not concern any thing of *existence*: and *truth* is none of those things that can become *dependent*, or be *created* or *made*. How absurd would it sound to speak of *creating truth*, or making *more truth exist*? The *sun*, or *opaque body* contrarily, are *substances existing*, capable at least of being made or created, and but simply possible in idea, not absolutely or eternally necessary. Thus they cannot be other than dependent. That a *body* should *emit* light, or *reflect* it, rather than *transmit* it, is a positive institution of some being so ordering it; and therefore a mark of dependence, as I assert. There would be no propriety in saying *A mathematical truth is a depending thing*. In short, we must distinguish between ideas that were eternally and necessarily connected in an *infinite Mind*, for these make eternal and absolute truths; and ideas that were but only barely compatible in it eternally, which constitute the natures of all created substances.

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really acts upon them; so that the action which we think we discover in them, is his immediate action. *This action* discovering itself several ways in the several bodies of the *universe*, and always uniformly and regularly, is termed *necessity* in them, as in a stone falling downward; and called, with respect to the uniform constancy of it, by Philosophers, *the law of their nature*. And it is from these instances only, that we get a notion of physical necessity; which I wish might be attended to. But men getting the first notion of it thus, and then extending it over the *supreme Being himself*, proceeded contradictorily, imagining there was still some superior nature above the Supreme: which was to make a *chimera*, a contradictory creature of the fancy, the *supreme*, or rather *supremest Cause* (p.)

XVIII. On

(p) When *Cyniscus* confutes *Jupiter* in *Lucian*, and makes him a *Drudge* to *fate*, insisting that *fate* performs all, he adds these remarkable words: 'Οἶδ' οὐδὲ ἢ εἰμαρμένην τιμῶντες ἄν, εἰς δέον αὐτὸ ἐπραττον· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι δύνατον εἰδὲ αὐταῖς ἔτι ἢ μοίραις ἀλλάξαι ἢ μεταρρίψαι τι τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δοξάντων περὶ ἐκάστου. This wonderfully exposes a chimerical necessity, and shews the absurdity of our prejudice, tho' contrary to the *Author's design*. *Jupiter* is a *slave* to the *Destinies*: the *Destinies* themselves can change

XVIII. On the other hand, to call this necessity of creating matter, *a moral necessity*, such, change nothing in *those decrees* that were *originally established* about every thing. *What being* was it then which established these *unalterable decrees*? That indeed is the secret. It is an *empty* and *unsupported necessity*; something which is *nothing* which tyrannizes over all things. Let an *Admirer* of *fatal necessity* solve this *Riddle*.

This argument will perhaps force him to say, that this fatal necessity is in the nature of the supreme Being himself, without running higher for it: and I think, this is what the modern Sceptics generally hint at now, and mean, though perhaps they do not speak out. But let them explain why there should be a *necessity of imperfection* in a necessarily existing Being, that is, in the perfectest Being? To admit of a *mixture* of perfection and imperfection, and then to assign the limits of each, will confound all their philosophy. There is certainly a *necessity of perfection* in such a Being; and to say there is likewise a *necessity of imperfection* in him, is to say there are two *absolute opposite necessities* in him, which would destroy each other; and this would leave no necessity of perfection in him at all. This looks like direct Atheism: and certainly the admitting a *contrariety* and *opposition* in the nature of the *supreme Being* will always end in Atheism. As I argued above with respect to existence, so I may argue here. There is a *necessity of some perfection* undoubtedly; otherwise there would have been a necessity of *universal and eternal imperfection*; and then no
perfection

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such, to wit, as determines the *Agent* to act, from the consideration of what is wisest and

perfection could have been *so much as possible*. And if there be a *necessity* of any *perfection*, it must be a *necessity* of *infinite perfection*; because there could not be two *opposite necessities*, both of *perfection*, and its contrary; and because *imperfection*, being a *negation*, is not a thing of which *necessity* or *eternity* can be predicated, any more than of nothing. Thus a necessarily existing Being is *necessarily infinitely perfect*. Let us consider how *acting by a physical necessity* agrees with this. To act by a physical necessity implies a *physical impotence* of acting otherwise; for if God had a physical power to act otherwise, he could only be under a *moral necessity* of acting as he doth, of creating matter, or doing any other action. Now *this physical impotence* will run through *every part of the contrivance* of the material world; if it be not absurd to speak of *contrivance* on this hypothesis, but rather proper to call it a *fatal and necessary constitution*. For example, God could not have made the *earth* to turn round on its axis in a *shorter* or *longer time* than it doth; effecting the present motion by a physical necessity, *i. e.* wanting power to have done otherwise; and the length of our *νοχθήμερον* must be a thing as necessary and immutable as the truth of any one of *Euclid's propositions*. This the *Fatalists* cannot get over. He could not have created *one atom more* or *less* of matter than he hath done; this proceeding likewise from a necessity of nature: unless it should be said, as above, that he creates it constantly from this necessity, not having power to abstain. He could not have given any atom *another*

and best to be done, supposes that they who affirm *God* to have been under this necessity, can

other degree of velocity, nor altered *the direction of its motion* in the least. Every thing in nature is an example of this. Supposing the number of hairs on a man's head to be n , he could not have caused that this number should be $n+1$, or $n-1$. The result of all is, It would imply a *physical contradiction*, that anything in nature should have been otherwise than it is; since the *greatest power possible* was not able to effect any the least deviation: and that is again, Every thing *is as it is*, by a natural, inevitable fate. This is the conclusion as fair as I am able to draw it. Now if this be so, why need we any longer own a *nominal Deity*? I find no difference between this and the *rankest Atheism*. Here is a *fatal necessity supreme*, and the Deity still the *Drudge of all-performing destiny*. What is it to us whether things fall out by *blind chance*, or come to pass by *rigid, unalterable fate*? If what goes under the name of the perfectest Being can have no liberty, we can have none. On either scheme we have nothing to *hope or fear*.—Compare this now with that kind of necessity which I just now shewed must belong to an infinitely perfect Being. Hence let it be observed that to give the Deity power without liberty, is to take away every reason we can have to own him, or to wish that he were: such a Deity serves the Atheist's turn as well as chance itself. But let it be remarked here, that this scheme of making the Deity act by a physical necessity is repugnant to itself. For upon this hypothesis it would be contradictory for any of the heavenly Bodies,

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can assign the wise consideration which determined him to produce this eternal effect: *can assign* the reason, I say; otherwise the assertion must turn to *supposition* only and *conjecture*: besides, it is unphilosophical to suppose that moral necessity can determine an *Agent* to do what we must look upon as a physical contradiction, unless we could form a consistent idea of an *eternal action* having both *beginning* and *end*. The only moral motive which, I think, can be alledged, why God should have created the world from eternity is, *that he might have communicated happiness and perfection to rational creatures as soon as possible*. But we cannot conceive even this, without allowing him a *priority of time*, or to have been pre-existent to his own effects. And if we allow him a *priority*, that by itself cannot be less than an *eternity*: otherwise two limited periods must make up

to move with a less degree of velocity than they do, the Deity being physically impotent to effect this: and yet even this is a contradiction, that a Being who is able to do more, should not have the physical power to do that which is less. As if it were said, a man who hath strength to raise a certain weight, would not be able to lift the half of it. So much is the Deity but a name for fatal necessity upon this scheme!

his

his eternity. Not to mention that, if we may speak of the reasonableness of an *earlier* or *later* existence, creatures that were to enjoy an eternity of existence *à parte post*, as it is called, have no reason to complain that they were not sooner created. *Mathematicians* allow that lines *infinite* or *endless* one way, are equal, whatever difference there may be on their finite extremes; and this supposition agrees with the exactness of demonstration: and we find *Lucretius* on his scheme, comforting those who are to die first, by telling them that the eternity of non-existence which they have before them; will be no longer than theirs who are to be born ages after. And this is applicable the other way. They who are born latest, have still an eternal duration before them. Besides that such creatures before they exist can complain of nothing, since they are not in the *predicament* of Being: a *non-ens* is capable neither of good or bad treatment. At this rate we might complain that we were not all born *at once*, nay that we were not all *eternal*, as eternal as *God*, *self-existent*. What absurdities may we not insist on, if we allow ourselves to proceed in this manner (*p*)? Up-
on

(7) Men who affect the height of *free-thinking*, and
C c 2 know

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on the whole then, *reason* neither admits of matter's being eternally created, nor can either

physical

know not what it is, are even capable of entering such complaints as these here mentioned, in order to shew that the constitution of things is wrong. “ *Can any bounds be set to desire* (says one); may not I wish to be as *wise*, as “ *powerful*, as *happy*, as any Being else is; *infinitely perfect*? Why am I made capable of *desiring* what I am “ *not capable of attaining*?” *Free-thinking* is certainly a good thing *if it be rational*: but if it exceed the bounds of reason, it of course becomes *absurd thinking*. If one would put the question, *May not I desire what is absurd, a contradiction*? He would see what answer it required; namely, that he should desire *to be rational* in the first place. That all Beings should be equally powerful, happy, perfect, is the wildest absurdity. The *constitution of things* is not wrong, but such desire foolish and inconsistent. We cannot help, it is true, desiring to be as happy as possible: but our chief desire in order to this should be, *That things may have been constituted by infinite wisdom and goodness*. And if so, our wishes are prevented. Man will certainly be as happy as possibility and reason can permit. Would he have *reason* to give way, or *impossibility* to take place, to gratify his absurdity? Since free-thinking came to be in vogue, we run to it from a mistaken conceit, as if it were to *free us from all restraint, a permission to talk licentiously of every thing*. But on the contrary, *it ties us down to the severity of eternal reason*. To be free from reason is the greatest *slavery*, which we ignorantly affect. It is not free-thinking to *pull down every thing, and build up nothing*.

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physical or *moral necessity* be alledged why it should be so; and an eternal effect, though now become a *philosophical term*, will nevertheless be an eternal contradiction (r.)

XIX. Having
thing. That would be making war upon *all the principles* of action and *reason* itself.

(r) Mr. *Leibnitz* has contended that God could not have created the material world *less than infinite*, not having a *sufficient reason* to determine in what part of infinite Space a finite mass of matter was to be placed. But upon the same account it might be contended, that he could not have made it *other than eternal*, not having a *sufficient reason* to determine in what period of eternity, (if I may so speak) it was to commence. And then we have an *eternal* as well as *infinite creation*, from the force of this principle; which is a contradiction in terms, if by creation be meant a thing's getting existence which had it not before; and if it always had existence it could not be created. Examples of this sort are numberless: Of two *similar, equal and solid particles* of matter, and Dr. *Clarke* shews there must be numberless such particles, unless we will say that matter is all pores without any solidity in it: of any two of these, I say, God could not have placed the one in *any position*, or in any *particular body*, rather than the other, not having a reason to determine the preference. Again, since all might have been adjusted after the same manner as at present, if the heavenly bodies had moved from east to west, instead of moving from west to east; it follows, that God could not have made them move either way, not having a sufficient reason to deter-

XIX. Having shewn that matter is not eternal *in any sense*, one is naturally led to observe, mine which of the ways. Thus, according to this principle, God could not have made the world at all, nor the least thing in it; for such reasons will hinder every thing; and this *moral necessity* extended beyond its bounds into barely *physical circumstances*, ties down the power of the Deity more rigidly than *fatal necessity* itself. If it be asked, *Doth ever God act then without a sufficient reason for the action, and a wise view?* I answer, he doth not: but the *sufficient reason of action* is taken from the nature of the whole effect, the use and design of it; not from physical circumstances in themselves indifferent. God had the *most sufficient reason*, and the wisest designs to answer in creating the world, which are not, cannot be frustrated, by there being one atom more or less of matter in it, by its being created a minute sooner or later, by its existing in the present portion of space rather than another; and we grossly misplace the sufficiency of the reason, when we lodge it in *the indifference of physical things*; and, in truth, it is no better than to make a slave of the Deity to deny his power to accomplish an end, because there are more ways than one by which it might be equally well effected. If it should be said, “We are not to suppose *such indifference* even in *physical circumstances*; nor therefore that God could have made the *least variation* in these, without a *sufficient reason* to determine him.” I answer, Mr. *Leibnitz* himself supposes *such indifference*, when he asserts that there was no reason why God might not

serve, that the great and only objection against its *having been created*, is the old maxim,

From

not have placed a *finite quantity* of matter as well in one part of infinite space as another. Besides, reason forces us to make this supposition. Every *infinitely little variation* of physical circumstances could not in the nature of things have had a *different sufficient reason* to determine it. Let us remember that *extension is infinitely divisible*, in which single respect there will arise an infinite number of infinitely little variations in producing the meanest physical effect, every one of which must nevertheless have been determined by a *separate sufficient reason*: for if any two of such infinitely small variations had been without their determining reasons, an *indifference* would have stood in the way, and the effect have been stopt for ever. *Ex. gr.* God must have had *millions* of *different reasons* to determine whether the *annual orbit* of the earth should have been half an inch larger or less than what it is; for there are millions of variations between these extremes: nay, to determine whether one single hair of a man's head should have been half an inch longer or shorter; for, even this comes not to pass without his immediate power. And the same is to be said of the *divisibility* of time, *variability* of the celerity of motion, of its *direction*, with other numberless particulars.

Now to apply this to the present argument: Since any assignable portion of time, a minute, *v. g.* is as infinitely divisible as extension, supposing there was a sufficient reason determining the commencement of matter to a *certain hour*, nay to a *minute* of that hour, still God wanted

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From nothing nothing can be produced, nor can any thing return to nothing. But this is

of

an infinite number of other determining reasons whether it should commence at one rather than another of these infinitely little *tempuscula*. For if the reasons for any two had coincided, these two would have been indifferent, to the ruining of this scheme; or else the *equilibrium* whether creation should have commenced the millionth part of a minute sooner or later, must have kept God in *eternal suspense*, and made the existence of his rational creation impossible! Thus, as I said, this scheme makes the reasonableness, the wisdom, and the goodness of God in all his works depend on the determining the indifference of physical circumstances, *absurdly*; and fetters his power even more rigidly than *Stoical fate*. It makes him (*absit blasphemia*) the *ass* between the two bundles of hay, or the needle between the two loadstones. What pleasure can men take in endeavouring to shew that both God and themselves are *slaves*! For this new-invented necessity extended over man deprives him not only of self-motion but the power of willing; of which in another place.

We are to say then, that God hath a wise end in producing every effect; but that his own will is sufficient to determine him which of two or more indifferent means he shall use in producing it. And since we see that a world is really created, we must say this; unless men will run back to *fatal necessity* for determining the indifference of physical circumstances, and incur the absurdities shewn in the last note.

From this reasoning it follows, That *liberty* consists

of no force, when asserted in opposition to the efficiency of *infinite power*; unless it could be shewn that the creation of matter implies a contradiction, which cannot be done. For how can it be shewn that creation *ex nihilo* by *infinite power* is a contradiction, unless by denying such power altogether? And since *infinite power* implies no contradiction, it must at least *be possible*: and if it be possible it must *be more*, viz. *necessary*, since it is a thing that cannot be *produced by any Being*, which production we must suppose when we say, *a thing is possible*; a thing possible to *no Being* is impossible. And I have shewn elsewhere (see sect. IV. Vol. I.) the absurdity of supposing that *any power* (*finite or infinite*) should be only *casual*, or *accidental in nature* (s.) As to the *maxim* itself; men indeed observing that in the *natural generation and corruption* of bodies, there was not *any production of new matter*, nor *destruction of old*, but only *a change of the sensible qualities* or *not only in acting according to moral motives where they are*; but in *self-determination by the power of the will*, where *circumstances are indifferent*; and that in the *Deity* himself.

(s) See the argument in the Note (q) where *infinite perfection* is shewn necessary.

accidents, arising from a change of *figure, position, &c.* settled this into a maxim in that case, That from nothing nothing could arise, nor any thing return to nothing; by the law of generation and corruption, that now obtains. And so far it was a good observation certainly, gathered from experience: but there was no *necessary connexion* between the *ideas* in it, why it should always be so, and impossible to be otherwise, (as there ought to have been to make it a *first principle*) otherwise men needed not have been beholden to experience for it, as they were (*t*); but would necessarily have seen it, or might at least have collected it from abstract reasoning. And how could men, by observing the law of generation and corruption that now ob-

(*t*) See *Lucretius's* arguments for this; after abundance of other examples to prove that *nothing can ever arise from nothing, or be reduced to nothing*, he says,

*Postremò, pereunt imbres, ubi eos pater æther
In gremio matris terrai præcipitavit.
At nitidæ surgunt fruges, ramique virescunt
Arboribus: crescunt ipsæ, foetuque gravantur.*——

And at last he concludes,

*Haud igitur penitus pereunt quæcunque videntur;
Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura: nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam alienâ.*

Lib. 1. ver. 250.

tains,

tains, collect that it was impossible to be otherwise, but by *supposing that law never to have had a beginning*, nor to have been *instituted by an infinitely wise and powerful Being*, but the effect of *furd necessity*, predominating in all things, and over all things; itself nothing, and belonging to nothing, as *Lucretius*, the great Abettor of this principle, did, who notwithstanding his *other principle, chance*, is forced to have recourse to an *unsupported necessity* here? Besides, it is to be noticed that this maxim is not demonstratively certain even in the case of *natural generation and corruption*. The thing seems to be true and reasonable; but the means of observing fail men before they come to the *subtilty of nature's work*, and the *first principles of body* in these operations: and after that, all the experiments men can make, and all their observations, will never amount to demonstrative certainty. What arguments could a man oppose to one who denied the *maxim* to hold even in *generation and corruption*? None surely but making him observe the *instances of generation and corruption* themselves: which shews the truth of what I here affirm. It is true, we say *God and nature do nothing in vain*;

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vain; and this is most certain: but the question recurs, *What is vain to be done?* *Ease* and *difficulty* with respect to *us* are not applicable to *infinity of power (u)*: and in this last *axiom*
infinity

(u) We may observe in the *works of nature* [an apparent] frugality of *means* indeed; but a great profuseness and magnificence of *materials*. This we see in the exuberancy of *seed* annually produced from every plant and vegetable: there is a great deal allowed for *waste*, so to speak. But pardon me, if I should endeavour to correct the first part of this observation, which regards the *frugality of the means* in producing any natural effect. We understand this, as if *small power* was applied, to bring to pass the *greatest things*, which is altogether wrong. The power of the *Deity himself* is every where applied, in the minutest circumstances, and in bringing to pass things to us the most contemptible. How can this be a *frugality of means*? There is indeed an admirable *simplicity* in the *method*, and an *uniform law* observed in the production of the several kinds of *plants* and *animals*, as much as is consistent with the variety of the species. This teaches us what we are to think of the *wisdom* of this Being. The method is varied by imperceptible degrees through all the tribes of the vegetable and animal kingdoms; and opposite extremes are thus joined by gentle and easy transitions. Even here then there is a *richness*, a *profuseness* of invention and contrivance. And the same efficacious power is *every where* exhibited, to teach us what we are to think of *him* in this respect of his Omnipotence. It is so far from being true, that great things are brought to pass
by

infinity of power is supposed. If then even in the case of generation and corruption, this *maxim* falls short of the self-evidence of an *axiom* or *intuitive truth*, how can it be opposed to the possibility of *creation* by *infinite power*? Or where is the force of it compelling men to assert that *brute-matter*, a thing entirely of a passive nature, by their own conception of it, should be self-existent?

XX. *Lucretius* makes this his *first principle*, and the *ground-work* of his whole book (v): but his reasoning upon it is loose

and by small power, that, on the contrary, a stupendous power is manifested in the most ordinary *appearances* of nature. This the excellent *Borelli* first observed in animal motion; and the ingenious Mr. *Hales*, by a course of happy experiments, hath shewn the same in the force of the ascending sap in vegetables. And since all is performed by the immediate power of the Deity; the *means*, the *method*, the *materials*, in every production of nature, declare him to be infinite in *Power*, in *Knowledge*, in *Goodness*.

(v) *Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet*

Nullam rem è nihilo gigni divinitùs unquam.

Lib. 1. ver. 150.

And this principle he proposes as an excellent remedy against the fear of any superior power.

*Quippe ita formido mortaleis continet omneis,
Quòd multa in terris fieri cœloque tuentur,*

Quorum

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 and frivolous. He argues from *generation* and
corruption, to the *first production* of matter;
 as if the *first formation* of the material world,
 and the *creation of matter*, were to be ac-
 counted for by the *same mechanical laws* that
 now obtain in it, as it is *formed*: telling us
 if natural bodies *rose spontaneously out of no-*
thing, (as if ever men had supposed this with-
 out a *divine power*) we should see men *spring*
out of the sea, fishes and birds from *the earth*,
 and herds of cattle *burst out of the clouds* (x):
 and

Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
Possunt, ac fieri divino Numine rentur.
Quas ob res, ubi viderimus nil posse creari
De nihilo; tum, quod sequitur, jam rectius inde
Prospiciemus, & unde queat res quæque creari,
Et quo quæque modo fiant, opera sine Divum. Ibid.
 (x) *Nam si de nihilo fierent; ex omnibu' rebus*
Omne genus nasci posset: nil semine egeret.
E mare primum homines, e terrâ posset oriri
Squammigerum genus, & volucres: erumpere cælo
Armenta, atque aliæ pecudes: genus omne ferarum
Incerto partu culta, ac deserta tenerent:
Nec fructus iidem arboribus constare solerent,
Sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnia possent, &c. Ibid.

Here he first excludes all *divine power*, and then supposes,
 if creation *ex nihilo* were possible, things ought to start
 up out of nothing every day: He makes the greatest in-
 stances of government and *superintendence*, viz. the regular
 observation

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and thence infers, that matter could not at all have been created, shuffling in an *universality* into his conclusion from *very limited* premisses (y.)

observation of the *several species* in natural productions, so many *arguments* against a *superintendence*, and by a *strange piece of logic* ascribes all to a *negative efficient*. If any *modern Sceptic* should not have had leisure to consider the reasons upon which he rejects the *Deity* and his *superintendence* in nature; these are the *great principles*, and *basis* of his belief, as *fair* as I am able to represent them; and lest I may have made a mistake inadvertently, I have cited the *Original*. I shall only mention another argument for the eternity of matter, which is, “That, if it had not “been eternal, all things would long ago *have fallen into* “*nothing*, and *sprung up again out of nothing*.”

Præterea, nisi materies æterna fuisset

Antehac, ad nihilum penitus res quæque redissent,

De nihiloque renata forent, quæcunque videmus,

At quoniam supra docui nil posse creari

De nihilo, &c.

(y) Answers to metaphysical questions must be unentertaining to the greatest part of Readers, and perhaps scarce intelligible to any but those who could start the difficulties: however, I shall venture to add one note more of this kind here, as in a place that will give the objection contained in the following Question, the greatest advantage. I had no design to enter into these *nice disquisitions*, at least in this place; but as a remarkable difficulty hath been occasioned by what I have advanced against
eternal

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eternal uncaused matter; if a rational solution can be offered, perhaps the ground of starting such difficulties may for the future be removed, and the truth more readily embraced. The question is; “ If *indifference* as to the “ manner of existing is inconsistent with *necessary existence*, are not all the actions of a necessarily existing “ *Being*, what may be considered as the *manner* of his existence, and therefore *necessary*?” This question carries the greatest difficulty with it, when considered with respect to the *creation* of the Universe, which is, as it were, the *beginning* of a new period in the *eternity of God*: for after creation, the *work of Providence* commences, and the constant superintendence of all his creatures, which seems a *new scene* of affairs to the *Deity*: so that we must either allow some *change* (with respect to action) in him, and therefore in the manner of his existence; or if otherwise, his actions must be *as necessary* as the manner of his existence; and then we must admit of the consequences of this physical necessity, which leaves him a *Being* whom we need not regard. To this I answer, first, That it hath been shewn above to satisfaction, I hope, *That indifference as to the manner of existence is inconsistent with necessity of existence*, or that *the manner of necessary existence is itself necessary*; as also, *That the actions of the Deity cannot proceed from a physical necessity*; that would only make him a powerful, but *surd Being*, (*i. e.* having power without intelligence) which is inconsistent with the *necessity of infinite perfection*. Now these *two points* being proved true separately, and independent of each other, the right method of going on in the investigation of the truth will be, to draw *this corollary* from

from them joined together, That *these actions* of the Deity, because *not eternal*, cannot be considered as the *manner* of his existence ; and that, though free, they yet produce *no change* in the manner of it. And if I had made this a *consequence* from these two points, every one must have granted, that I proceeded according to the method of demonstration, and that therefore the *conclusion itself* was unexceptionable. It can never be allowed, that what may follow as a *consequence* from a proposition proved, may be made an *objection* against it. Such a method would overturn all geometry. Instances of which I need not give. Dr. Barrow, after a *Theorem* of Euclid (16 El. 3.) says, *Ex hac propositione paradoxæ consequuntur, & mirabilia bene multa.* It would be hard to make one of these *wonderful consequences* an objection against the demonstration from which it follows. This is that case, in which we know certainly *that a thing is*, but know not *the manner* how it is ; and the present point is an instance of it. It is certain, that God doth not act from a *physical necessity*, and that the *manner* of his existence *is immutable* ; whence it follows that *his actions, though free, do not change the manner of his existence* : this, I say, is certain ; but *the manner how it is* exceeds our comprehension. And yet (with that humility which becomes us when we speak of this *infinite, wonderful, adorable Being*) we may go a little farther in this point, and reason thus.

If a rational mind is *very finite*, as ours is, it can have but *one object* under view at once, or one particular thing under the consideration of the intellect at a time ; and it can therefore *will* but *one thing* to be done at once. This we can easily conceive from our own experience. But if the mind be *less limited*, or perfecter in kind,

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which, as not involving contradiction, I have liberty to suppose, it will be able, as such, to have *two objects* under the consideration of the understanding at once, and to *will* two distinct things to be performed at once: and its *power*, corresponding to its *other perfections*, will be able to perform both at once. And, without mentioning other intermediate degrees, we may imagine the progression to go on. Now, if we suppose the mind to become at last *infinite*, or all limits to be taken away from it, it must (*as such*) have an *infinite number of objects* under the intuition of the intellect at once, or an infinite number of things all in view at a time; and this by the same kind of reason as a very finite mind can have but one; and be able to *will* an infinite number of things all to be done at once; and its *power* being also infinite, or without limitation, it will be able to perform them all at the same time, without *perplexity* or *disorder* (instances of which I hope have appeared, when the *various, indefinient, universal action* of an *immaterial Being* upon all the parts of matter, in all places, and at all times, was shewn to be necessary to support the material world.) This, I say, it will be able to do *quâ infinite*. Infinite perfection directly implies this; and it would be absurd to deny it, because we cannot conceive the *manner* of it.

The *first step* being duly weighed, let us next consider this Infinite Mind as *necessarily existing*, and in that respect it must have had an *infinite number of objects* under the view of the intellect, not only *once*, but *always*. Necessity of existence doth not *limit* infinity of perfection, but *shews that infinity necessary and eternal*. It would not be having an infinite and necessary understanding, (*i. e.* a *necessarily infinite understanding*) to be able to comprehend an infinity of things *at once, and for a little only*,

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and then to *wink* and *relax*: we must own that such an understanding must have had a comprehension of infinite things, (*i. e.* an *infinite comprehension*) necessarily and eternally. Thus then a *necessarily infinite intellect* must have had all objects necessarily and eternally in view, and under immediate prospect. And this is the main point gained. This is *infinite knowledge*! And such a Being must have had infinite knowledge by a *physical*, or *natural necessity*; even those who are least attentive must see that the terms all along imply it. But mark, *This is a physical necessity of perfection*, as it ought to be. To make the Being *free* here would be to make it *imperfect*: we might as well say, *free to exist necessarily or not*, as free to have infinite knowledge or not to have it.

The next thing to be considered is, that *this Being* having all things always and necessarily in view, must always and eternally *will* according to his infinite comprehension of things; that is, *must will* all things that are *wisest* and *best* to be done. There is no getting free of this consequence. If it can *will* at all it must *will* this way. To be capable of knowing and not capable of *willing* is not to be understood; and to be capable of *willing* otherwise than what is *wisest* and *best* contradicts *that knowledge* which is *infinite*. Infinite knowledge must direct the *will* without the error. Here then is the *origin of moral necessity*, and that is really of *freedom*: for the Being is not determined to this constant and eternal act of *willing*, by a *physical energy* or *power* constantly acting, but from the knowledge of the *eternal aptitudes* and *agreeableness of things* to each other; or in other words, from the intuition of the *eternal relations* of its own *ideas*, which are the *archetypes* of things. Indeed to *will* by a physical necessity, or by the *determination*

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and *impulse* of an external physical cause, is, when nearly considered, a direct contradiction; it is not to *will*, but to be *involuntarily determined*, the same as to say *to will whether a thing wills or not*, or *to will against the will*. Perhaps it may be said, when the *divine will* is determined from the consideration of the *eternal aptitudes of things*, it is *as necessarily determined*, as if it were *physically impelled*, if that were possible. But it is unskilfulness to suppose this an objection. The great principle is once established, *viz.* That the *divine will* is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things, instead of being physically impelled: and after that the *more strong* and *necessary* this determination is, the *more perfect* the *Deity* must be allowed to be. It is this that makes him an *amiable*, an *adorable Being*, whose *will* and *power* are constantly, immutably, determined by the consideration of what is *wisest* and *best*, instead of a *surd Being* with *power*, but without *discerning* or *reason*. It is the beauty of this necessity that it is as strong as *fate* itself, with all the advantage of *reason* and *goodness*. This *constant act of willing* proceeds from his *knowledge*; it is true; but as proceeding from knowledge, it is to be considered as *determined by knowledge*; and knowledge must be considered as having a *priority of nature*, though not of *time*. Hence the wonderful nature of the *divine will*, that it is both *immutable*, as proceeding from a *necessary physical perfection*; and yet *infinitely rational*, as being the issue of *infinite* and *true knowledge*, or the knowledge of all truth. It is strange to see men contend that the *Deity* is not free, because he is *necessarily rational*, *immutably good* and *wise*; when a *man* is allowed still the perfecter Being, the more fixedly and constantly his will is determined by reason and truth. *Liberty*, as I have said before, *consists in being determined*

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terminated by moral motives (the more unerringly and constantly the better) in opposition to being *physically impell'd* (which indeed takes away the act of willing, or any act, properly speaking) and in *self-determination* by the power of the will amidst the *indifference* of physical circumstances. And let it be here remembered that all this follows easily and without the trouble of such a long deduction, when once it is shewn that there is a *necessity of infinite perfection*, that is, of a *Being infinitely perfect*, which appears from what has been said above; for since all this is a perfection, it must be in *that Being*. And who, though ever so much engaged on the opposite side, will venture expressly to say that *to be determined by moral motives* is not a perfection? Or to be *self-determined* by the power of the will, where physical circumstances are *indifferent*, in order to effect a wise and good purpose, is not a perfection?

But to go forward, if next we consider the actions of this Being as exerted upon his creatures in consequence of this eternal act of willing, they are (*as in consequence of that*) guided by the absolutely greatest *council and wisdom*, and therefore performed in the *fittest time, manner, circumstances*. But what is chiefly to the present purpose is, that though vast power is exerted, as in *moving* the heavenly bodies, for instance, yet it is exerted without *struggle, effort or contention of strength*, so to say. *Ease and difficulty* are not applicable to *infinity of power*: they are the marks of our limitation, but vanish here. That power would not be infinite, by which one thing were done *smoothly*, and another thing with *rugged labour and toil*. Let him who hath the term [*infinite power*] often in his mouth, consider only the import of it. *To perform* is equally easy as *to will* to this Being, and that without a figure, but upon the foot of reason and argu-

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ment. All this is still implied in *necessary infinity of perfection*. And this at length will help us to conceive that *even the actions of this Being* no more change the manner of his existence *than his willing them*, there being no *emotion, stress or contention* in performing the effect that might occasion an *alteration*. Nor can they be considered as the manner of his existence; since they are *temporary, successive* (as in the motions of matter) and *not necessary*, as it must be.

We shall better conceive this, if we consider *why*, and *how*, our *manner of existence* is constantly changed; and this particular deserves our attention. In short, this happens in our bodies from *motion, relative situation, and a constant flux of parts*; from all which an immaterial Being must be free. In our minds the manner of existence is changed from a *constant succession of ideas*, and the occurring of *new objects, new desires*, and the *willing new effects* to be produced. This happens from the finiteness of our minds. If we have any *compass* of thought, knowledge, ideas, will, it must be by the *successive admission of new objects*, into the mind. In an *Infinite Mind* it is quite the reverse of this: all things must be always and eternally in view, whence no *new object* of desire can happen, nor therefore *change in the will* (which is the great source of the change of the manner of existence in our minds); and though the actions are performed *in time*, and commensurately with the *successive existence* of creatures, yet this is without *change of thought, motion*, or any kind of *alteration*: it is without calling the attention from *other things*, to apply it to *that thing*; or calling the power from *other places* to apply it in *that place*. This is a wonderful superiority of nature; so far above our way, that we are struck with admiration at the thought;

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thought : and yet the certainty of the conclusion will make one contemplate it with pleasure.

It was from these considerations that *Boëtius* defines the eternity of God to be *vitæ interminabilis tota simul & perfecta possessio* (De consol. phil. lib. 5. prof. 6.) for in a necessarily infinite intellect all things must be always and necessarily present ; from necessary infinity of knowledge all the purposes of wisdom and reason must be willed by one indefinient act : no new object can offer to the understanding, no mutability can happen therefore to the will, nor therefore can there be any rising or falling of pleasure and happiness. And this is indeed *interminabilis vitæ tota simul & perfecta possessio* ; which coincides with this, *That the manner of necessary existence is itself necessary, and necessarily the best.* *Quod* (says this Philosopher) *ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet ; nam quicquid vivit in tempore, id præsens à præterito in futurum procedit : nihilque est in tempore constitutum, quod totum vitæ suæ spatium pariter possit amplecti.* This is undeniably a mark of imperfection to live by change, to lose what is past, to want what is yet to come, and to place infinite happiness in a succession of things, though all pleasant. If any state were good, why should it pass ? If any thing will be pleasant, why should it not be present ? Why should it be first in expectation, a minute in enjoyment, and then in reflexion only ? This, I say, is plainly a mark of imperfection ; it is our own state ; and therefore to be denied concerning a *Mind* infinitely perfect. If the *Roman CONSUL* had gone into the sceptical ways of thinking now fashionable, he would not have left us such a noble, such a philosophical, such an exalted idea of the Divine Mind. See here *Dr. CLARKE's Demonstrat.* Part. 1. Prop. 5.

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Lastly, To obviate the main thing objected : from all this we may see that when *God* created the Universe, as there was no *new object* of knowledge presented to his *Intellect*, nor *new desire* to his *Will*, so there was no *new difficulty* started to his *Power* ; since, as was above shewn, to *perform* must be equally easy to necessary infinity of power, as to *will* the performance. The creation of a world, the superintendence of his own works, the methods of Providence, and the whole scheme of procedure, especially with respect to rational Beings, were no *novelties* to him, but what he had in view, *familiar* (if I may so say) from eternity. Let it be observed here (lest I should be forced to make unnecessary repetitions) what I have shewn above to be the import of a *necessarily infinite Intellect*. In a word, after we have once more considered that, if there be *a necessity for any Being*, it must be for *infinite Being* ; and if there be a necessity for *any perfection*, it must be for *infinite Perfection* (it cannot be for *infinite* diminished by *any quantity*, in either case) : after this, I say, it would be a low, unphilosophical prejudice to think that *God* could be lonely, and without entertainment, before the existence of his own effects, or put to any difficulty by them after they existed ; that he could have bettered his condition by them, or that it would have been worse without them.

I cannot end this note, tho' already too long, without saying something of the *unsuccessive existence* of the *Deity*, or of his *unsuccessive eternity*. This is an extremely metaphysical speculation, and there hath been much controversy about it. What we may say safely in it will also be easily seen, I humbly conceive, from what goes before. There is certainly no succession of *ideas*, *desires*, *will*, in the *infinite or necessary Mind* ; and therefore no *change* or
mutability

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mutability in it. This follows when it is shewn that the manner of existence of a necessarily existing mind must be itself necessary and immutable, of which I have given two different demonstrative proofs above (N^o 6 and 7.) Thus there is really no actual succession in the manner of *God's existence*, that is, in his eternity, nay, not after the existence of a material world. The changes and successions that then happen, happen to something else not to HIM. And yet, since the *successive* or *changing existence* of creatures is co-existing with the *unsuccessive* and *immutable existence* of the *Deity*, we may see that this *co-existence* might have been ages sooner, or that the *one* doth not exclude the *other*, nor is inconsistent with it, but as being infinitely greater, comprehends it. We see in another case, that tho' all *motion* (a mark of finity, and itself successive) is in *space*, yet *space* itself is *immoveable*. It is, as I am apt to think, something like this *successive* and *unsuccessive existence*, both *co-existing*, which *Aristotle* means when he allows *time* to be *within* the *mundane limits*, but not *without them*. Consider his own words (*loco supra citat.*) κρόνον δὲ ἐστὶν ἀεὶ καὶ ἀκίνητος· κίνησις ὅ ἀνευ φύσεως σώματι δ' ἐστὶν· ἔξω ὃ τῷ οὐρανῷ δέδεικται ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν, δ' ἐνδεχέσθαι γενέσθαι σώμα. As if he had said, “ There is an *unsuccessive existence*, wherever there “ are not changes and vicissitudes by motion.” Thus far then, I think, we may go with clearness, and understand what we say. On the other hand, it is, I think, scarce intelligible, to apply this *successiveness* or *unsuccessiveness* (so to speak) to *time* itself, or to *eternity* abstractedly taken: these seem applicable only to Beings existing by themselves: therefore they seem capable of no alteration or change in themselves, abstracting from the Beings existing in them. If all *created Beings* were taken away, all

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possibility of any *mutation*, or *succession* of one thing to another would appear to be also removed. Abstract succession in eternity is scarce to be understood. What is it that succeeds? One minute to another perhaps? [*—velut unda supervenit undam.*] But when we imagine this, we fancy that the *minutes* are things separately existing, which keep on their own course, tho' there were no Being at all existing. This is the common notion, and yet it is a *manifest prejudice*. Time is nothing but the *existence* of created, successive Beings and eternity the *necessary existence* of the Deity. Therefore if this necessary Being hath no change or succession in his nature, his existence must of course be unsuccessive.

We seem to commit a double over-sight in this case : first we find succession in the *necessary nature and existence* of the Deity himself, which is wrong, if the reasoning above be conclusive: And then we ascribe *this succession* to eternity, considered abstractedly from the *Eternal Being*, and suppose it [*—one knows not what*] a thing subsisting by itself, and flowing one minute after another. This is the work of *pure imagination*, and contrary to the *reality* of things. Hence the common metaphorical expressions, “Time *runs* apace.” “Let us *lay hold* on the present minute :” and the like. The Philosophers themselves mislead us by their *illustrations*. They compare *eternity* to the motion of a *point*, running on for ever, and making a *traceless* infinite line. Here the *point* is supposed a *thing actually subsisting*, representing the *present minute*, and then they ascribe *motion* or *succession* to it; that is they ascribe *motion* to a mere non-entity, to illustrate to us a *successive eternity*. Hence all the perplexities of a *past eternity*, made up of *finite successive parts* : and hence the contradiction of a *punctum stans* ;
though

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though in this case a *punctum stans* is no more a contradiction than a *punctum movens*: for in truth the *punctum* is nothing at all, either to stand still or move forward. As to the expression *nunc stans*, by which some school-men have chosen to describe eternity; it certainly implies opposite ideas, if applied to our existence, or if our manner of existence be applied to the Deity. For then we make [*nunc*] a relative term, which hath a reference to *past* and future. But this is a wrong application; and if once we allow an *all-perfect Mind* which hath an eternal, immutable, and infinite comprehension of *all things, always* (and allow it we must) the distinction of *past* and *future* vanishes with respect to *such a Mind*; and the expression *nunc stans* will appear to have propriety. In a word, if we proceed step by step, as above, the eternity or existence of the Deity will appear to be, *Vitæ interminabilis tota simul & perfecta possessio*, how much soever this may have been reckoned a paradox hitherto.

All this diffuse reasoning *may* (for the sake of memory) be comprised in two or three sentences. For, first, An infinitely perfect *Mind* must have a perfect comprehension of *all things, always*: and then, *this Mind* must always *will* what is infinitely reasonable, according to this infinite knowledge. From these two propositions it follows, That there can be no succession of *ideas*, nor change of *will*, in *such a MIND*. And, lastly, it must be as *easy* to Infinite Power to *perform* according to the rule of infinite reason as to *will* the performance; for supposing *difficulty* denies *infinity* of power. And hence the *actions* of such a Being occasion *no change* in the manner of his existence; and yet, as *directed* by infinite reason, they cannot be *physically necessary*.

Thus

Thus we are come to the end of this tedious Enquiry concerning the Immateriality of the human soul, where the nature of the subject hath carried us through all the most abstruse and difficult points of natural Philosophy. The whole is submitted to the judgment of the Candid Reader. If any thing of importance hath been discovered, which may give a contrary turn to the present prevailing sceptical notions; this, with the variety and difficulty of the many things treated of, will, I hope, plead my excuse for such mistakes as do not affect the main design.

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